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I. INTRODUCrION
Successful defense of actions for injunctive relief and damages brought by
terminated dealers, distributors and franchisees' frequently turns upon selection of the
best procedural posture for defending the case. A reading of the complaint in these
cases will usually reveal equities weighing heavily in favor of the dealer who claims
to have been suddenly and mercilessly cut off from its only source of supplies after
long and faithful service and good performance on behalf of the heartless and greedy
manufacturer. 2 The area of terminated dealer litigation is one in which conflicting
public policies also exist. These conflicting policies include the strong public policy
in favor of a manufacturer's right to sell to whomever it wishes and consequently to
select the persons through whom it will sell its product, the public policies represented
by the antitrust laws and by private enforcement of those laws,3 the public policy in
favor of arbitration as a method of resolving disputes, 4 and the public policies
1. Although the terms dealer, distributor, and franchisee are each capable of different meanings this Article's
analysis applies to each. The law applicable to a dispute, however, may depend upon the status of the plaintiff, such as
when a franchise protection statute or a dealer protection act is applicable. Moreover, in certain areas, such as the law
governing injunctive relief, the outcome of litigation can be different depending upon which of these categories includes
the plaintiff. A distributor that carries many lines may have great difficulty in obtaining preliminary injunctive relief to
prevent the termination of a distributorship agreement for a line of goods that represents but a small portion of its sales.
See, e.g., Grand Light & Supply Co. v. Honeywell, Inc., 80 F.R.D. 699, 702 (D. Conn. 1978) (motion for a preliminary
injunction against the termination of a distributorship agreement denied because plaintiff failed to show substantial harm
resulting from the termination; plaintiff derived only $115,000 of a $6 million annual operation from the defendant's
product line).
2. For elaborate descriptions of these equities, see Brown, Franchising-A Fiduciary Relationship, 49 Tec. L.
REv. 650 (1971); Gellhom, Limitations on Contract Termination Rights-Franchise Cancellations, 1967 DuKE L.J. 465,
467-73. A successful reliance upon these equities is found in Semmes Motors v. Ford Motor Co., 429 F.2d 1197, 1205
(2d Cir. 1970), which affirmed a preliminary injunction against termination of a dealership. It should be noted, however,
that the Second Circuit limited Semmes to its facts in Jack Kahn Music Co. v. Baldwin Piano & Organ Co., 604 F.2d 755,
761 (2d Cir. 1979). But see Ryko Mfg. Co. v. Eden Servs., 759 F.2d 671, 673 (8th Cir. 1985); Roso-Lino Beverage
Distribs. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 749 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1984) (citing Semmes and holding that loss of distributorship
which was the livelihood of husband and wife for years was irreparable harm).
3. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 342-44 (1979); United States v. Topeo Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610
(1972).
4. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 22-25 (1983).
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represented by the strict standards governing the availability of injunctive relief.5
The purpose of this Article is to survey the most common issues and strategies
in the defense of such cases. This Article will also show certain pitfalls to avoid in
setting up a distribution system and in drafting franchise or dealership agreements. 6
The first section of this Article discusses the dealership agreement. This contract
between the parties is the starting point for identifying their respective rights and
responsibilities. Many of the issues in terminated-dealer litigation involve the central
provisions of the dealer agreement: the duration of the agreement, notices required to
be given under it, nonrenewal and termination provisions, forum selection clauses
(including arbitration agreements), and limitations upon remedies. The second section
of this Article discusses bodies of substantive law that apply to disputes arising upon
termination of dealers. The third section of this Article discusses remedies typically
sought in terminated-dealer cases (preliminary injunction, specific performance, and
damages) as well as the procedural arguments that may be employed to defend a
terminated-dealer case. All of these subjects are treated in the context of the typical
"wrongful termination" case in which a distributor has received notice of nonrenewal
or termination of its agreement and files suit in state or federal court seeking
injunctive relief, damages, or both. Additionally, in many instances, counsel will be
contacted by the manufacturer before a decision is made to send notice of nonrenewal
or termination.
II. THE FIRST STEP: ANALYSIS OF THE DEALERSHIP AGREEMENT
Frequently, the best defense to a terminated-dealer action is found in the
dealership contract itself and is thus difficult for the plaintiff to overcome. 7 A dealer
5. Mason County Medical Ass'n v. Knebel, 563 F.2d 256, 261 n.4 (6th Cir. 1977) (rejecting "possibility of
success on the merits" as one of four standards for preliminary injunctive relief, and requiring that "the plaintiffs must
demonstrate a strong or substantial likelihood or probability of success on the merits." (emphasis in original)).
6. The drafting of distribution agreements is discussed in Van Cise, A Franchise Contract, 14 AsNusr BuLL. 325
(1969). A checklist of facts and questions to be reviewed with a client contemplating a prospective dealership termination
or nonrenewal is provided at the conclusion of this Article, infra p. 998.
7. For example, under Ohio law, an unambiguous written agreement does not become ambiguous simply because
its operation will work a hardship on one of the parties. S & M Constructors v. City of Columbus, 70 Ohio St. 2d 69,
71,434 N.E.2d 1349, 1351 (1982) (citing Ohio Crane Co. v. Hicks, 110 Ohio St. 168, 143 N.E. 388 (1924)). Moreover,
cases have held that a plaintiff's failure or refusal to read the language of an agreement does not release the plaintiff from
obligations under it. Stanley A. Klopp, Inc. v. John Deere Co., 510 F. Supp. 807, 811 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (holding that
plaintiff dealer whose contract had been terminated could not recover future profits after manufacturer breached dealership
agreement because of provision barring recovery of future profits upon termination of dealership), aff d mem., 676 F.2d
688 (3d Cir. 1982). Accord Operating Eng'rs Pension Trust v. Gilliam, 737 F.2d 1501, 1504 (9th Cir. 1984); Quality
Foods v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 715 F.2d 539, 542 (1Ith Cir. 1983); Saavedra v. Donovan, 700 F.2d 496, 500 (9th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 892 (1983); Mercury Coal & Coke v. Mannesmann Pipe & Steel Corp., 696 F.2d 315,
318 (4th Cir. 1982); Vernon v. Drexel Burnham & Co., 52 Cal. App. 3d 706, 714, 125 Cal. Rptr. 147, 151 (1975)
(reversing denial of a petition for arbitration in which the plaintiff contended that he was unaware of the arbitration clause
because he did not read it).
Furthermore, not only is the intention of the parties to a written contract to be ascertained from the writing itself, but
also "it is their intention as it existed at the time the contract was executed which must control rather than any subsequent
intention tailored to complement an individual's posture once an agreement has gone sour." New Eng. Merchants Nat'l
Bank v. Iran Power Generation & Transmission Co., 502 F. Supp. 120, 127 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). Accord Payroll Express
Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 659 F.2d 285, 291 (2d Cir. 1981); Corenswet, Inc. v. Amana Refrigeration, 594
F.2d 129, 132 (5th Cir.) ("As is so often the case with franchise and distributorship relationships, the termination clause
in the standard form contract was of little interest or concern to the parties so long as things were going well between
them."), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 938 (1979).
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agreement usually includes the following terms and conditions that are frequently
significant during litigation: the duration of the agreement; dealer requirements by
way of satisfactory performance under the agreement; notice requirements; integra-
tion clauses; provisions regarding nonrenewal or termination, both as to the grounds
for such action and as to the method by which it should be accomplished; forum
selection provisions, including arbitration agreements; and limitations upon remedies.
A. The Duration of Distributorship Agreements
Ordinarily the duration of a distributorship is specified in writing, and is for a
definite term. However, much litigation has resulted from the fact that many
distributorships or exclusive sales agency contracts are oral or are written without
reference to a term. The better practice is for the dealer agreement to specify in
writing the duration of the dealer's appointment, the method of termination, the
period of notice required, and the method of giving the notice required.
When a dealer agreement is oral, or is silent as to its duration, the plaintiff dealer
typically claims inadequate notice of termination, detrimental reliance (by expendi-
tures for improvements to its facilities, and by purchases of large quantities of
inventory or spare parts) upon the defendant manufacturer's continuation of the
distributorship, and possible ruin due to sudden, unexpected cancellation. The dealer
may then argue that its actions in anticipation of continued required efforts on its part
should protect it from an abrupt or premature termination. This argument may be
supported by cases holding that contracts providing for termination upon the occur-
rence of a specific event are not terminable at will and may not be terminated except
upon the occurrence of the specified event. 8
Courts do not favor contracts of perpetual or unlimited duration; if a contract is
silent as to its term, courts will not imply that a contract is of unlimited duration. 9 In
8. See, e.g., Ehrenworth v. Stuhmer & Co., 229 N.Y. 210, 128 N.E. 108 (1920) which involved a distributorship
contract that provided that it was to last "as long as the plaintiff and Stuhmer & Co. remained in business," id. at 214-15,
128 N.E. at 108. In rejecting the defendant's contention that it was not bound by the agreement because the contract lacked
mutuality, the court found that the agreement had "every element of a contract" including a term governing its
"duration," id. at 218, 128 N.E. at 110. The fact that the duration was for as long as the parties remained in business
posed no problem because "this court has had no difficulty in approving contracts made to last through the life of one
of the parties." Id. at 220, 128 N.E. at 110. Accord Warner-Lambert Pharmaceutical Co. v. John J. Reynolds, Inc., 178
F. Supp. 655, 662-63 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), affd per curiam, 280 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1960); Ketcham v. Hall Syndicate, 37
Misc. 2d 693,699,236 N.Y.S.2d 206, 212 (Sup. Ct. 1962) (rejecting plaintiff's attempt to terminate a contract to produce
and deliver cartoons on the ground that the contract contained an indefinite term because the contract was not indefinite
as to its duration), affd mem., 19 A.D.2d 611,242 N.Y.S.2d 182 (1963); United Chem. & Exterminating Co. v. Security
Exterminating Corp., 246 A.D. 258, 259, 285 N.Y.S. 291, 292 (1936) (an agreement providing that it was to continue
in full force and effect until cancelled by the consent of both the parties was not terminable at will, "even though it is
impossible to predict exactly when the contingency will occur by which it will be terminated.").
Recently the Second Circuit reviewed these cases in determining that "New York's policy against perpetual
commitments" does not apply to agreements that provide for termination upon occurrence of specified events. Payroll
Express Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 659 F.2d 285, 291-92 (2d Cir. 1981). Therefore, since most distribution
agreements include provisions regarding termination upon the occurrence of listed events, the rule against perpetual
contractual commitments should not apply to such agreements.
9. William B. Tanner Co. v. Sparta-Toman Broadcasting Co., 716 F.2d 1155, 1159 (7th Cir. 1983). Accord
United States Surgical Corp. v. Oregon Medical & Surgical Specialties, 497 F. Supp. 68, 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (a perpetual
obligation is not inferred from the absence of date of termination; if parties intend perpetual duration, they must expressly
say so; if no duration is stated, contract is for a reasonable time, in this case, four to five years); Brownsboro Rd.
Restaurant, Inc. v. Jerrico, Inc., 1985-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 66,561 (Ky. App. 1984).
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Haines v. City of New York, 10 one of the leading cases on the subject, the New York
Court of Appeals held that contracts of exclusive agency or distributorship are
terminable at will."t Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit has noted, "Courts are
reluctant to interpret contracts providing for some perpetual or unlimited contractual
right unless the contract clearly states that that is the intention of the parties."' 2
Similarly, the Third Circuit has stated, "A franchise is not a marriage for life." 13
Most modem authorities agree that dealer agreements are terminable at will.' 4 In
Aaron E. Levine & Co. v. Calkraft Paper Co.,I s for example, the court, in a suit by
a paper broker against a paper mill and its parent corporation for alleged breach of
contract and alleged wrongful termination of the distributorship, held that a distrib-
utorship contract was terminable at will and that reasonable notice of termination was
given.' 6 Rejecting the concept of a common law duty not to terminate a distributor-
ship agreement, the court recognized that the Uniform Commercial Code requires that
reasonable notice be given, and that what constitutes that notice depends upon the
circumstances in each case. 17 The court then held that since the paper mill had advised
the distributor beginning ten months earlier of the likelihood of termination, and had
given him the names of competing mills that the distributor could call in an attempt
to get a new affiliation, plaintiff had sufficient notice to enable him to find a new
source of supply and thus had reasonable notice of the termination, even though
formal notice of termination had never been given.18
More recently, the Ninth Circuit, using an analysis similar to that set forth in
Aaron E. Levine & Co., relied upon the Uniform Commercial Code19 to decide Zidell
Explorations v. Conval International, Ltd.20 The court applied principles usually
The opinion in Tanner also contains a discussion of the distinction between disputes over expressing and disputes
arising from omission in contract interpretation. "That is, the problem of interpreting the meaning which parties intend
contractual terms to have is distinct and should be considered separately from the problem of construing the scope of a
contract." William B. Tanner Co. v. Sparta-Toman Broadcasting Co., 716 F.2d 1155, 1158 (7th Cir. 1983) (emphasis
in original). See also Joe Regueira, Inc. v. American Distilling Co., 642 F.2d 826, 829-30 (5th Cir. 1981) (granting
summary judgment against plaintiff wholesale distributor whose alleged oral agreement with defendant had been
terminated on 30 days' notice; court distinguished, under Florida law, between indefinite contract (one wholly lacking in
reference to its duration) that was terminable at will upon reasonable notice, and a perpetual contract that may continue
perpetually under an agreed duration term). Cf. C.A. May Marine Supply Co. v. Brunswick Corp., 557 F.2d 1163, 1165
(5th Cir. 1977) (distinguishing between construction and interpretation of contract in dealer's wrongful termination
action); Haines v. City of New York, 41 N.Y.2d 769, 773,364 N.E.2d 820, 823 (1977) ("Having determined the duration
of the city's obligation, the scope of its duty remains to be defined.").
10. 41 N.Y.2d 769, 364 N.E.2d 820 (1977).
11. Id. at 772, 364 N.E.2d at 822 (1977). Accord Northeastern Wholesalers v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp.,
24 Misc.2d 165, 198 N.Y.S.2d 945,946 (Sup. Ct. 1960) (dismissing an action involving an exclusive sales contract which
said that it was to continue so long as the plaintiff's sales in the assigned areas constituted a reasonable percentage of the
defendant's total production; the contract was held to be of indefinite duration and therefore terminable at will). Cf.
Copy-Data Sys., Inc. v. Toshiba Am., Inc., 755 F.2d 293, 301 (2d Cir. 1985).
12. William B. Tanner Co. v. Sparta-Toman Broadcasting Co., 716 F.2d 1155, 1159 (7th Cir. 1983).
13. Bateman v. Ford Motor Co., 302 F.2d 63, 66 (3d Cir. 1962), quoted with approval in Milos v. Ford Motor
Co., 317 F.2d 712, 716 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 896 (1963).
14. Annot., 19 A.L.R.3d 196 (1968).
15. 429 F. Supp. 1039 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
16. Id. at 1051.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 336-57 for a discussion of the Uniform Commercial Code's application to
distribution agreements.
20. 719 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1983).
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applied to the question of termination of distributorship agreements without a
specified duration: If the agreement does not contain a definite ending date, it is
terminable at will by either party subject only to the obligations of reasonable notice
and good faith.2' Although the court in Zidell Explorations indicated that fulfillment
of the notice and good faith requirements presents a jury question,22 summary
judgment is appropriate to resolve this issue when there are no disputed issues of
material fact.23 These cases also raise the issue of whether the notice period is
sufficient to enable the terminated distributor to search for or obtain alternative
sources of supply. That issue is treated in the next section of this Article.
Some courts apply an exception to the termination-at-will rule, the recoupment
doctrine, when the dealer has made a substantial investment in reliance upon
continued performance under the distributorship agreement. 24 Two Eighth Circuit
cases decided on the same day are illustrative. McGinnis Piano & Organ Co. v.
Yamaha International Corp.2 held that distribution agreements which contain no
provisions for duration or termination contain an implied provision of reasonable
duration when the dealer has made substantial investments in reliance upon the
agreement. Additionally, the notice period must afford the dealer a sufficient
opportunity to recover its investment. The court defined this period as a "period of
time necessary to close out the franchise and minimize losses." 26 The principle
underlying the recoupment doctrine is that a reasonable duration will be implied in a
dealer agreement to allow the dealer to recover its initial investment.27 The question
of reasonable duration is for the jury.28 Under the recoupment theory, however, the
measure of damages is limited to the unrecouped investment, and includes neither lost
future profits nor normal operating expenses. 29
Ag-Chem Equipment Co. v. Hahn, Inc.,30 another Eighth Circuit case, made
clear that the doctrine of recoupment applies only when the contract is terminable at
will3 ' and only to "a distributorship requiring one, large, initial investment." ' 32 As
these decisions demonstrate, the doctrine of recoupment is a limited exception to the
termination-at-will rule.
21. Id. at 1473-74.
22. Id.
23. FED. R. Cw. P. 56(c); RJM Sales & Mktg. v. Banff Prods. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1368 (D. Minn. 1982) (under
Minnesota law, no "wrongful termination" of wine distributor because unambiguous termination clause requiring thirty
days written notice created a contract terminable at will and did not require cause for termination; summary judgment
granted to defendant).
24. See generally Gellhom, supra note 2, at 479; Comment, Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code and
Franchise Distribution Agreements, 1969 DurE L.J. 959, 997; Matheus v. Tombstone Pizza Corp., Bus. FRANcH. GUID
(CCH) 1 7619 (Wis. App. 1981).
25. 480 F.2d 474, 479 (8th Cir. 1973) (applying Minnesota law).
26. Id. at 479.
27. Id. See also Schultz v. Onan Corp., 737 F.2d 339, 346-47 (3d Cir. 1984); W.K.T. Distrib. Co. v. Sharp Elecs.
Corp., 746 F.2d 1333, 1335-36 (8th Cir. 1984); Matheus v. Tombstone Pizza Corp., Bus. FRAcH. GumE (CCH) 7619
(%Vis. App. 1981).
28. McGinnis Piano & Organ Co. v. Yamaha Intl Corp., 480 F.2d 474, 481 (8th Cir. 1973).
29. Id. at 48142.
30. 480 F.2d 482 (8th Cir. 1973) (reviewing cases from various jurisdictions).
31. Id. at 487, 492.
32. Id. at 487.
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A third line of cases holds that distribution agreements are terminable only upon
reasonable notice. In other words, a contract granting a dealership for an indefinite
duration continues for a reasonable time, and is not terminable at will. Perhaps the
leading case is Des Moines Blue Ribbon Distributors v. Drewrys Ltd.,33 an action by
a beer distributor against the brewery for damages resulting from cancellation of the
beer distributorship agreement. There, the court held that the cancellation without
notice by the brewery gave rise to damages equal to the amount of sales that the
distributor would have made during a reasonable time period following receipt of
notice of termination of the distributorship agreement.3 4 The court rejected the
defendant's argument that the agreement was terminable at will, holding that it "will
continue for a reasonable time and may be terminated without cause only upon
reasonable notice. ' 35 The court reasoned that damages are recoverable for the period
of reasonable notice that was not given.36 Sometimes courts apply a hybrid of two of
the above rules, and hold that a contract is terminable at will if reasonable notice is
given. 37
Although distributorship agreements should be terminable at will if they do not
specifically provide a period of duration, the manufacturer, in anticipation of future
termination possibilities, should plan for the contingency of litigation. Ordinarily, the
manufacturer is better served by ensuring its customers continuous service. Although
a distribution agreement should properly be considered to be terminable at will,
interests in uninterrupted service to customers and preparation for litigation make it
prudent for the manufacturer to provide reasonable notice of termination.
B. The Significance of Notice Requirements
Notice requirements in distribution agreements serve several purposes. First,
requiring notice before termination helps to minimize the distributor's losses by
giving the distributor the opportunity to seek alternative sources of supply, liquidate
inventory, avoid being stuck with large quantities of product or spare parts that he will
not be able to market effectively, and make other necessary adjustments to his
business. Conversely, the notice of termination informs the distributor of the ap-
proaching fact of cancellation, and triggers his duty to mitigate damages. A notice
period also helps to maintain service to the customers of the distributor and the
manufacturer by enabling both to plan how best to serve customers in the future. In
these ways, the notice provisions of a contract provide the parties with certainty in
their relationship.
33. 256 Iowa 899, 129 N.W.2d 731 (1964).
34. Id. at 908-09, 129 N.W.2d at 737.
35. Id. at 906, 129 N.W.2d at 736.
36. Id. at 908-09, 129 N.W.2d at 737. Accord Corenswet, Inc. v. Amana Refrigeration, 594 F.2d 129, 139 (5th
Cir.) (citing Drewrys and holding that a claim "based on inadequate notice would not entitle [plaintiff] to injunctive relief"
because "the manufacturer's failure to give proper notice is adequately remediable at law."), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 938
(1979).
37. McCasland v. Prather, 92 N.M. 192, 196-97, 585 P.2d 336, 340-41 (Ct. App. 1978). In that case the court
stated that § 2-309 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides that "a contract is terminable at will upon reasonable
notification." Id. at 197, 587 P.2d at 341. The dissent argued that the contract was terminable at will, relying in part upon
the law of distributorship contract terminations. Id. at 197-98, 585 P.2d at 341-42.
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In general, a party that terminates an agreement need not state the reasons for
termination, unless the contract itself requires it do so. 38 In Contemporary Mission v.
Famous Music Corp.,39 the Second Circuit held that a written notice constituted
adequate compliance with the notice requirement in a contract granting the exclusive
right to distribute certain records in the United States:
Famous also maintains that, even if there were a breach, Contemporary is barred from
asserting it, because it failed to adequately comply with the notice requirement contained
in the Crunch agreement. We find this argument unpersuasive... it would be hyper-
technical to upset the verdict on the ground that the notice was insufficient. We decline
to construe the notice provision as if it were a common law pleading requirement under
which every slip would be fatal. The purpose of the written notice requirement was to
permit Famous within 30 days to cure any material breach.40
The Second Circuit's reluctance to entertain a "hypertechnical" construction of
a notice provision is a typical judicial response. 41 The dissent in Contemporary
Mission vigorously disputed the majority's reasoning regarding notice of breach, and
stated that a provision permitting a cure of a material breach within thirty days after
receipt of written notice of such breach should preclude recovery unless such notice
has been given. 42
Further, notice is not invalidated by the fact 43 that it is not sent by the method
required in the agreement. The Fifth Circuit so held in Sports Center v. Riddell,
Inc.,44 in which a sports equipment manufacturer terminated its dealer agreement by
a letter sent by ordinary mail, instead of "by registered mail" 45 as required by the
distributor agreement.
The general rule is that the termination of a distributorship of an indefinite or
unspecified term must be preceded by reasonable notice.46 The Ninth Circuit in Sierra
Wine & Liquor Co. v. Heublein, Inc.47 reasoned that a reasonable notice requirement
is appropriate for a distributorship with no express duration, and that the lack of such
notice supported a right to recover six months' profits.
38. Measday v. Kwik-Kopy Corp., 713 F.2d 118, 126 n.6 (5th Cir. 1983) (quoting RzsrxATe4Err (SEco.ND) oF
Co.mcrs § 248 comment b (1979)).
39. 557 F.2d 918, 925 (2d Cir. 1977).
40. Id. at 925 (footnotes omitted; emphasis added).
41. See, e.g., McGowan v. DM Group IX, 7 Ohio App. 3d 349, 455 N.E.2d 1052 (Franklin County Ct. App.
1982).
42. Contemporary Mission v. Famous Music Corp., 557 F.2d 918, 928-29 (2d Cir. 1977).
43. However, it is an issue of fact whether the manufacturer provided proper notice before termination, and this
issue can preclude the grant of summary judgment. Carlson Mach. Tools v. American Tool, 678 F.2d 1253, 1263 (5th
Cir. 1982).
44. 673 F.2d 786 (5th Cir. 1982).
45. Id. at 792. Accord Dixon v. American Indus. Leasing Co., 162 W.Va. 832, 836-37, 253 S.E.2d 150, 153
(1979).
46. Copy-Data Sys., Inc. v. Toshiba Am., Inc., 755 F.2d 293, 301 (2d Cir. 1985); First Flight Assocs. v.
Professional Golf Co., 527 F.2d 931, 935 (6th Cir. 1975) ("contracts silent on time of termination are generally terminable
at will by either party with reasonable notice;" five month notice was held reasonable). This principle has been called "the
majority rule" in Sierra Wine & Liquor Co. v. Heublein, Inc., 626 F.2d 129, 131 (9th Cir. 1980). See generally Annot.,
19 A.L.R.3d 196 (1968); Matheus v. Tombstone Pizza Corp., Bus. FRANcii. GUIE (CCH) 7619 (Vis. App. 1981)
(collecting cases).
47. 626 F.2d 129, 131-32 (9th Cir. 1980).
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The sufficiency of the period of time for notice depends upon the circumstances
of each case. One court has held that notice of approximately ten months was
sufficient in that case, but emphasized that the circumstances of each case are
important, and cited two cases involving distributorships of thirteen years duration,
in which notices of four months and of two weeks were upheld.48 Some cases have
held that a six month period of time is sufficient to give the terminated distributor time
to obtain alternative supplies. 49
C. Nonrenewal and Termination Provisions
This section of the Article deals with the methods of accomplishing termination
or nonrenewal decisions. A fundamental distinction must be drawn between nonren-
ewal and termination of a distribution agreement. Nonrenewal of an agreement
implies the expiration of an agreement by its own terms, whereas termination is the
affirmative act of ending an agreement. The difference in the two concepts is
significant because it implies a difference in the burden of proof if there is a
disagreement about the legality or justification for the action. To show that a
nonrenewal decision was unjustified or unlawful, the burden should be on an
aggrieved distributor. In contrast, in a termination situation, the burden of persuasion
does not shift to the defendant manufacturer, but the defendant manufacturer may
have the burden of going forward with evidence to support a termination decision.
There may also be differences regarding notice requirements.50 Courts recognize the
distinction between termination and nonrenewal with varying degrees of precision.5'
From the standpoint of drafting a dealer agreement or of setting up a distribution
system, the manufacturer should demonstrate a strong preference for a nonrenewal
system. Mutual termination provisions should be included as well to cover situations
such as the death or incapacity of the principals of the dealer; any substantial change
in the ownership, control, or management of either party; failure to pay indebtedness
when due; dishonesty; bankruptcy or insolvency; and litigation between the parties.
48. Aaron E. Levine & Co. v. Calkraft Paper Co., 429 F. Supp. 1039, 1050-51 (E.D. Mich. 1973).
49. Newport Tire & Rubber Co. v. Tire & Battery Corp., 504 F. Supp. 143, 148, 152 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (in a case
handled by the author, the notice of termination offered the plaintiff six months of continued association with the defendant
to ease the plaintiff's transition to alternative forms of tire supply; the court concluded that a six month period would give
plaintiff sufficient time); Lee-Moore Oil Co. v. Union Oil Co., 441 F. Supp. 730, 737-39 (M.D.N.C. 1977) (two months
notice of intention not to renew agreement on the next upcoming anniversary date of the agreement, coupled with extension
of the plaintiff's supply for an additional six months, was sufficient to mitigate effect upon plaintiff; the court also rejected
the plaintiff's argument that a comparable source meant a source of a comparable brand); Bos Material Handling v. Crown
Controls Corp., 137 Cal. App. 3d 99, 104, 186 Cal. Rptr. 740 (1982) (in another case handled by the author, a one month
notice of non-renewal was softened by an offer to defer expiration of the agreement by an additional month).
50. Fern & Klein, Restrictions on Termination and Nonrenewal of Franchises: A Policy Analysis, 36 Bus. LAw.
1041, 1043 (1981).
51. See, e.g., Spray-Rite Serv. Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 684 F.2d 1226, 1233 n.2 (7th Cir. 1982), aff'd on other
grounds, 465 U.S. 752 (1984); Brattleboro Auto Sales v. Subaru Inc., 633 F.2d 649, 650 n.2 (2d Cir. 1980); J.H.
Westerbeke Corp. v. Onan Corp., 580 F. Supp. 1173, 1184 (D. Mass. 1984) ("At the outset, and to put this matter into
perspective, this is not a dealer termination case. The challenged activity here is Onan's decision not to renew Westerbeke
as its distributor."); Pitney-Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 517 F. Supp. 52, 64 (S.D. Fla.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 237 (1981)
(where agreement used terms "expiration" and "termination" they have "distinct, if not mutually exclusive,
meanings.").
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Three issues remain with respect to the enforcement of termination or nonre-
newal provisions. First, must such provisions be followed? Second, who must be
satisfied that the provisions for termination are met; is the standard objective or
subjective? Third, are termination provisions the exclusive means by which an
agreement may be terminated? The first question is easily answered; the cases
typically hold that termination provisions must be followed.5 2 For example, when a
distribution agreement required that disputes between the parties be submitted to
arbitration prior to termination, the Second Circuit strictly enforced the conditions of
that termination provision, and held that until the parties arbitrated their dispute, a
preliminary injunction against the attempted termination was proper.5 3 Applying a
classic benefit of the bargain analysis from the law of contracts, the court held that
the plaintiff was entitled to have the defendant follow the termination procedures . 4
Failure to comply with termination provisions is a breach of contract. 55
The next issue raises the question whether the appropriateness of a termination
or nonrenewal is subject to an objective or subjective standard. If a distributorship
agreement is considered to be akin to a contract for personal services, then the test of
adequate performance should be whether the manufacturer in fact is satisfied, and not
whether he ought to be satisfied.5 6 However, the distribution agreement may not
permit termination upon the subjective dissatisfaction of the terminating party, but
instead require application of an objective test (i.e., whether a reasonably prudent
manufacturer, acting honestly, fairly, and in good faith would be dissatisfied). 57 The
only basis for this special rule for distribution agreements is that they require the best
efforts and personal services of the dealer in order to make them effective. 58
The final issue regarding enforcement of termination provisions is whether such
provisions constitute the exclusive method of terminating a distribution agreement.
The best discussion of this subject is found in the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Olin Corp.
v. Central Industries.5 9 The court summarized "the Corbin view" that a termination
provision is the exclusive means of contract termination, and "the Williston view"
that a termination provision does not bar termination for material breach unless it is
52. Guinness-Harp Corp. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 613 F.2d 468, 473 (2d Cir. 1980); WICO Corp. v. Willis
Indus., 567 F. Supp. 352, 354 (N.D. I11. 1983) (rejecting an argument that the manufacturer did not breach distributorship
agreements because the distributor failed to agree on sales quotas and to meet the sales quotas required by the agreements;
"the termination procedures themselves still had to be followed.").
53. Guinness-Harp Corp. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 613 F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1980).
54. Id. at 473.
55. Maykuth v. Adolph Coors Co., 690 F.2d 689, 694 (9th Cir. 1982); McCarty v. Mercurymetalcaft Co., 372
Mich. 567, 127 N.W.2d 340 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 952 (1965).
56. Canonsburg Supply & Equip. Co. v. John Deere Indus. Equip. Co., 388 F. Supp. 135, 137 (W.D. Pa. 1975)
(defendant chose not to renew dealer agreements; nonrenewal was not a breach because the contract required defendant's
personal satisfaction, which was not obtained). Cf. Corenswet, Inc. v. Amana Refrigeration, 594 F.2d 129, 138 (5th Cir.)
(a contract clause permitting termination without cause "can have the salutary effect of permitting parties to end a soured
relationship without consequent litigation."), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 938 (1979).
57. This was the test approved in Carlson Equip. Co. v. International Harvester Co., 710 F.2d 481, 482-83 (8th
Cir. 1983) (affirming judgment for plaintiff dealer in the amount of $200,000, and holding that an objective standard
applied to termination of the agreement).
58. See infra text accompanying notes 517-18, discussing the nature of distribution agreements as it bears upon the
grant or denial of injunctive relief.
59. 576 F.2d 642 (5th Cir. 1978).
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by its terms exclusive. 6° The court chose the Williston view. 61 This rule is a
reasonable one in view of the fact that it is so difficult for the parties to an agreement
to conceive of every possible ground for termination that may later arise.
D. The Choice of Law Provision
Distributorship agreements, like most commercial agreements of any length or
complexity, contain a standard provision expressly designating the law to be applied
in construing the agreement. 62 These contractual choice of law agreements serve a
number of important purposes: First, they add certainty to the parties' relationship by
removing any doubt as to what law applies. Second, they foster uniformity among
dealers in various states by assisting in the imposition of similar obligations on the
part of both the manufacturer and the dealers, regardless of the location of the
dealerships. Third, by permitting the manufacturer to select the law of a state with
which it is familiar, these provisions tend to effectuate the policy in favor of
upholding contracts by preventing frustration of the parties' expectations by unknown
or unforeseen legal doctrines from one state or another. A manufacturer trying to
maintain uniform standards and communicate uniform expectations to its dealers
scattered in many states can do so only if it is confident of the application of the law
of a single state to its relations with its dealer network.
Generally, the choice of law by the parties to a contract will be upheld so long
as there is a reasonable or substantial relationship of that state to the parties or to the
contract or transaction at issue and there is no violation of a fundamental policy of a
state with a greater interest in the determination of the particular issue than the chosen
state.63 However, in terminated dealer cases, the courts have also held that they need
not address or enforce choice of law provisions if the laws of the two states in issue
are substantially the same.64
The courts of most states respect choice of law provisions, 65 even when the law
60. Id. at 647-48.
61. Id. at 648.
62. A typical provision of this sort reads: "This agreement shall be construed according to and the legal relations
between the parties governed by the laws of the state of New York."
63. RFsrATL- E;r (SEcoND) CoNsucr oF LAws § 187 (1971); Schulke Radio Prods. v. Midwestern Broadcasting Co.,
6 Ohio St. 3d 436, 453 N.E.2d 683 (1983).
64. Camfield Tires v. Michelin Tire Corp., 719 F.2d 1361, 1366 n.2 (8th Cir. 1983); New Linen Supply v. Eastern
Envtl. Controls, 96 Cal. App. 3d 810, 817 n.2, 158 Cal. Rptr. 251, 255 n.2 (1979) (reversing the denial of a petition to
compel arbitration in a distributor's action against the manufacturer); Berman v. Dean Witter & Co., 44 Cal. App. 3d 999,
1003, 119 Cal. Rptr. 130, 133 (1975) ("Although the contract contains a provision that its enforcement shall be governed
by New York law . .. it appears that whichever law is applied the result is the same since in all material aspects the law
of both jurisdictions is the same."). Ganer v. DuPont Glore Forgan, Inc., 65 Cal. App. 3d 280, 286-87, 135 Cal. Rptr.
230, 233 (1976), also held that a choice of forum provision is "a more drastic thing than a choice of law provision,"
although both are usually respected by California courts. The court also stated: "The choice of law provision is not invalid
as a matter of law, because contained in a contract of adhesion." Id. at 287, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 233. See also Coastal Steel
v. Tilghman Wheelabrator Ltd., 709 F.2d 190, 202 (3d Cir.) (a choice of law problem "need not be resolved in this case
either, for each jurisdiction whose law is arguably relevant takes substantially the same position with respect to
enforceability of contractual forum selection provisions."), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 938 (1983); Bus Material Handling v.
Crown Controls Corp., 137 Cal. App. 3d 99, 105, 186 Cal. Rptr. 740, 742 (1982) (case handled by the author, "the dealer
agreement contains a provision that its construction shall be governed by Ohio law. However, it is unnecessary to address
choice of law problems at this juncture since the result as to arbitrability would be the same in either jurisdiction.").
65. Smith, Valentino & Smith, Inc. v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 491, 494, 551 P.2d 1206, 1208, 131 Cal. Rptr.
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chosen is that of another country. 6 Federal circuit courts also enforce contractual
choice of law provisions.6 7 The Sixth Circuit has held68 that a choice of law
provision 69 designating Wisconsin law made applicable the substantive laws of that
state, including the Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law, a strict dealer protection
statute.7 0 In so holding, the court rejected the manufacturer's argument that the effect
of the choice of law provision was only to give meaning and effect to the language
of the agreement, rather than to be "governed" by the laws of the state of
Wisconsin. 71 In another case, the Eighth Circuit, upholding a trial court's refusal to
apply California substantive law on restrictive covenants in employment contracts,
held that California's law did not control because the agreement contained an express
choice of Minnesota law. 72 These results are in accord with the modem trend of
authority.
E. Forum Selection Clauses
It is a common practice to include in distributorship agreements a forum selection
clause providing that the courts of a particular country or state shall be the forum for
resolution of disputes between the parties.73 It is important that the forum selection
clause be contained in the distributorship agreement and not in a related or ancillary
agreement if it is intended that the forum selection clause should govern disputes
arising under the dealer agreement.7 4 This section of the Article reviews the major
374, 376 (1976) involved litigation over termination of an insurance agency agreement by which the plaintiff had been
appointed a managing general agent to represent an insurance company; in upholding a forum selection provision which
required any action arising out of the agreement to be brought in Philadelphia, the Supreme Court of California held that
contractual choice of law provisions are respected by California courts. Accord 33 Flavors of Greater Delaware Valley
v. Bresler's 33 Flavors, 475 F. Supp. 217, 226-28 (D. Del. 1979) (upholding choice of Illinois law in distributorship
agreement of Delaware franchisee).
66. In Mul-T-Lock Corp. v. Mul-T-Lock Ltd., 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,855 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), an antitrust
action by an exclusive distributor for termination of the distribution agreement was stayed pending resolution by the Israeli
courts of the manufacturer's contract action seeking a declaration that the agreement had been validly terminated. The
agreement contained a provision requiring that it be construed in accordance with Israeli law.
67. See, e.g., Kirby v. Chrysler Corp., 554 F. Supp. 743, 748 (D. Md. 1982) (following choice of Michigan law
contained in dealer agreements).
68. Boatland, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 558 F.2d 818 (6th Cir. 1977) (applying the Wisconsin Fair Dealership
Law).
69. That provision read: "This agreement and all of its provisions are to be interpreted and construed according to
the laws of the State of Wisconsin." Id. at 820 n. 1.
70. Id. at 822.
71. Id. at 821.
72. Medtronic, Inc. v. Gibbons, 684 F.2d 585 (8th Cir. 1982).
73. See generally Baade, An Overview of Transnational Parallel Litigation: Recommended Strategies, 1 R v. or
LrnGoAnoN 191,204-06 (1981); Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses in International and Interstate Commercial Agreements,
1982 U. I. L. REv. 133. These articles discuss the differences among the types of forum selection clauses: those which
are merely permissive and simply allow an action to be brought in a designated forum, and those which are mandatory
and exclusive, and require that a suit may only be brought in a particular forum.
74. Mead Corp. v. McNally-Pittsburg Mfg. Corp., 654 F.2d 1197, 1206 (6th Cir. 1981); Dorton v. Collins &
Aikman Corp., 453 F.2d 1161, 1166, 1168-69 (6th Cir. 1972) (arbitration provision was a material alteration and
therefore not part of the contract); Product Components v. Regency Door & Hardware, 568 F. Supp. 651 (S.D. Ind. 1983)
(motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction granted; forum selection clauses contained in plaintiff seller's
acknowledgement form and invoice materially altered the contract between the parties so that the defendant buyer was not
bound thereby); National Mach. Exch. v. Peninsular Equip. Corp., 106 Misc. 2d 458, 431 N.Y.S.2d 948 (Sup. Ct. 1980)
(the defendant, a Michigan buyer, was not bound by a forum selection clause contained in the order acknowledgement
of a New York seller because the order varied materially from the offer).
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cases regarding forum selection clauses, and notes the particular problems they create
in distribution agreements.
Two opinions of the United States Supreme Court have sanctioned the use of
forum selection clauses. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.,75 held that a forum
selection clause in a maritime towage contract between an American plaintiff and a
German defendant was valid and enforceable. The Supreme Court stated that public
policy favors the enforcement of such provisions and that such clauses are prima facie
valid and should be enforced unless the resisting party shows that enforcement would
be unreasonable and unjust, or that the clause is invalid as a result of fraud or
overreaching. 76 The other leading Supreme Court case is Scherk v. Alberto-Culver
Co. ,77 which recognized the general acceptability of a forum selection provision.
Certainly these provisions must be acceptable when inserted into a manufacturer's
transactions with its nationwide network of dealers. Further, it is well settled that
parties to an agreement may agree to submit to the jurisdiction of a particular court
for the resolution of controversies arising out of their contract, and may also agree as
to the manner and method of notice. 78 The interests promoted by such an arrangement
include the prevention of frivolous litigation instituted by a dealer, the selection of a
court more familiar with the law that is to be applied to the construction and
interpretation of the dealer agreement, and uniformity in the enforcement and
construction of the standard distributorship agreements.
In fact, the courts have upheld the enforcement of forum selection provisions in
dealer agreements. For example, Bense v. Interstate Battery System of America,79
affirmed the dismissal of a complaint for lack of proper venue in an action for
damages for violations of the antitrust laws. The plaintiff was a distributor for the state
of Vermont and certain portions of the state of New York; the defendant manufacturer
was located in Texas. The terminated agreement provided that any action arising from
the agreement could be brought only in Dallas County, Texas.80 The Second Circuit
held that the forum selection clause would be enforced under the principles of Bremen
and Scherk, and rejected the plaintiff's argument that a choice of law provision in the
agreement required the selection of Texas law, and that Texas venue law (which
disfavored forum selection clauses) was therefore applicable.81 Similarly, the Ninth
Circuit in Crown Beverage Co. v. Cerveceria Moctezuma, S.A.,82 dismissed a
75. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
76. Id. at 9-12. Accord Bryant Elec. Co. v. City of Fredricksburg, 762 F.2d 1192, 1196-97 (4th Cir. 1985)
(upholding forum selection provision; Virginia law applied); Pelleport Investors v. Budco Quality Theatres, 741 F.2d 273,
279 (9th Cir. 1984); Mercury Coal & Coke v. Mannesmann Pipe & Steel Corp., 696 F.2d 315, 317-18 (4th Cir. 1982)
(following Bremen; recognizing that both West Virginia and New York enforce forum selection clauses; reversing the grant
of an injunction against New York litigation of a claim for damages for breach of a contract for the purchase of coal).
77. 417 U.S. 506, 516 (1974).
78. National Equip. Rental v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315-16 (1964); Mercury Coal & Coke v. Mannesmann Pipe
& Steel Corp., 696 F.2d 315, 317 (4th Cir. 1982); Comprehensive Merchandising Catalogs v. Madison Sales Corp., 521
F.2d 1210, 1212 (7th Cir. 1975).
79. 683 F.2d 718 (2d Cir. 1982).
80. Id. at 719-20.
81. Id. at 721-22.
82. 663 F.2d 886, 888-89 (9th Cir. 1981). Accord Bankers Trust Co. v. Worldwide Transp. Servs., 537 F. Supp.
1101, 1103-04, 1111-12 (E.D. Ark. 1982) (enforcing forum selection provision choosing Mexican courts forcross claims
1985]
938 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46:925
plaintiff dealer's pendent contract claim on the ground that a forum selection clause
which chose Mexican courts was enforceable.
A useful case in the terminated dealer area is Garay v. Scott & Fetzer Co.,83 in
which the plaintiff vacuum cleaner distributor attempted to avoid a forum selection
clause in his written distributor agreement by arguing that the defendant's alleged
anticompetitive torts and alleged violations of the Maryland Antitrust Act were not
within that provision. The court transferred the action in accordance with the choice
of forum provision, which stated that the plaintiff must bring "any legal action against
The Company arising out of or related in any manner to this Distributor Agreement
or to the relationship and/or dealings between distributor and The Company" solely
in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio or the Court of
Common Pleas for Cuyahoga County, Ohio. 84
The California Supreme Court has upheld a forum selection clause that required
any action arising out of an insurance agency agreement to be brought in Philadelphia.
In Smith, Valentino & Smith, Inc. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County,85 the
court rejected the plaintiff's argument that because it had asserted claims couched in
tort terms, 86 the tort counts did not arise under a forum selection paragraph that
required litigation in Pennsylvania of any actions "with respect to any matters arising
under or growing out of this agreement. '"87 The court held that forum selection
clauses are valid and may be given effect in the absence of a showing that enforcement
of such a provision is unreasonable. 88 The opinion in Smith, Valentino & Smith is a
useful opinion with respect to a dealer agreement, because the insurance agency
agreement involved is in essence the same type of commercial contract as a
distributorship agreement.
Other courts do not look with the same favor upon forum selection clauses. 89 The
Tenth Circuit has held that the applicability of such a provision is itself an issue of
fact, and that it is not "vexatious for a party to raise this issue in a forum other than
the one designated in the venue selection clause." 90 In Cutter v. Scott & Fetzer Co.,91
a Wisconsin distributor succeeded in evading a forum selection clause because the
Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law supported the plaintiffs argument that public policy
favored the right to maintain the litigation in Wisconsin. 92
for amounts owed for services under a contract, and for quantum meruit, but denying enforcement for cross claim over
which the court exercised ancillary jurisdiction because it was inextricably intertwined with issues presented in complaint).
83. 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,051 (D. Md. 1979).
84. Id.
85. 17 Cal. 3d 491, 551 P.2d 1206, 131 Cal. Rptr. 374 (1976).
86. The plaintiff claimed breach of contract, intentional interference with advantageous business relationships, and
unfair competition. Id. at 494, 551 P.2d at 1209, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 376.
87. Id. at 497, 551 P.2d at 1210, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
88. Id. at 496, 551 P.2d at 1209, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 377.
89. See, e.g., Colonial Leasing Co. v. Pugh Bros. Garage, 735 F.2d 380, 382 (9th Cir. 1984) (under Oregon law,
a fine print take-it-or-leave-it forum selection clause in leasing contract given no effect). Kolendo v. Jerrell, Inc., 1980-81
Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,831 (S.D.W. Va. 1980) denied enforcement of a forum selection clause in a contract between the
plaintiff and his former employer. The court correctly described the effect of forum selection provisions as "pre-litigation
waivers of venue," id., but used reasoning applicable to many cases to deny enforcement of such a provision.
90. Hospah Coal Co. v. Chaco Energy Co., 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) T 64,635 (10th Cir. 1982).
91. 510 F. Supp. 905 (E.D. Wis. 1981).
92. Id. at 908. The court noted that the same forum selection clause was enforced in a Maryland ease, Garay v.
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The general rule is that "the question of the enforcement of forum selection
clauses is to be decided under federal law.' 93 However, there is a split among the
cases as to whether the enforceability of contractual forum selection clauses should
be determined under federal law or state law.94
The interaction between a forum selection clause and the two federal change of
venue statutes, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a) and 1406(a), presents another issue. A number
of cases have used these venue statutes to transfer a case in accordance with a forum
selection clause;95 section 1404(a) may also be used to transfer a case to a district
other than the one chosen under a forum selection clause. "Although forum-selection
clauses are usually upheld absent a showing of unreasonableness, the existence of
such a clause, if not mandatory, does not prevent the court from ordering a change
of venue under section 1404(a). " 9 6 Finally, "[c]onsideration of the criteria relevant
to a motion under section 1404(a) is an accepted procedure when evaluating a
forum-selection clause. '997
In cases in which the manufacturer does not wish to use arbitration as the method
of resolving disputes arising under the distributorship agreement, a well-drafted
forum selection provision is appropriate, and should be given effect. Following the
lead of the Supreme Court, the federal and state courts are increasingly willing to
enforce such provisions. 98
Scott & Fetzer Co., 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,051 (D. Md. 1979), but distinguished Garay on the ground that in
the Cutter case, "a substantial portion of the plaintiff's action is governed by a Wisconsin statute which was enacted to
protect the interests of persons such as the plaintiff." 510 F. Supp. at 909. However, if the provision at issue is an
arbitration agreement, rather than a forum selection clause, the result should not follow Cutter in view of the United States
Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982) and the recent Supreme Court decision in Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S.
1 (1984), discussed in notes 179 & 368 infra.
93. C. Pappas Co. v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 565 F. Supp. 1015, 1016 (D. Mass. 1983) (claims by a Massachusetts
wine distributor against its California suppliers were to be resolved in the California courts, under a forum selection clause
in the distributorship agreement; plaintiff's claims included violations of the federal antitrust laws and state law claims for
breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duties, tortious interference with prospective business relations, and violation of
the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act).
94. Coastal Steel Corp. v. Tilghman Wheelabrator Ltd., 709 F.2d 190 (3d Cir. 1983) collected the cases that
discussed this split of authority, but held that the court need not resolve the question, "for each jurisdiction whose law
is arguably relevant takes substantially the same position with respect to enforceability of contractual forum selection
provision." Id. at 202. See generally Note, Incorporation of State Law Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 78 Mitc. L.
REv. 1391 (1980).
95. C. Pappas Co. v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 565 F. Supp. 1015, (D. Mass. 1983) (defendant's motion to dismiss
or to transfer relied upon Fm. R. Ctv. P. 12(b)(3), and 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a); court referred also to section 1404(a)).
96. Credit Alliance Corp. v. Crook, 567 F. Supp. 1462, 1464 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (citation omitted). That opinion
held that a forum selection provision is not a waiver of a party's right to seek a transfer to another district for its own
convenience under section 1404(a) unless "that party's preselected forum is one that by the terms of the agreement 'is
assigned exclusive jurisdiction of cases arising under the contract."' Id. at 1465, quoting Plum Tree, Inc. v. Stockment,
488 F.2d 754, 758 n.7 (3d Cir. 1973). CreditAlliance contains an important lesson in drafting forum selection provisions;
it distinguishes between language that empowers state courts to adjudicate a matter, and language that provides that a state
is the exclusive or the only appropriate forum where the case may be heard. 567 F. Supp. at 1465.
97. Cutter v. Scott & Fetzer Co., 510 F. Supp. 905, 909 (E.D. Wis. 1981).
98. Bense v. Interstate Battery Sys. of Am., 683 F.2d 718, 721-22 (2d Cir. 1982) (terminated distributor's antitrust
claims held properly dismissed for lack of venue because forum selection agreement provided that exclusive venue was
to be Dallas County, Texas).
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F. Arbitration Agreements
Many distributorship agreements contain arbitration provisions. This discussion
of arbitration agreements follows the analysis of forum selection clauses because, as
the Supreme Court recognized in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. ,99 an arbitration
provision "is, in effect, a specialized kind of forum-selection clause that posits not
only the situs of the suit but also the procedure to be used in resolving the dispute."' 100
The benefits of an arbitration agreement l0 in a distributorship contract are that the
process is speedy, there is no trial by jury, the parties may specify the venue of the
arbitration as well as the type and size of panel that is to hear the case, and the
arbitration is a cheaper and more private proceeding than a court action.102
A common mistake made by the terminated dealer plaintiff is to ignore an
arbitration agreement and then resist the defendant manufacturer's attempt to compel
arbitration by raising thin arguments to defeat arbitration, instead of demanding a
speedy arbitration and perhaps contesting only the location of the arbitration. A
challenge to the venue of the arbitration may be raised either under the rules of the
American Arbitration Association 0 3 or under various principles governing contracts
of adhesion. 104
Under both state and federal law, there are strong policies favoring arbitration.
The federal policy derives from the United States Arbitration Act,10 5 which the United
States Supreme Court has recognized as embodying a "statutory policy of rapid and
unobstructed enforcement of arbitration agreements." 106 The federal policy regarding
arbitration also includes a policy that "requires a liberal reading of arbitration
agreements," 107 and a rule that "as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning
the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the
problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself of an allegation of
99. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
100. Id. at 519.
101. A typical arbitration provision is the standard broad form clause of the American Arbitration Association. Some
arbitration agreements also specify the number of arbitrators, the method of selecting the arbitrator or the panel, and
various other instructions concerning the consideration of the issues or the decision to be rendered.
102. Courts have expressed skepticism about the lengths to which parties sometimes go to delay arbitration, thereby
robbing the procedure of its advantages. Although arbitration "is often thought of as a quick and efficient method" to
resolve disputes, "cases involving arbitration clauses sometimes are best remembered as monuments to delay because of
the litigation and appeals antecedent to the actual arbitration." Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Duncan, 712 F.2d 270
(7th Cir. 1983) (quoting Standard Chlorine, Inc. v. Leonard, 384 F.2d 304, 305 (2d Cir. 1967)). Accord Merit Ins. Co.
v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 683 (7th Cir.) (condemning "an interminable chapter in the efforts of people who
have chosen arbitration and been disappointed in their choice to get to the courts-to which they could have turned in the
first instance for resolution of their disputes-to undo the results of their preferred method of dispute resolution"), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 1009 (1983).
103. American Arbitration Ass'n Commercial Arbitration Rule 11.
104. A case handled by the author, Bos Material Handling v. Crown Controls Corp., 137 Cal. App. 3d 99, 108, 186
Cal. Rptr. 740, 744 (1982), held "as a matter of law that the contractual provision requiring arbitration is neither contrary
to the reasonable expectations of Bos nor so unfair as to be unconscionable." The Court of Appeal then held that the
plaintiff dealer was entitled on remand "to an evidentiary hearing on whether the dealer agreement is adhesive and, if so,
whether the Ohio forum comports with the reasonable expectations of Bos or is unduly oppressive." Id.
105. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
106. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 23 (1983).
107. Id. at 23 n.27. Accord In re the Arbitration between Sharp Elecs. Corp. v. Branded Prods., 1984-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 1 66,314 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (state antitrust action was within terms of broad arbitration clause; federal policy
favoring arbitration preempted any state antitrust policy or law).
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waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability."10 8 Further, court litigation over
arbitrability of issues is discouraged. "Contracts to arbitrate are not to be avoided by
allowing one party to ignore the contract and resort to the courts. Such a course could
lead to prolonged litigation, one of the very risks the parties, by contracting for
arbitration, sought to eliminate."' 10 9
The leading cases stating the federal policy in favor of arbitration are the
Steelworkers Trilogy."10 One of the principles enunciated in the Steelworkers Trilogy
is that arbitration "should not be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance
that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted
dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage.""' The Steelworkers
Trilogy has been adopted by many states as part of their substantive law. 12 In
Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. v. Benjamin F. Shaw Co., 113 the Sixth Circuit, after
quoting from the Steelworkers Trilogy, recently explained that
[lI]ower federal courts have applied these principles to cases arising out of commercial
transactions as well as those related to labor disputes. Where a commercial contract
contains a broad arbitration provision covering all controversies arising under the agree-
ment, arbitration is ordered unless the parties seeking to avoid it can show that the
particular dispute is expressly excluded." 4
States which have announced strong public policies in favor of arbitration as a
means of settling disputes include California, 115 Ohio,116 and New York." 7 Given the
strong public policies in favor of arbitration and the utility of arbitration as a device
to resolve dealer disputes, the presence of a broad arbitration provision" 8 in a dealer
108. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983).
109. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 7 (1984).
110. The Steelworkers Trilogy consists of United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960);
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); and United Steelworkers of Am.
v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). The Supreme Court also recognized in the Steelworkers Trilogy
that "in the commercial case, arbitration is the substitute for litigation." United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960).
I11. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960).
112. See, e.g., Service Employees Int'l Union v. County of Napa, 99 Cal. App. 3d 946, 952, 160 Cal. Rptr. 810,
813 (1979) ("the Steelworkers Trilogy has effectively become a part of California law.")
113. 706 F.2d 155 (6th Cir. 1983).
114. Id. at 160.
115. Doers v. Golden Gate Bridge Highway & Transp. Dist., 23 Cal. 3d 180, 189, 588 P.2d 1261, 1266, 151 Cal.
Rptr. 837, 842 (1979); Vernon v. Drexel Burnham & Co., 52 Cal. App. 3d 706, 716, 125 Cal. Rptr. 147, 153 (1975).
116. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Shuff, 67 Ohio St. 2d 172, 174, 423 N.E.2d 417, 418 (1981) ("Arbitration
is favored because its purpose is to avoid needless and expensive litigation.") (quoting Springfield v. Walker, 42 Ohio
St. 543,546 (1885)); Bellaire City Schools Bd. of Educ. v. Paxton, 59 Ohio St. 2d 65, 70, 391 N.E.2d 1021, 1024 (1979)
(citing numerous cases supporting "a strong policy in favor of prompt resolution of disputes in accordance with written
contractual arbitration clauses."); Campbell v. Automatic Dye & Prods. Co., 162 Ohio St. 321, 329, 123 N.E.2d 401,
405 (1954) ("It is the policy of the law to favor and encourage arbitration and every reasonable intendment will be indulged
to give effect to such proceedings and to favor the regularity and integrity of the arbitrator's acts.") (citations omitted).
117. Cooper v. Ateliers de la Motobecane, S.A., 57 N.Y.2d 408,411, 442 N.E.2d 1239, 1240, 456 N.Y.S.2d 728,
729 (1982); Mobil Oil Indonesia v. Asamera Oil Ltd., 43 N.Y.2d 276, 281-82, 372 N.E.2d 21, 23, 401 N.Y.S.2d 186,
188 (1977); Maye v. Bluestein, 40 N.Y.2d 113, 118, 351 N.E.2d 717, 720, 386 N.Y.S.2d 69, 72 (1976); Nationwide
Gen. Ins. Co. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 37 N.Y.2d 91, 95, 332 N.E.2d 333, 335, 371 N.Y.S.2d 463, 466 (1975).
118. The presumption of arbitrability is much weaker with a narrowly drawn arbitration agreement. A good
discussion of this point is found in Twin City Monorail v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 728 F.2d 1069, 1072-73 (8th Cir.
1984).
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agreement coupled with discovery should establish that a terminated dealer's causes
of action are arbitrable.
In this regard, there are two lines of cases which are relevant. First, there are
those cases in which the claims of terminated dealers have been held arbitrable. The
leading case is Becker Autoradio U.S.A. v. Becker Audoradiowerk GmbH," 9 in
which the Third Circuit reversed the denial of a motion to compel arbitration in an
action by an exclusive distributor against a West German automobile radio manu-
facturer. The plaintiff sought damages for the defendants' failure to renew its
exclusive distributorship agreement. The defendant manufacturer sought arbitration
under a written arbitration provision of the distribution agreement that provided for
arbitration in Germany of "all disputes arising out of and about this agreement.' 120
The trial court rejected the defendants' argument that the dispute was one "arising out
of" the agreement, and held that the dispute between the parties arose out of a
separate and distinct oral agreement that the manufacturer would renew the distrib-
utorship agreement if the plaintiff fulfilled certain conditions such as opening a branch
office, establishing some exhibits at its expense, and performing without compen-
sation certain administrative functions. 121
The Court of Appeals reversed the order denying arbitration, using reasoning
that would be applicable to most disputes over arbitrability of claims between a
terminated dealer or franchisee and a defendant manufacturer. Emphasizing the strong
policy in favor of arbitration, the court stated that the arbitration provision would be
liberally construed, and that any doubts would be resolved in favor of arbitration.12
The court then held that the controversy concerning whether the defendant manufac-
turer "agreed to extend the 1974 Agreement beyond its 1976 expiration date"'' 23 was
one which arose out of the contract because the subject of termination and renewal
was covered by the contract itself. 124
Since most dealer agreements cover the subjects of termination and renewal, a
broad arbitration provision should require arbitration of disputes over the causes,
validity, or circumstances of termination or nonrenewal. 2 5 Phrased another way, the
test under a broad form arbitration provision is whether the issues presented in the
plaintiff's complaint arose from the relationship between the plaintiff and defen-
dant. 126
A second case of broad applicability is Bos Material Handling v. Crown
Controls Corp.,127 which reversed the denial of a petition to compel arbitration under
119. 585 F.2d 39 (3d Cir. 1978).
120. Id. at 42.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 44-45, cited with approval in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,
25 n.31 (1983).
123. Id. at 45.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 46.
126. Id. Accord Berman v. Dean Witter & Co., 44 Cal. App. 3d 999, 1004-06, 119 Cal. Rptr. 130, 133-34 (1975)
(reversing denial of defendants' petition to compel arbitration and to stay proceedings, and holding that broad arbitration
provision required arbitration of tort claims of negligence and breach of a fiduciary relationship).
127. 137 Cal. App. 3d 99, 186 Cal. Rptr. 740 (1982). The author represented the defendant manufacturer in that
Case.
[Vol. 46:925
1985] DEFENDING TERMINATED DEALER LITIGATION
a broad arbitration provision in a dealer agreement. The case is useful because it dealt
with causes of action that frequently appear in dealer litigation. The plaintiff's causes
of action, each of which complained of the unilateral termination of the dealer
agreement, consisted of tortious breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing,
interference with economic relations, fraud, unfair competition, restraint of trade
under California's antitrust statute, and intentional interference with prospective
advantage and contract. 128 The court held that all causes of action except the state
antitrust claim were arbitrable because the agreement "has specific provisions
relating to extension and termination. 'j 29 However, the court found that under
California law the selection of Ohio as the forum for arbitration could be an invalid
provision of the agreement, and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on that issue. 130
As with claims under the Sherman Act, the court held that the state antitrust claim was
not arbitrable, 131 but must be stayed pending arbitration of the other controversies
arising out of or relating to the dealer agreement.1 32
Numerous other cases have dealt with claims by terminated dealers, and have
held them to be arbitrable. Cases from the First Circuit, 133 the Second Circuit, 134 and
numerous federal district court 35 and state court opinions136 have held that claims by
terminated dealers or claims under exclusive sales contracts are arbitrable.
A second line of cases that is helpful in arguing for arbitration of a terminated
dealer's claims are cases, which through broad construction, fully enforce arbitration
128. Id. at 104, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 742.
129. Id. at 106, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 743.
130. Id. at 108, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 744.
131. Id. at 109-11, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 745-46.
132. Id. at 111, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 747. Accord NPS Communications v. Continental Group, Inc., 1984-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 66,297 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (where antitrust claim was severable or its validity unclear, federal antitrust claim was
stayed pending arbitration).
133. Hilti, Inc. v. Oldach, 392 F.2d 368 (1st Cir. 1968) (requiring arbitration of claims by a terminated sales
representative that defendant had terminated the franchise and dealership without proper and just cause; court rejected the
plaintiff's argument that its claim (based upon a recently enacted Puerto Rican dealer protection statute) was outside the
scope of the arbitration provision, and held that the broad language of the arbitration agreement required the conclusion
"that the parties intended to arbitrate all disputes arising thereunder irrespective of whether they were foreseeable at the
time of agreement." Id. at 372-73).
134. Roso-Lino Beverage Distribs. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 749 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1984); Necchi Sewing Mach.
Sales Corp. v. Necehi, S.P.A., 369 F.2d 579, 582 (2d Cir. 1966) (claims for unfair competition, unauthorized trademark
use and abandonment of distributorship agreement held to be within an arbitration provision as "arising out of or in
connection with" it).
135. Else v. Inflight Cinema Int'l, 465 F. Supp. 1239, 1243 (W.D. Pa. 1979) (ordering arbitration of claims for
violation of California Franchise Investment Law and fraudulent misrepresentation where distributor agreement provided
for arbitration of "any dispute or controversy arising hereunder"); Kastanias v. Nationwide Auto Transporters, 390 F.
Supp. 720, 722 (W.D. Pa. 1975) (cause of action for "unjust termination" of agency agreement that was renewable from
year to year held to be arbitrable under the "broad language" ofthat provision); Zenol, Inc. v. Carblox, Ltd., 334 F. Supp.
866, 869 (W.D. Pa. 1971) (claim for damages for wrongful termination of exclusive sales agency contract is within the
scope of arbitration clause), aff'd, 474 F.2d 1338 (3d Cir. 1973); Sumaza v. Cooperative Ass'n, 297 F. Supp. 345,
348-49 (D.P.R. 1969) (granting a motion to stay proceedings pending arbitration in an action by terminated agent under
written distributorship contract for sale of meat products; dispute was based upon Puerto Rican Dealers Act).
136. New Linen Supply v. Eastern Envtl. Controls, 96 Cal. App. 3d 810, 158 Cal. Rptr. 251 (1979) (reversing denial
of defendant's petition to compel arbitration under an arbitration provision of a written distributor agreement; allegations
in complaint included unfair competition and fraudulent sales practices). That case further held that the defendant
manufacturer was entitled to invoke the provision in the contract requiring arbitration, despite the fact that it had declared
the contract terminated, id. at 815-16, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 254. Accord Kastanias v. Nationwide Auto Transporters, 390
F. Supp. 720, 722 (W.D. Pa. 1975); Zenol, Inc. v. Carblox, Ltd., 334 F. Supp. 866, 869 (W.D. Pa. 1971), aff 'd, 474
F.2d 1338 (3d Cir. 1973).
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agreements, 137 or hold that arbitration provisions with broad language include tort
claims. As Judge Learned Hand wrote fifty years ago: "If the clause is general in
form, it makes no difference what may come up under it.' '138 Both state139 and federal
opinions' 4° have held that broad form arbitration provisions include tort claims as well
as contract claims.
In summary, the argument in favor of arbitration should be constructed as
follows:
(1) There is a strong public policy in favor of enforcing written arbitration agreements in
the jurisdiction involved;
(2) The governing principal is that arbitration should be compelled unless it can be said
with positive assurance that the arbitration provision is not susceptible to an inter-
pretation that covers the asserted dispute.' 41
(3) The arbitration provision in the agreement contains broad language of the type that has
been held to include the plaintiff's claims;
(4) The testimony on deposition or at hearing established that the claims underlying the
complaint are within the arbitration provision;
(5) The case law has held that similar claims by terminated distributors are arbitrable.
G. Limitations and Exclusions of Damages
Many distributorship contracts contain provisions that seek to limit liability for
damages, or to exclude recovery of certain types of damages upon termination of the
agreement. Perhaps the leading case is Stanley A. Klopp, Inc. v. John Deere Co.,142
in which the trial court held that a clause disclaiming liability for lost profits or other
losses precluded the recovery of lost profits as damages for an alleged wrongful
termination. 143 The court held that as a matter of law this provision was not
unconscionable.1 44 The court further rejected the plaintiff's argument that the limi-
tation clause did not apply in the case of wrongful termination. 145
In Phillips Machinery Co. v. LeBlond, Inc.146 a provision of a machine tool
137. See Guinness-Harp Corp. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 613 F.2d 468, 470-71 (2d Cir. 1980) (an agreement
that a distributor would not be terminated until disputes were submitted to arbitration, was enforceable by preliminary
injunction).
138. Shanferoke Coal & Supply Corp. v. Westchester Serv. Corp., 70 F.2d 297, 299 (2d Cir. 1934), aff'd, 293
U.S. 449 (1935), quoted with approval in Georgia Power Co. v. Cimarron Coal Corp., 526 F.2d 101, 106 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 952 (1975).
139. Berman v. Dean Witter & Co., 44 Cal. App. 3d 999, 1004-06, 119 Cal. Rptr. 130, 133-34 (1975) (reversing
denial of petition to compel arbitration and to stay proceeding, requiring arbitration of tort claims of negligence and breach
of a fiduciary relationship); Lewsadder v. Mitchum, Jones & Templeton, Inc., 36 Cal. App. 3d 255, 111 Cal. Rptr. 405
(1973) (reversing the denial of a petition to compel arbitration and to stay an action for intentional torts (fraud and libel)
under an "any controversy" arbitration agreement).
140. Blumberg v. Berland, 678 F.2d 1068, 1070-71 (11th Cir. 1982) (claims of breach of fiduciary duty, deceit,
negligence, and breach of contract held arbitrable in New York under an "any controversy" arbitration provision); In re
Oil Spill by Amoco Cadiz, 659 F.2d 789, 794 (7th Cir. 1981).
141. See the Steelworkers Trilogy discussed at notes 110-14, supra.
142. 510 F. Supp. 807 (E.D. Pa. 1981), aff'd mem., 676 F.2d 688 (3d Cir. 1982).
143. Id. at 809.
144. Id. at 810-11.
145. Id. at 811-12.
146. 494 F. Supp. 318, 323-24 (N.D. Okla. 1980). See also Cowin Equip. Co. v. General Motors Corp., 734 F.2d
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distribution agreement that excluded damages for lost profits resulting from cancel-
lation was held not to be unconscionable under Oklahoma law. Similarly, in Zunch
v. Artec International Corp.,147 the court held enforceable under California law a
provision which stated that upon termination, the defendant was not liable for
damages or for commissions, expenditures, investments or opportunities foregone.
As in Stanley A. Klopp, Inc., the court rejected a claim that this provision did not
apply to a cause of action for unlawful termination.148
A less restrictive provision was upheld in RJM Sales & Marketing v. Banfi
Products Corp.149 The provision limited liability to the distributor in the event of
termination to commissions on orders shipped within ninety days of the effective date
of termination.150 A provision which gives some remedy to the dealer rather than a
"no damages" provision, will be more readily upheld by the courts. "Similar
limitation of liability clauses between commercial parties have been held enforceable
repeatedly."' 5 '
H. Provisions for Repurchase of Dealer Inventory
A number of courts have upheld provisions regarding the repurchase of products
by the manufacturer from the distributor upon termination of the distributorship
agreement. In W.L. May Co. v. Philco-Ford Corp.,152 the Supreme Court of Oregon
rejected the dealer's claim that a provision in the distributorship contract giving the
manufacturer the option to repurchase any of its products sold to the distributor, was
unconscionable at the time of the formation of the contract, and that the manufac-
turer's refusal to repurchase the inventory rendered the termination provisions
unconscionable.153 Kirby v. Chrysler Corp. 154 held that an obligation to repurchase
a former automobile dealer's inventory of new vehicles was enforceable and that the
plaintiff was entitled to damages in storage charges and finance charges caused by the
defendant's failure to repurchase the vehicles within ninety days of the effective date
of termination of the dealer agreements.
Finally, Walnut Creek Pipe Distributors v. Gates Rubber Co. Sales Division,155
held that no implied covenant to repurchase would be found in a jobber distributor
contract, reasoning that courts will not rewrite harsh or inequitable contracts and that
contract terms will not be implied unless necessary.
1581 (lth Cir. 1984) (Uniform Commercial Code section governing unconscionability does not create a basis for the
recovery of damages in a suit in which the plaintiff equipment dealer argued that a noncancellation provision in the dealer
contract was unconscionable.).
147. 559 F. Supp. 961, 968 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
148. Id. at 968-69.
149. 546 F. Supp. 1368 (D. Minn. 1982).
150. Id. at 1375-76.
151. Id. Accord Cardinal Stone Co. v. Rival Mfg. Co., 669 F.2d 395, 397 (6th Cir. 1982) (under Ohio law, an
exclusive remedy provision in a sales contract prevented recovery of damages for plaintiff's detrimental reliance on the
defendant's conduct).
152. 273 Or. 701, 543 P.2d 283 (1975).
153. Id. at 705, 543 P.2d at 288.
154. 554 F. Supp. 743, 756-57 (D. Md. 1982); see also Motive Parts Warehouse v. Facet Enters., 774 F.2d 380
(10th Cir. 1985).
155. 228 Cal. App. 2d 810, 815, 39 Cal. Rptr. 767, 771 (1964).
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I. The Integration or Merger Clause
The integration or merger provision 156 is one of the most common and most
ignored sections of a distributorship agreement. It is also one of the provisions that
is potentially most useful to the manufacturer faced with a suit by one of its former
dealers. For example, in rejecting the plaintiff's argument that the district court erred
in finding that there existed a nonexclusive licensing agreement as a matter of law,
the Fifth Circuit held that the merger provision was determinative. 157 The Fifth Circuit
stated the classic reasoning concerning the enforcement of a merger provision: "[I]t
makes clear the intention of both parties that the agreement was to be the complete
and exclusive statement of terms so as to preclude the consideration of any evidence
as to consistent additional terms under U.C.C. 2-202(b).' 158 Similarly, in affirming
the entry of summary judgment for a defendant in an action brought by franchisees
of retail panelling stores against a general distributor, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit relied on a merger clause to agree with the district court
that the franchise agreements were not ambiguous. 159 In addition, the court held that
the integration clause and the parol evidence rule together showed that the district
court properly refused to consider minutes of a management meeting of the fran-
chisor, because the "franchise contracts state unequivocally that they embody the
final and exclusive understanding of the parties, and District law gives full effect to
that stipulation." 160
A similar analysis was employed by the Ninth Circuit in Golden Gate Accep-
tance Corp. v. General Motors Corp. 161 There, the court affirmed a grant of summary
judgment in an action by an automobile dealer, in which the plaintiff dealer attempted
to raise an issue of material fact by arguing about the dealer's understanding of the
terms of the agreement, and that an employee of the manufacturer had made certain
statements prior to execution of the agreement. 16 2 However, the Ninth Circuit rejected
both those arguments and the attempt to create a genuine issue of material fact.16 3
Accordingly, if the dealer agreement contains an integration clause, attempts by a
plaintiff dealer to avoid the unambiguous language in a dealer agreement should be
rejected.
In many terminated dealer cases, the sequence of the arguments of the parties
follows a similar pattern. First, the dealer argues that some conduct of the manufac-
turer constituted a "bad faith" or "wrongful" termination. The manufacturer then
responds by pointing to the language in the dealer agreement that justifies the conduct
taken by the manufacturer. 164 Next, the dealer replies that representatives of the
156. A provision of this type is customarily found in business contracts.
157. Franz Chem. Corp. v. Philadelphia Quartz Co., 594 F.2d 146, 148 (5th Cir. 1979).
158. Id. at 149.
159. Lee v. Flintkote Co., 593 F.2d 1275, 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The court quoted what it called "an express
merger clause."
160. Id. at 1281 (footnotes omitted).
161. 597 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1979).
162. Id. at 680-81.
163. Id. at 680.
164. This language may include provisions requiring the dealer to take certain steps on pain of termination, or
provisions permitting termination upon the occurrence of specified events.
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manufacturer orally agreed to the dealer's actions, or waived certain requirements of
the dealer agreement. It is these very claims that an integration clause can successfully
refute, without the necessity for a trial.
Nevertheless, it is possible to avoid the effect of integration clauses if the course
of dealings between the parties was extremely informal, or if there was fraudulent
conduct. For example, the Sixth Circuit has held that a written franchise contract was
not completely integrated even though it contained a merger clause. 165 In that case a
franchised dealer for motor homes claimed that there was an agreement that the dealer
could return unsold units to the manufacturer for full credit. The district court's
holding that the parol evidence rule barred evidence of the alleged repurchase
agreement was reversed. 66 The court of appeals observed that the parties had
conducted their transaction very informally and therefore, even though the written
dealer agreement contained an integration provision, 67 oral evidence of the supposed
repurchase agreement should have been admitted.
The rationale for rejecting an integration clause as a result of fraud was well
stated by the Virginia Supreme Court in Packard Norfolk, Inc. v. Miller,168 in which
the court held that fraud in the inducement of a contract rendered the entire contract
voidable. The court specifically applied this reasoning to an integration clause.' 69 The
same court also had held that even though a franchise contract disclaimed the
existence of a principal-agent relationship between a franchisor and its franchisee, an
agency relationship may still arise.' 70 Therefore, an integration clause must be
distinguished from a disclaimer; an integration provision serves to reject alleged
inconsistent agreements, but by its own terms does not operate as a definitive
limitation upon the parties' relationship.
III. THE SECOND STEP: THE BODIES OF SUBSTANTIVE LAW APPLICABLE TO
CLAIMED VIOLATIONS OF DEALERSHIP AGREEMENTS OR OTHER WRONGFUL
CONDUCT BY MANUFACTURERS
A variety of state and federal substantive laws may apply to dealer-manufacturer
disputes. State statutes include the Uniform Commercial Code, various dealer
protection acts, 17' the "baby Sherman Acts" enacted by most states,' 72 and in some
instances, state franchise 173 or deceptive trade practices' 74 statutes. In addition to this
165. Central Jersey Dodge Truck Center v. Sightseer Corp., 608 F.2d 1106 (6th Cir. 1979).
166. Id. at I11.
167. Quoted in full, id. at 1110.
168. 198 Va. 557, 564, 95 S.E.2d 207, 212 (1956).
169. Id. at 565, 95 S.E.2d at 213 (quoting other authority).
170. Murphy v. Holiday Inns, 216 Va. 490, 494, 219 S.E.2d 874, 878 (1975) (holding that defendant franchisor's
motion for summary judgment had been erroneously granted).
171. Wisconsin has the most restrictive state dealer protection act. See infra text accompanying notes 362-80.
172. See infra note 180.
173. For example, in 1980 California enacted the California Franchise Relations Act, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§
20000-20043 (West Supp. 1985). Among other provisions, the statute imposes good cause and notice requirements for
termination; section 20020 provides that there may be no termination before expiration of the term of an agreement except
for good cause. Other provisions restrict the ability to fail to renew a franchise (section 20025, requiring "at least 180
days prior written notice of its intention not to renew" as well as precluding enforcement of any covenant of the
nonrenewed franchisee not to compete with the franchisor or other franchisees), and require repurchase of resaleable
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state legislation, the state common law of contracts and torts, 175 as well as procedural
actions, such as preliminary injunctions, must be considered. However, the discus-
sion of state law in this Article focuses on the Uniform Commercial Code because it
is the law under which many dealer disputes are litigated. Significant applicable
federal laws include the antitrust laws, 176 the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act,1
77
current inventory of the franchisee in the event of termination or failure to renew a franchise other than in accordance with
the statute (§ 20035). However, the act applies only when a franchisee is domiciled in California, or operates its business
there. Bunch v. Artec Int'l Corp., 559 F. Supp. 961, 968 n.14 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). Cf. Grand Light & Supply Co. v.
Honeywell, Inc., 771 F.2d 672 (2d Cir. 1985)(relationship between distributor and manufacturer not a franchise within
state franchise act).
174. Although the applicability, scope of activities covered, and remedies available under state deceptive trade
practices statutes vary, most cases have rejected attempts by dealers to use state deceptive trade practices acts to provide
remedies for distribution changes or for termination. Steams v. Genrad, Inc., 752 F.2d 942 (4th Cir. 1984); Canada Dry
Corp. v. Nehi Beverage Co., 723 F.2d 512, 515-16, 520-22 (7th Cir. 1983) (reversingjury verdict of $200,000 awarded
to franchisee on its counterclaim for damages for violation of the Indiana Deceptive Franchise Practices Act); Red
Diamond Supply v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 637 F.2d 1001, 1007-08 (5th Cir.) (aff'mning grant of directed verdict motion
on plaintiff dealer's claim under Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
827 (1981); United Roasters v. Colgate-Paimolive Co., 649 F.2d 985, 991-92 (4th Cir.) (North Carolina unfair or
deceptive practices statute did not provide a remedy for ordinary breach of contract), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1054 (1981);
C. Pappas Co. v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 1985-1 Trade Cans. (CCH) 66,641 (E.D. Cal. 1985); Hydro Air of Conn., Inc.
v. Versa Technologies, Inc., 1985-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) $ 66,564 (D. Conn. 1984); Jobbers Warehouse Serv. v. Maremont
Corp., 453 F. Supp. 840, 842 (D. Mass. 1978) (granting a motion to dismiss a diversity action for failure to state a claim
because "while plaintiff complains generally about 'certain unfair and deceptive trade practices,' the gravamen of the
complaint is the cancellation by Maremont of Jobbers' distributorship" and it "is axiomatic that a change of distributors
is not in itself an unfair trade practice."); Zapatha v. Dairy Mart, 381 Mass. 284, 285,298-300, 408 N.E.2d 1370, 1374,
1379-80 (1980) (reversing trial judge's ruling that franchisee termination constituted an unfair method of competition and
unfair and deceptive act within the meaning of the Massachusetts deceptive trade practices statute); Reiter Oldsmobile v.
General Motors Corp., 378 Mass. 707, 710, 393 N.E.2d 376, 378 (1979) (rejecting automobile dealer's attempt to use
Massachusetts unfair or deceptive practices statute to enjoin automobile manufacturer's grant of another franchise in
plaintiffs market area; the court stated it "found no decisions of Federal courts or the FTC that condemn the grant of a
competitive franchise under" the Federal Trade Commission Act). These holdings are sound, in that the law of contracts
governs manufacturer-dealer relationships and state deceptive practices statutes should not be stretched so as to become
dealer protection acts.
Many of the state court interpretations of these unfair and deceptive trade practices laws look to section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982). In one terminated dealer action, the Fourth Circuit held that
federal antitrust law did not preempt application of the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act, and the jury should
have been permitted to determine those claims. Bostick Oil Co. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 702 F.2d 1207, 1219-20 (4th
Cir. 1983) (reversing grant of motion for directed verdict; holding that the state statute could reach unilateral action
(whereas section 1 of the Sherman Act does not), but that a duplicative damage award could not be permitted).
One circuit court has also held that the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051-1127 (1982) does not preempt the Wisconsin
dealer protection statute. Boatland, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 558 F.2d 818, 825 (6th Cir. 1977) rejected the argument
that the Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law interfered with the trademark registrant's right to grant a license for a definite term,
by requiring that the license continue in operation for an indefinite period of time.
The few cases that have applied a state deceptive trade practices act to permit a dealer to recover have distinguishing
features that limit them to their facts or to the language of the statute. For example, the 1975 amendments to the Texas
Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act, Tax. Bus. & CM. COE Am., § 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1985)
expanded the definition of "consumer" to include a "corporation," § 17.45(4), so that a treble damage cause of action
is available to a terminated dealer adversely affected by an unconscionable action or course of action, § 17.50. See Woo
v. Great Southwestern Acceptance Corp., 565 S.W.2d 290 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978) (distributor recovered treble the
purchase price paid for a distributorship, and attorneys' fees, under this statute).
175. See, e.g., Crues v. KFC Corp., 729 F.2d 1145 (8th Cir. 1984) (under Missouri law there was sufficient
evidence from which a jury could determine issues of fraudulent misrepresentation and damages in connection with the
purchase of franchised restaurants).
176. Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2. "Similar conduct often provides the basis for both
franchise law and antitrust violation charges." C.A. May Marine Supply Co. v. Brunswick Corp., 649 F.2d 1049, 1053
n.4 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1125 (1981).
177. 15 U.S.C. § 2801 (1984). A discussion of the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act is beyond the scope of this
Article. However, the Act does not forbid terminations or nonrenewals of gas station operators, so long as the requirements
of the statute are met. Compare Brungardt v. Amoco Oil Co., 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) T 65,829 (10th Cir. 1983)
(upholding the nonrenewal of a gas station lease and termination ofa franchise, and recognizing that the statute's permitted
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the Dealers' Day in Court Act,178 and the United States Arbitration Act. 179
A. The Antitrust Laws
1. Introduction
Under federal or state1 80 antitrust laws, a terminated dealer has an uphill struggle
terminations and nonrenewals "reflect intent to allow reasonable business judgments by the franchisor.") with Rogue
Valley Stations v. Birk Oil Co., 568 F. Supp. 337, 350 (D. Or. 1983) (collecting cases discussing circumstances under
which franchisor may be estopped from termination).
178. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-25 (1984). This statute is also known as the Automobile Dealer Franchise Act. It provides
in 15 U.S.C. § 1224 that it does not affect the federal antitrust laws, and in 15 U.S.C. § 1225 that it does not invalidate
state laws unless there is an irreconcilable express conflict. "But the Dealers' Act was intended to supplement the antitrust
laws, and every Dealers' Act violation will not necessarily amount to an actionable antitrust violation." Marquis v.
Chrysler Corp., 577 F.2d 624, 641 (9th Cir. 1978) (upholding grant of directed verdict on claim under section 1 of
Sherman Act even though there was a Dealers' Act violation). Sherman v. British Leyland Motors, Ltd., 601 F.2d 429,
447 n.31 (9th Cir. 1979) quoted this language and stated that the "converse, no doubt, is also true," i.e., every Sherman
Act violation is not also necessarily a Dealers' Act violation.
179. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1984). The United States Supreme Court recently held in Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465
U.S. 1 (1984) that a section of the California Franchise Investment Law, which required judicial determination of claims
under that statute, conflicted with the Federal Arbitration Act (which declared national policy favoring arbitration), and
thus violated the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. Accord Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 723 F.2d 155, 158 (1st Cir. 1983) (federal law preempted section of Puerto Rico Dealers' Act
which provided that an agreement to arbitrate a controversy regarding the dealers' contract was unenforceable), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part, 105 S. Ct. 3346 (1985); see Note, Arbitrability and Antitrust. Mitsubishi Motors Corp v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, 23 CotrM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 655 (1985).
180. Most states have "baby Sherman Acts" which seek to forbid certain anticompetitive practices that are intrastate
in their scope or effects. For example, California has the Cartwright Act, CAL. Bus. & PRor. Coos § 16700-16703 (West
1964); New York has the Donnelly Act, N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 340 (MeKinney Supp. 1975); Ohio has the Valentine Act,
Ofno REv. Coos ANN. §§ 1331.01-.99 (Page 1979 & Supp. 1984); West Virginia has the West Virginia Antitrust Act, W.
VA. Con § 47-18-1 to 47-18-23 (1980 & Supp. 1984). These statutes follow a common pattern; like California's
Cartwright Act, most state antitrust statutes are "patterned after the Sherman Act." Marin County Bd. of Realtors v.
Palsson, 16 Cal. 3d 920, 925, 549 P.2d 833, 835, 130 Cal. Rptr. 1, 3 (1976). "The state antitrust statutes, . . . , were
fashioned afterthe federal antitrust statutes .... Red Diamond Supply v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 637 F.2d 1001, 1003
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 827 (1981). Red Diamond is perhaps the most significant federal case applying a state
antitrust law (that of Louisiana) to distributorship problems. Accord Cowley v. Braden Indus., 613 F.2d 751, 756 (9th
Cir.) ("Because appellants have not cited, nor have we found, any authorities which have held conduct similar to
Aeromotor's to be unlawful under Arizona or Colorado antitrust law, we aflirm the judgment of the district court that there
were no state antitrust violations."), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 965 (1980); Uniroyal, Inc. v. Hoff & Thames, Inc., 511 F.
Supp. 1060, 1067 (S.D. Miss. 1981) ("In the absence of some relevant holding that Mississippi law condemns activity
which is not violative of the federal antitrust laws, summary judgment will be granted to Uniroyal on this claim.");
American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Delta Communications Corp., 408 F. Supp. 1075, 1114-15 (S.D. Miss. 1976) (where federal
antitrust claims were dismissed as a matter of law, court dismissed parallel claims under state antitrust statutes), aff'd,
579 F.2d 972 (5th Cir. 1978).
Most of the state statutes provide for some type of enforcement by the state attorney general, who is empowered to
seek injunctive relief and monetary penalties, e.g., W. VA. Con § 47-18-8 (1980) (providing for penalties "of not more
than the greater of a total of $100,000 or $500 per day for each and every date of said violation"). Many of these statutes
provide for double or treble damages, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. Coos § 16750 (West 1964) (treble damages); Oino REv.
Conm AsN. § 1331.08 (Page 1984) (double damages); VA. Coos § 18.2-499 (1982) (treble damages); W. VA. Coos
§ 47-18-9 (1980) (treble damages); and many of the statutes provide a damage provision patterned after section 4 of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15, e.g., Omo REv. Coos ANN. § 1331.08 (Page 1984); W. VA. CoDn § 47-18-9 (1980).
The drawbacks of using these statutes in terminated dealer cases include the fact that the scope of some of these state
antitrust statutes is not as broad as that of the Sherman Act; the provisions for recovery of damages may not be as liberal;
and there are frequently no terminated dealer cases that have been litigated under these statutes. See, e.g., Transource Int'l
v. Trinity Indus., 725 F.2d 274, 286 (5th Cir. 1984); Angola Farm Supply & Equip. Co. v. FMC Corp., 59 N.C. App.
272, 296 S.E.2d 503 (1982) (defendants' refusal to provide to plantiff customer a parts list was not an illegal restraint of
trade under North Carolina antitrust law); Smith v. Waite, 424 S.W.2d 691 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968) (antitrust law not
applicable to franchise agreement); Tsx. Bus. & CoM. Coos ANN. §§ 15.01-.34 (Vernon 1983).
Under most of these statutes the courts will look to the federal cases under the Sherman Act in interpreting the state
antitrust act. "California has long held that the Sherman Act and the Cartwright Act are similar and that Sherman Act cases
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in gaining relief. The United States Supreme Court decisions in Continental T.V. v.
GTE Sylvania, Inc. 18 1 and Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp. 182 have made
it very difficult for a terminated dealer to obtain relief under the antitrust laws. This
section of the Article assumes familiarity with the federal antitrust laws 183 and with
apply in construing the Cartwright Act." Derish v. San Mateo-Burlingam Bd. of Realtors, 724 F.2d 1347, 1350(9th Cir.
1983) (collecting cases). Accord Standard Liquor Corp. v. Olympia Brewing Co., 1983-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) T 65,230
(D. Kan. 1982) (under Kansas Antitrust Law, temporary restraining order prohibiting beer brewer from terminating
distributor was allowed to expire because of lack of irreparable harm and because mere substitution of dealers is not an
antitrust violation); Bos Material Handling v. Crown Controls Corp., 137 Cal. App. 3d 99, 109, 186 Cal. Rptr. 740, 745
(1982); Guild Wineries & Distilleries v. J. Sosnick & Son, 102 Cal. App. 3d 627, 162 Cal. Rptr. 87 (1980) (illegality
under Cartwright Act of termination of distributor); St. Petersburg Yacht Charters v. Morgan Yacht, 457 So. 2d 1028 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. 1984) (terminated yacht dealer stated cause of action against sailboat manufacturer under Florida Antitrust Act,
but rule of reason applicable and no per se violations stated, under motion for summary judgment in action under Donnelly
Act; applying federal precedent); List v. Burley Tobacco Growers' Coop. Ass'n., 114 Ohio St. 361, 369, 151 N.E. 471,
474 (1926). See also Zimmerman v. Board of Publications, 1985-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) T 66,501 (D. Colo. 1985); Westbury
Donuts v. Dunkin' Donuts of Am., 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 164,951 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (after holding that a conspiracy
to terminate one franchisee and substitute another was not a Sherman Act violation, the court held the same analysis
applicable under the state antitrust law); State v. Carvel Corp., 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) T 65,926 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984)
(granting defendant's motion for summary judgment in action under Donnelly Act; applying federal decisions in holding
that a contract between an ice cream franchisor and an ice cream mix producer was not an illegal tying arrangement); Troop
v. Central Inv. Corp., 11 Ohio Bar Rpt. 567 (Ashland County C.P. 1983).
A state antitrust claim may be pendent to a Sherman Act claim brought in a federal district court. Transource Int'l
v. Trinity Indus., 725 F.2d 274, 286 (5th Cir. 1984). One possible benefit of bringing a pendent state claim is that it may
permit recovery beyond the four year statute of limitations of the Clayton Act (§ 4B of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15b
(1984)). Compare In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 661 F.2d 1145 (7th Cir. 1981) (holding that there is no
statute of limitations applicable to a Valentine Act claim) and State v. Klosterman French Baking Co., 1977-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 9 61,361 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (argued by the author) with Pinney Dock & Transp. Co. v. Penn Cent. Corp., 1932-3
Trade Cas. (CCH) 9 65,053 (N.D. Ohio 1982) (rejecting reasoning of Klosterman, and holding that the section of the
Valentine Act (Oieo Rev. ConE ANN. § 1331.12 (Page 1984) providing that no statute of limitation shall prevent or be a
bar to any suit for any violation of the Valentine Act, was preempted by the four year statute of limitations of the Clayton
Act, because of the anticompetitive effects on interstate commerce involved). Cf. Salveson v. Western States Bankeard
Ass'n, 731 F.2d 1423, 1432 (9th Cir. 1984) ("California Cartwright Act claims are not preempted by the federal antitrust
laws."); Glasofer Motors v. Osterlund, Inc., 180 N.J. Super. 6, 433 A.2d 780 (App. Div. 1981) (New Jersey Antitrust
Act not preempted by Sherman Act; same standards of analysis applied to both statutes).
Further, the close relationship of the federal and state antitrust acts is demonstrated by the rule that facts determined
in one such antitrust action are given collateral estoppel effect in the other action. University Life Ins. Co. of Am. v.
Unimare Ltd., 699 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1983). Not only collateral estoppel but also resjudicata will prevent a plaintifflosing
under one Act from bringing the same suit against the same defendant under the other Act. After extensive analysis, the
court in Derish v. San Mateo-Burlingame Bd. of Realtors, 724 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1983) concluded that "res judicata
must bar a plaintiff who loses under the Cartwright Act from bringing the same suit against the same defendant in federal
court under substantially the same law in the Sherman Act. When both state and federal law offer a plaintiff equally sharp
teeth for enforcing the same claim, he may indeed have but 'one bite at the apple."' Id. at 1352. Accord Daley v. Town
of New Durham, 733 F.2d 4 (lst Cir. 1984) (antitrust action dismissed; federal district court acquires no jurisdiction over
a claim under the Sherman Act that was removed to district court from state court because state court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction; federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over antitrust claims); Salveson v. Western States Bankcard Ass'n,
731 F.2d 1423, 1431 (9th Cir. 1984) (state antitrust claims under California's Cartwright Act were properly removed to
federal district court, and then should have been dismissed with prejudice because res judicata barred their relitigation);
Classen v. Weller, 1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) V 64,199 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (applying abstention doctrine, granted motion
to stay federal antitrust action, even though federal court had exclusive jurisdiction, pending resolution of appeal in state
court of grant of summary judgment on Cartwright Act claims, because issues underlying federal antitrust claims could
be resolved through adjudication of state claims).
For a discussion of state antitrust laws, see Houenkamp, State Antitrust in the Federal Scheme, 58 Io. L.J. 375
(1983); LaRue, Defending Antitrust Cases in the State Courts, 50 AtNziusr L.J. 875 (1982); Rill, The New West Virginia
Antitrust Act From the Defense Perspective, 81 W. VA. L. REv. 207 (1978); Comment, The Valentine Act, 15 CAse W.
RES. L. REv. 179 (1963).
181. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
182. 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
183. Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1984) (prohibiting contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in
restraint of trade); section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1984) (prohibiting the three offenses of monopolization,
attempted monopolization, and conspiracy to monopolize a relevant market); and section 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.
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the principles of antitrust analysis. Some of the earlier literature on distribution
problems under the antitrust laws is still the best introduction to the subject, 184 and
study of modem cases must begin with the two decisions of the United States Supreme
Court in Sylvania and Monsanto.
One of the benefits to a dealer of suing the manufacturer under the antitrust laws
is that an antitrust claim may enable the dealer to escape an arbitration provision in
the dealer agreement. It is settled law that federal antitrust issues are not arbitrable,
and that an agreement to arbitrate them is unenforceable. 85
However, antitrust claims are usually combined with other claims such as breach
of contract or other state law claims. In that situation, the relevant inquiry becomes
whether or not to stay arbitration in favor of permitting the antitrust action to proceed.
Here the courts have held that the trial judge must evaluate the strength of the antitrust
claims; weak antitrust claims should not require the stay of arbitration, or else a party
to an arbitration agreement could simply postpone arbitration by filing an antitrust
complaint. 186 Circuit Judge Posner has suggested the best rule: "[W]hat ordering of
arbitration and antitrust litigation will produce the quickest, soundest resolution of the
complete controversy between the parties."' 187 Therefore if the court determines that
a dealer's antitrust case should not be stayed pending arbitration, then the only two
ways for the defendant manufacturer to influence the venue of the case are to attempt
to enforce a forum selection clause if one exists, 188 or to move for a change of venue
under the applicable statutes.' 89
§ 14 (1984) (prohibiting certain exclusive dealing arrangements). If an exclusive dealing arrangement is legal under section
3 of the Clayton Act, then "it is also legal under the less stringent Sherman Act." Bamosky Oils v. Union Oil Co., 665
F.2d 74, 85 (6th Cir. 1981) (footnote omitted) (citing Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 335 (1961)).
184. See, e.g., Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 75 YAmL .J.
373 (1966); Hibner, Selected Problems in Vertical Restraint Cases-The Need for Predictability, 26 MscER L. Ray. 911
(1975); Note, Restricted Channels of Distribution Under the Sherman Act, 75 HAxv. L. Rev. 795 (1962).
185. The seminal case was American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maquire & Co., 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968). The
circuits that have considered the issue agree. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 723 F.2d 155,
162-63 (1st Cir. 1983), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 105 S. Ct. 3346 (1985); University Life Ins. Co. of Am. v.
Unimarc Ltd., 699 F.2d 846, 850-51 (7th Cir. 1983). Indeed, Mitsubishi Motors applied this doctrine to an international
agreement with a Japanese automaker, and rejected arguments that the doctrine should not be applied to agreements with
foreign countries. "We conclude that the nonarbitrability of antitrust issues is an American doctrine that is alive, well,
justified both in its conception and in its application to at least the kind of international agreement we confront in this
case-an agreement governing the sales and distribution of vehicles in the United States. " 723 F.2d at 163 (emphasis in
original).
186. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 723 F.2d 155, 169 (1st Cir. 1983) (district court
must "assess the likelihood of success of the antitrust claims, a relevant factor in deciding whether or not to stay
arbitration") (collecting cases), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 105 S. Ct. 3346 (1985); University Life Ins. Co. of Am.
v. Unimarc Ltd., 699 F.2d 846, 851 (7th Cir. 1983); Bos Material Handling v. Crown Controls Corp., 137 Cal. App.
3d 99, 111-12, 186 Cal. Rptr. 740 (1982) (a case handled by the author, in which a claim under California's Cartwright
Act was stayed pending arbitration of the other controversies arising out of or relating to the dealer agreement); Sabates
v. International Medical Centers, 450 So. 2d 514, 517 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (following federal precedent that antitrust
claims are not arbitrable, claims under Florida Antitrust Act should not have been submitted to arbitration under an
arbitration agreement in a medical services contract between a physician and a health care provider).
187. University Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Unimare Ltd., 699 F.2d 846, 851 (7th Cir. 1983).
188. See, e.g., C. Pappas Co. v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 565 F. Supp. 1015 (D. Mass. 1983) (forum selection clause
was enforced in a wine distributor's suit against its California supplier in a case involving federal antitrust claims and state
law claims for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duties, tortious interference with prospective business relations, and
violation of the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act).
189. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a) and 1406(a) (1984).
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2. Types of Restraints
Although the various types of vertical restrictions possessed more legal signif-
icance prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania,
Inc.,190 it is still conceptually helpful to distinguish among the various types of
distributorship agreements. An exclusive distributorship or exclusive franchise is an
agreement between the manufacturer and the distributor that the manufacturer will not
sell to other outlets or distributors within the distributor's exclusive territory, and
sometimes that the manufacturer will not sell directly to customers within that
exclusive territory. 191 Some of the old exclusive distributorships also included a
promise by the dealer not to sell outside the territory. 192 These provisions are no
longer prevalent in distribution agreements.
The meaning of an "exclusive distributorship" was thoroughly explored by the
Sixth Circuit in Industrial Equipment Co. v. Emerson Electric Co.,193 which reversed
the trial court's holding that as a matter of law there existed an exclusive distribu-
torship contract between the parties. 19 4 In so doing, the appellate court ascribed to the
term "exclusive distributor" the meaning that there is only one distributor in a
particular geographic area. 195 The court also rejected the plaintiff's argument that an
exclusive agreement was admitted because the manufacturer had failed to object to the
plaintiffs statement that it expected to be the exclusive distributor. Although the
manufacturer's conduct may have been "less than forthright," there was neither an
acceptance by silence or inaction, nor an admission by the defendant of an exclusive
contract. 196
A location clause is an agreement that the dealer will sell only from a specified
location; it is the designation of the place of business for which the franchise or license
to sell is granted. 197 An area of primary responsibility, which can be combined with
190. 433 U.S. 36 (1977). This section focuses on marketing arrangements and restrictions which concern the
territory, customers, or location of the distributor, and not upon other requirements that may be imposed upon a distributor.
See, e.g., Kestenbaum v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 575 F.2d 564, 571 (Sth Cir. 1978) (requiring a dealer to advertise does
not violate the Sherman Act), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909 (1979).
191. See Bork, supra note 184, at 466; Note, supra note 184, at 796; Note, Vertical Agreements to Terminate
Competing Distributors: Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 92 HARv. L. Rav. 1160, 1164 (1979); Note, Antitrust Law-
Vertical Restraints-Per Se Mandate ofSchwinn Extended to Location Clause in Franchise Agreement, 26 MRcER L. REv.
629, 634 (1975).
192. An example of such an old-fashioned provision is found in Dobbins v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., 362 F. Supp.
54, 61 (D. Or. 1973).
193. 554 F.2d 276, 278 (6th Cir. 1977).
194. Id.
195. Id. at 286-87.
196. Id. at 287. The same result was reached in a case interpreting the meaning of "non-exclusive" in a license
agreement. Eskimo Pie Corp. v. Whitelawn Dairies, 284 F. Supp. 987, 994, 989-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (a non-exclusive
license involves a bare right to use the trademark or patent, without any right to exclude others; contract at issue was a
written agreement for a license for the sale of ice cream products, which granted a "non-exclusive right to purchase"
products).
197. One of the leading cases upholding the use of the location clause was Salco Corp. v. General Motors Corp.,
517 F.2d 567 (10th Cir. 1975). In that case, the location clause provided that the dealer "will not move to or establish
a new or different location . . . without prior written approval of Buick." Id. at 575 n.7. The court in Salco described
the manufacturer's "vital stake in the locations of its dealerships" as including the "adequate coverage of a market are"
and the "economic viability of its dealership." Id. at 573. Salco was quoted with approval in Golden Gate Acceptance
Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 597 F.2d 676, 680-81 (9th Cir. 1979), which affirmed the grant of summary judgment
to the defendant manufacturer on claims under both the Sherman Act and the Dealer's Day in Court Act: ' '[iThere is
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a location clause, is simply an area in which the distributor is supposed to concentrate
its efforts.19 8 Sometimes attempts are made to distinguish between territorial restric-
tions and customer restrictions, or between restrictions embodying promises by the
seller, and those embodying promises by the buyer.199 However, all of these
restrictions are judged under the same general standards.
Although the term "franchise" is used somewhat loosely in the cases and in the
literature, the essential distinction between a franchise agreement and a dealer
agreement is that the franchising agreement is based upon a license for trademark
rights. 2oo
3. Significant Distinctions in Antitrust Analysis
In order to evaluate situations involving terminated dealers, it is important to
remember several significant distinctions in antitrust analysis. 20 The first and perhaps
most basic distinction under section 1 of the Sherman Act is the category of per se
offenses, as opposed to the types of conduct that are tested under the rule of reason.20 2
nothing in the Act which gives a dealer the right to dictate the location of its own choosing."' (quoting Salco Corp. v.
General Motors Corp., 517 F.2d 567, 573 (10th Cir. 1975)). Golden Gate recognized the validity under the antitrust laws
of location provisions. Id. at 678 n.4.
198. "Such clauses allow manufacturers to insist upon intensive coverage of areas assigned to resellers but not to
confine the resellers to their assigned territories." Bork, supra note 184, at 467. In Salco Corp. v. General Motors Corp.,
517 F.2d 567,573 (10th Cir. 1975), the dealers "had the entire Denver metropolitan area as a primary responsibility area
and were free to sell to whomever they could persuade to purchase their automobiles." Under an area of primary
responsibility provision, "the distributor or dealer is not barred from selling outside his territory but may have his franchise
terminated if he does not achieve a certain sales volume within it." Note, Restricted Channels of Distribution Under the
Sherman Act, 75 Hsv. L. Rav. 795, 797 (1962). See, e.g., Schwimmer v. Sony Corp. of Am., 677 F.2d 946, 947 (2d
Cir. 1982).
199. Preston, Restrictive Distribution Arrangements: Economic Analysis and Public Policy Standards, 30 LAw &
Co~nm',. PRoas. 506, 507-10 (1965); Note, supra note 184, at 796.
200. Comment, Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code and Franchise Distribution Agreements, 1969 DuK,
L.J. 959, 975 ("At the core of all franchising is the licensing of a trademarked product or service."). See also H. BRowN,
FANcnicno: REunms AND Rsvats 10 (1973). One author has defined the "business format franchising situation" as "the
vertical trademark license agreement, where the owner of a trademark licenses that trademark and allocates mutually
exclusive territories to independent licensees that have no ownership or corporate connection with the trademark owner."
Timberg, Territorial Restrictions on Franchisees: Post-Schwinn Developments, 19 ANrmusT BtLL. 205, 212 (1974).
201. For older literature concerning terminations under the antitrust laws, see Bohling, Franchise Terminations
Under the Sherman Act: Populism and Relational Power, 53 Tox. L. Rv. 1180 (1975); Wade, Some Antitrust Problems
in Terminating Franchises, 44 ST. Joino's L. Rsv. 23 (1969); Note, A Sui Generis Approach to Franchise Termination,
50 Norm DAE LAw. 544 (1975); Comment, Franchising and the Antitrust Laws: An Overview, 41 TENN. L. Ray. 535
(1974).
202. The classic discussion of the rule of reason is contained in the opinion of Justice Brandeis in Board of Trade
v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). More recent discussions of these issues are contained in Broadcast Music
v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1979); National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S.
679, 687-92 (1978); Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49-51 (1977). Antitrust cases brought by
distributors which discuss these issues include Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126, 129-31 (2d Cir.) (en bane),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 946 (1978); Kestenbaum v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 575 F.2d 564, 570-71 (5th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 909 (1979); H & B Equip. Co. v. International Harvester Co., 577 F.2d 239, 245-46 (5th Cir. 1978);
Northwest Power Prods. v. Omark Indus., 576 F.2d 83, 90-91 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1978); Gough
v. Rossmoor Corp., 585 F.2d 381, 386-89 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 936 (1979). See Note, Vertical
Agreements to Terminate Competing Distributors: Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 92 HARv. L. Rsv. 1160 (1979);
Comment, Vertical Agreement as Horizontal Restraint: Cemuto, Inc. v. United Cabinet Corp., 128 U. PA. L. RE. 622,
643 (1980).
The classic definition of per se offenses is contained in Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958):
"[Clertain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming
virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm
they have caused or the business excuse for their use."
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The classic per se offense is price fixing.203 The Supreme Court has listed the
offenses of horizontal allocation of territories2°4 and of division of markets, group
boycotts, and tying arrangements205 as other per se offenses. However, in recent years
the Supreme Court's reluctance to find per se offenses has meant that this distinction
between per se offenses and those under the rule of reason is becoming more a
distinction between price-fixing and rule of reason inquiries. 2°6 As the Fifth Circuit
has stated: "So great is the power of the per se rule that we have named it 'the trump
card of antitrust law. When an antitrust plaintiff successfully plays it, he need only
tally his score.'" 207 In contrast, the rule of reason is one of antitrust's "open-ended
and fact-specific standards." 208 Unless price fixing is involved, most terminated
dealer cases are judged according to the rule of reason. Therefore, an extended
discussion of per se offenses is unnecessary.
A second fundamental distinction under section 1 of the Sherman Act is between
unilateral and concerted action. Under section 1, an agreement between two or more
persons is required before an offense exists. 209 The Supreme Court in Monsanto stated
that this distinction was "not always clearly drawn by parties and courts." 210 This
requirement often leads a plaintiff distributor to allege a conspiracy between the
manufacturer and another distributor.
The third and fourth critical distinctions are between vertical and horizontal
restraints, and restrictions upon intrabrand competition and interbrand competition. 2 1
Both of these distinctions are discussed in connection with the Sylvania opinion. In
defending a terminated dealer action, each of these distinctions becomes a point of
attack for the manufacturer. A plaintiff must take care to preserve and present the two
distinct theories represented by a horizontal allocation and a vertical restriction.
Counsel must present a correct jury instruction that separately sets forth these
theories. 212
203. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 344-48 (1982); National Soc'y of Professional
Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692-94 (1978); United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333, 334-38
(1969); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 210-28 (1940).
204. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972).
205. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 n.15 (1982).
206. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 15 n.25 (1984) ("The rationale for per se rules in part
is to avoid a burdensome inquiry into actual market conditions in situations where the likelihood of anticompetitive conduct
is so great as to render unjustified the costs of determining whether the particular ease at bar involves anticompetitive
conduct.").
207. Sports Center v. Riddell, Inc., 673 F.2d 786, 790 n.3 (5th Cir. 1982). Accord Zidell Explorations v. Conval
Int'l, 719 F.2d 1465, 1471 (9th Cir. 1983) ("When conduct is per se illegal, the end does not justify the means.").
208. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 438 (1978).
209. Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 110 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
911 (1981); H.L. Moore Drug Exch. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 662 F.2d 935, 941 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880
(1982), quoted with approval in Schwimmer v. Sony Corp. of Am., 677 F.2d 946, 952 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1007 (1982). See also H & B Equip. Co. v. International Harvester Co., 577 F.2d 239, 243 (5th Ci. 1978).
210. 465 U.S. 752, 761 (1984).
211. For a discussion of these two distinctions, see Preston, Restrictive Distribution Arrangements: Economic
Analysis and Public Policy Standards, 30 LAw & Co.rm,'e'. PRoas. 506, 508 (1965). Intrabrand competition is competition
among sellers of the same brand; interbrand competition is among sellers of different brands of a product or service.
"Intra-brand competition is competition among Holiday Inn's franchisees in the market of 'Holiday Inn motel beds.'
Inter-brand competition is competition among Holiday Inns, Sheraton Inns, Ramada Inns, etc." American Motor Inns v.
Holiday Inns, 365 F. Supp. 1073, 1088 n.4 (D.N.J. 1973), aff'd in part, 521 F.2d 1230 (3d Cir. 1975).
212. A case the author argued, Reno-West Coast Distrib. Co. v. Mead Corp., 613 F.2d 722, 725-26 (9th Cir.), cert.
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4. The Sylvania Decision
Although much has been written21 3 about the Supreme Court's decision in
Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,214 for the purposes of this Article a brief
summary of its holding together with a description of the other important principles
and limitations upon the opinion will be sufficient. In Sylvania, the defendant
manufacturer terminated the plaintiff's distributorship after the plaintiff began to sell
the product at an outlet other than the one approved by the manufacturer. 2 5 Sylvania
is significant in the distribution area because it overruled United States v. Arnold,
Schwinn & Co.2 16 which had held that it was a per se violation of the Sherman Act
for a manufacturer to seek to restrict either the territory or customers for the trade of
an article after the manufacturer has parted with title over that article.2 17
Sylvania held that vertical territorial restrictions should be judged under the rule
of reason rather than under the per se rule stated in Schwinn.21 8 The precise restriction
at issue in Sylvania was a location clause 219 which "limited the number of franchises
granted for any given area and required each franchisee to sell his Sylvania products
only from the location or locations at which he was franchised.''220 In deciding
Sylvania, the Supreme Court set forth the principle that interbrand and not intrabrand
competition "is the primary concern of antitrust law." 221 The Court reasoned that the
benefits to the manufacturer from the promotion of interbrand competition out-
weighed the detriments to intrabrand competition.222 Accordingly, since Sylvania, the
courts have been more willing to uphold vertical restrictions upon dealers because
they promote intrabrand competition. 223
Notwithstanding Sylvania's treatment of intrabrand competition, the lower
courts have continued to examine the intrabrand restrictions on distributor competi-
denied, 444 U.S. 927 (1979) held that the plaintiff's proffered charge concerning a horizontal conspiracy under United
States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966), was not properly presented to the trial court, and emphasized that
the burden is upon counsel to present a correct jury instruction.
213. Bohling, A SimplifiedRule ofReasonfor VerticalRestraints: Integrating Social Goals, Economic Analysis, and
Sylvania, 64 IowA L. Rsv. 461 (1979); Koches, Developments in the Lmv of Vertical Nonprice Restrictions: A Welcome
Return to the Rule of Reason, 33 U. Mi&,. L. REv. 247 (1978); Liebeler, Intrabrand "Cartels" Under GTE Sylvania,
30 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1 (1982); Louis, Vertical Distribution Restraints after Sylvania: A Postscript and Comment, 76
Mxu. L. Rsv. 265 (1976); Maher, On the Pathfrom White to Schwinn to Sylvania to . . . ?, 82 Dcx. L. Rsv. 433 (1978);
Pitofsky, The Sylvania Case: Antitrust Analysis of Non-Price Vertical Restrictions, 78 CowuM. L. Ray. 1 (1978); Posner,
The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. Cm. L. REv. 1 (1977).
214. 433 U.S. 36 (1977), aff 'g 537 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1976).
215. 537 F.2d 980, 983 (9th Cir. 1976), aff 'd, 433 U.S. 26 (1977).
216. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
217. Id. at 382. The Sylvania Court summarized the rule from Schwinn, 433 U.S. 36, 44-45 (1977).
218. 433 U.S. 36, 58-59 (1977).
219. This location provision was described in the en bane opinion of the Ninth Circuit, GTE Sylvania, Inc. v.
Continental T.V., 537 F.2d 980, 983 (9th Cir. 1976), aff'd, 433 U.S. 36 (1977). Whatthe restrictions did not encompass
(anticompetitive practices, exclusive dealerships, and right of veto over new dealers) was also important, id. at 980. An
interesting diagram contrasting Sylvania's distribution policy with that in Schwinn was included in the original Ninth
Circuit panel opinion, 1974-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 75,072 (9th Cir.), withdrawn to be heard en banc, 1974-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 75,435 (9th Cir. 1974).
220. 433 U.S. 36, 38 (1977).
221. Id. at 52 n.19.
222. Id. at 54-56.
223. After Sylvania, the Second Circuit held it to be reversible error to charge a jury that a purpose to restrict
intrabrand competition would support a finding of liability. Borger v. Yamaha Int'l Corp., 625 F.2d 390, 397 (2d Cir.
1980).
1985]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
tion in determining whether a vertical restraint passes muster under antitrust analy-
sis.224 Underlying this scrutiny is the concern that competition between dealers will
bid down the retail price, which in turn puts downward pressure on the wholesaler's
selling price; intrabrand dealer restrictions tend to eliminate this competitive pres-
sure.225
Two limitations upon the Supreme Court's opinion in Sylvania are of equal
importance to the antitrust analysis of dealership agreements. First, the Court
emphasized that Sylvania dealt only with nonprice vertical restrictions. 22 6 The Court
reaffirmed the rule of per se illegality of price fixing. 227 Therefore a vertical
restriction that is part and parcel of a price fixing scheme will not withstand antitrust
scrutiny. In the second significant restriction on the scope of the holding, the Court
reaffirmed the rule of per se illegality for horizontal restrictions. 228
One line of cases illustrating the above analysis involves manufacturers' re-
sponses to "bootlegging" practices by dealers. Apparently the only post-Sylvania
appellate decision in which the plaintiff distributor prevailed in showing a vertical
restraint to be unjustified was Eiberger v. Sony Corp. of America.229 Despite a
well-drafted, non-exclusive franchise provision 2" 0 which did not restrict the dealers to
sales within a territory, or give them an exclusive right to sell within a territory, the
Second Circuit held that the defendant's warranty fee system constituted an unrea-
sonable vertical restraint of trade.2 3' In that case a Sony dealer began to sell Sony
machines substantially below list price in a number of areas. 232 Other dealers began
to complain about the sale of these "bootleg" machines. 233 The manufacturer's
warranty fee system required a selling dealer who failed to render warranty service to
pay the scheduled warranty fee to the manufacturer. 234 However, the court found that
in fact the manufacturer used the system to punish dealers selling outside their
territory by debiting the warranty fee to the accounts of dealers to whom the
manufacturer originally sold the machines.235 In effect, "the amounts of the warranty
224. See, e.g., Graphic Prods. Distribs. v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560 (11th Cir. 1983).
225. Id. at 1572 n.20. See also Com-Tel, Inc. v. DuKane Corp., 669 F.2d 404, 412 (6th Cir. 1982) ("Although
the primary concern of the antitrust laws is with interbrand competition, intrabrand competition is still a concern,
especially in cases such as this where no benefits from increased interbrand competition may or did result from the vertical
restrictions.") (footnotes omitted); Eiberger v. Sony Corp. of Am., 622 F.2d 1068, 1081 (2d Cir. 1980) (an anticom
petitive impact on intrabrand competition can alone support a finding that section 1 of the Sherman Act has been violated);
Cemuto, Inc. v. United Cabinet Corp., 595 F.2d 164, 166 n.11 (3d Cir. 1979) ("[1lntrabrand competition has not been
of so little importance as never to merit the protection of a per se rule.").
226. 433 U.S. 36, 52-54 (1977).
227. Id. at51 n.18.
228. 433 U.S. at 58 n.28. The classic definition of, and distinction between, horizontal and vertical restrictions is
contained in United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 607-08 (1972).
229. 622 F.2d 1068 (2d Cir. 1980).
230. Id. at 1070 n.I.
231. Id. at 1070.
232. Id. at 1071-72.
233. Id. at 1077.
234. Id. at 1072.
235. Id. at 1072-73. The facts in Eiberger justified this result. According to the record, one Sony dealer "stormed
into the store of an unauthorized competitor and opened boxes on the shelves to obtain the serial numbers of the Sony
dictation equipment inside." Id. at 1073. When the complaining Sony dealer was arrested for trespass, the manufacturer
"interceded on his behalf with the local prosecutor." Id. at 1073 n.8.
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fees were large enough to eliminate any profit that a dealer would make on sales to
unauthorized dealers for resale.'236
In contrast to the Second Circuit's decision in Eiberger, the Fifth Circuit has
twice considered alleged restrictions upon bootlegging practices, and both times has
found in favor of the manufacturer. Parsons v. Ford Motor Co. 237 affirmed a grant
of summary judgment in favor of defendants in an antitrust action by a plaintiff who
was engaged in the interdealership transfer of new motor vehicles. In that case the
automobile manufacturer used an allocation system to distribute its models that were
in short supply. While the conduct at issue was described differently by the two
parties, 238 the Fifth Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment as to the claims
under section 1 of the Sherman Act, for lack of significant probative evidence of
conspiracy, holding that "[e]nforcement of the company's fleet allocation system
policy is not equivalent to conspiracy." 239
Six weeks after Parsons was decided, a different panel of the Fifth Circuit in
Sports Center v. Riddell, Inc.24 0 affirmed a directed verdict in favor of dealers that
had been joined as defendants, and affirmed ajudgment that had been entered in favor
of the defendant manufacturer upon a jury verdict, in an action by a sporting goods
dealer alleging that the defendants had conspired to damage its business in violation
of section 1 of the Sherman Act. The manufacturer maintained a "'bootleg' ban" 24'
that was described as a policy of discouraging sales by its dealers to anyone other than
ultimate consumers.2 42 After reviewing the distinction between vertical and horizontal
restraints, the Fifth Circuit concluded that there was no section 1 violation.2 43 Parsons
and Sports Center indicate that the manufacturer has significant freedom to enforce
its dealer policies without incurring liability for a conspiracy under section 1 of the
Sherman Act.
5. The Monsanto Decision
The second leading Supreme Court opinion in the terminated dealer area is
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp.2 44 Monsanto resolved a conflict among the
federal circuits regarding the sufficiency of the evidence that must be produced by an
236. Id. at 1079.
237. 669 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1982).
238. Id. at 310-11.
239. Id. at 313. The Fifth Circuit also approved the grant of a motion to dismiss the claims under section 2 of the
Sherman Act because the plaintiffs claimed that the manufacturer attempted to monopolize the sale of new Fords. Every
manufacturer has a natural monopoly in the sale of his own product which does not contravene the antitrust laws. Id. at
312.
240. 673 F.2d 786, 787 (5th Cir. 1982).
241. Id. at 788.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 791-92. Accord Terry's Floor Fashions, Inc. v. Burlington Indus., 1985-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,639
(4th Cir. 1985) (affirming summary judgment for defendants; manufacturers' anti-bootlegging policy was consistent with
marketing strategy). Cf. Coin-Tel, Inc. v. DuKane Corp., 669 F.2d 404, 407 (6th Cir. 1982) (affirming judgment in favor
of an antitrust plaintiff who successfully argued that an alleged conspiracy should be regarded as an illegal per se group
boycott where, even though pressure was applied vertically by the manufacturer, the stifling of competition was
predominantly horizontal and on the dealer level).
244. 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
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antitrust plaintiff to survive a motion for a directed verdict in a case in which the
plaintiff distributor is attempting to prove a conspiracy to set resale prices. In that case
the Seventh Circuit had held that "proof of termination following competitor
complaints is sufficient to support an inference of concerted action."245 The Supreme
Court rejected this standard but affirmed the award of damages under a new standard
that it formulated. 246
After discussing the "two important distinctions" between concerted and inde-
pendent action, and between concerted action to set prices and concerted action on
non-price restrictions, 247 the Court held that the Seventh Circuit's standard permit-
ted a price fixing agreement to be inferred merely from the existence of com-
plaints.2 48 In contrast, the Court's standard required the antitrust plaintiff to present
evidence that reasonably tended to prove that the defendant manufacturer and others
had consciously pursued a common scheme designed to achieve an unlawful objec-
tive.249 This latter standard restricts the latitude granted to a finder of fact to infer
an unlawful motive on the part of a defendant manufacturer that has terminated a
dealer.250
6. The Application of Antitrust Principles to Terminated Dealer Situations: The
Dealer Substitution Cases
Older Supreme Court cases have addressed broad questions concerning the
lawfulness of a manufacturer's entire method of distribution, and have held some
distribution systems unlawful. 251 However, in recent years courts have not found it
necessary to address arguments that entire distribution systems are violative of the
antitrust laws.252 The facts of each situation should provide sufficient basis for a de-
termination of the plaintiff's claims without the necessity to reach these questions.
At least in the absence of class action certification, this reluctance on the part of the
courts is advisable, if only because of the possible severe adverse economic effects
of such a finding on a manufacturer and each of the members of its distribu-
245. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 684 F.2d 1226, 1238 (7th Cir. 1982).
246. 465 U.S. 752, 768 (1984).
247. Id. at 760-64.
248. Id. at 764.
249. Id.
250. See Borger v. Yamaha Int'l Corp., 625 F.2d 390, 397 n.4 (2d Cir. 1980) (an unlawful purpose is not sufficient
to establish a Sherman Act violation). Cf. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436 n.13 (1978)
(a civil violation of the Sherman Act can be established by proof of either purpose or effect). Together with Sylvania's
emphasis on the anticompetitive effects of conduct alleged to violate the Sherman Act, these cases undercut the
conventional wisdom that an antitrust plaintiff had to show a purpose or effect to harm competition.
251. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 601,603 (1972); United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388
U.S. 365, 367, 369-70 (1967), overruled, Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); United States
v. Scaly, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 351-53 (1967).
252. Graphic Prods. Distribs. v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 1572 n.20 (11th Cir. 1983) (even though a plaintiff's
claim may have been "that Itek's distribution system violated the antitrust laws, and that GPD's termination was illegal
only insofar as Itek's distribution system was illegal," there was no need to reach that argument where the conduct alleged
to be a violation was the termination, which was effected pursuant to provisions of a dealership contract which contained
no restraints that were challenged as unreasonable); American Motor Inns v. Holiday Inns, 521 F.2d 1230, 1244-53 (3d
Cir. 1975) (court did not reach question of whether franchisor's practice of sending "radius letters" to the three existing
inns nearest the sites of proposed franchised inns constituted a general or national conspiracy among the franchisees to
divide the market among themselves).
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tion network. Accordingly, most terminated dealer disputes arise when a manufac-
turer's dissatisfaction with a single dealer leads the manufacturer to choose another
dealer.
This section of the Article examines the permissibility of the "dealer switch" or
"dealer substitution" actions of a manufacturer. Both Monsanto and Sylvania left
undisturbed a large body of case law involving the dealer switch or dealer substitution
situation. The three leading opinions in this area are from the Ninth,253 Sixth,254 and
Fifth255 Circuits. Together they establish a proposition that has been widely applied
in antitrust litigation brought by exclusive distributors: a manufacturer does not
violate the Sherman Act by terminating a dealer, even if the termination is done
pursuant to an agreement with the prospective new dealer. This rule is sensible in
view of the fact that unless a manufacturer is vertically integrating256 or is going out
of business, the manufacturer's interest will almost always lead it to search for and
negotiate with a potential new distributor to replace a dealer that is to be terminated.
If this conduct were forbidden, then the manufacturer's legitimate interest in main-
taining adequate service to its customers would be jeopardized.
The leading case in this area is Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke
& Liquors, Ltd.,257 in which the plaintiff liquor distributor alleged that the defendant
distiller had conspired to terminate the distributorship and to replace plaintiff with
another dealer. In dismissing the action, the Ninth Circuit set forth the classic
statement of the law in this area:
We think it indisputable that a single manufacturer or seller can ordinarily stop doing
business with A and transfer his business to B.... There is language in many of those
cases which, taken out of context, plaintiff construes as meaning that, if the seller agrees
with a third party-a competitor of the seller, for example, or a competitor of A-to do
the same thing, a per se violation of section 1 has occurred. This obviously cannot mean
an agreement with B, the new distributor; he could not accept the distributorship without
agreeing to do so. And the decisions ... make it clear that the decision of the seller to
transfer his business from A to B is valid even though B may have solicited the transfer
and even though the seller and B may have agreed before the seller terminates his dealings
with A.28
Equally significant with respect to the ability of a plaintiff dealer to withstand a
preliminary motion is the court's holding that the plaintiff dealer's evidence that it was
in fact a good dealer did not support an inference of anticompetitive intent.25 9
Hawaiian Oke has been followed in numerous cases. 260 Its holding has been
253. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 1062 (1970).
254. Ace Beer Distribs. v. Kohn, Inc., 318 F.2d 283 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 922 (1963).
255. Burdett Sound v. Altec Corp., 515 F.2d 1245 (5th Cir. 1975).
256. See discussion of vertical integration infra notes 328-35.
257. 416 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970).
258. Id. at 78 (emphasis added).
259. Id.
260. See, e.g., Bushie v. Stenocord Corp., 460 F.2d 116, 119-20 (9th Cir. 1972) (The most that evidence that
distributor was a good dealer demonstrates is that the defendant may have been mistaken in judging the quality of its
distributor's performance.); Bay City-Abrahams Bros., Inc. v. Estee Lauder, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 1206, 1215 (S.D.N.Y.
1974) (granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment in an action by a plaintiff cosmetic distributor against a
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strengthened by Sylvania's emphasis upon the requirement of "demonstrable eco-
nomic effect" for an antitrust violation26' and Monsanto's emphasis upon the
distinction between concerted and independent action. 262
Certain refinements and additions to the Ninth Circuit's holding in Hawaiian
Oke should be noted. The Ninth Circuit in Golden Gate Acceptance Corp. v. General
Motors Corp.263 summarized the applicable rule as follows:
It has been consistently held in this circuit that it is not a violation of the Sherman Act
for a manufacturer to conspire with others to simply switch distributors at one of its ex-
clusive franchises and to cease doing business with a former dealer. Thus, as a matter of
law, the appellants' antitrust charges in their complaint failed to state a claim under the
Sherman Act. Moreover, it is clear from the record below that, even given the requisite
presumptions in appellants' favor, GM's termination of the Agreement was caused di-
rectly and justifiably by Kohlenberg's and the Dealership's breach of the Agreement.
Consequently, the district court's grant of summary judgment as to the antitrust claims
was proper.264
The following year the Ninth Circuit quoted this passage from Golden Gate
Acceptance Corp., adding that the desire to replace an ineffective dealer with a more
efficient one is a proper basis for termination.2 65
Although each case under the Sherman Act must be judged on its own facts, 2 66
these cases are of broad applicability because the basic facts underlying most of them
are common to the terminated dealer situation: a manufacturer seeks to terminate one
dealer, replacing that dealer (either simultaneously or at a later date)267 with a new
dealer.
The second of the three leading cases, the Sixth Circuit's decision in Ace Beer
Distributors v. Kohn, Inc.,268 affirmed the dismissal of the complaint in an antitrust
action for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 269 The plain-
tiff was an exclusive distributor of beer, and one of the defendants was the plain-
tiff's sole source and supply of that product.270 The court held that the defendant
brewer and others did not violate the Sherman Act by agreeing to eliminate the
plaintiff as a beer distributor, the brewer thereafter conducting its business through
cosmetics manufacturer. After discussing Hawaiian Oke and other cases, the court stated: "This result is not altered by
proof that the cutoff distributor was a 'good dealer,' as plaintiff contends."). Accord Marquis v. Chrysler Corp., 577 F.2d
624, 640 (9th Cir. 1978) ("Furthermore, even if Marquis could show that his dealership was satisfactory, that would not
compel a different result.").
261. Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 59 (1977).
262. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 (1984).
263. 597 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1979).
264. Id. at 678-79 (footnotes omitted).
265. Chandler Supply Co. v. GAF Corp., 650 F.2d 983, 989 (9th Cir. 1980).
266. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71, 79 (9th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970).
267. Oreek Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126 (2d Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 946 (1978); Note,
VerticalAgreements to Terminate Competing Distributors: Oreek Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 92 H.xv. L. Ray. 1160, 1166
(1979); Bushie v. Stenocord Corp., 460 F.2d 116, 120 (9th Cir. 1972) (fact that defendant had no outlet in Phoenix for
months after termination of distributor was of no significance).
268. 318 F.2d 283 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 922 (1963).
269. Id. at 287.
270. Id. at 285.
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another distributor. 27' The Sixth Circuit made plain Ace Beer's precedential vital-
ity272 in Byars v. Bluff City News Co.:273
Franchisees and distributors which have been unilaterally terminated have discovered to
their chagrin that ordinarily the law offers them no remedy absent proof that a conspiracy
against them took place. An agreement with another distributor to replace the terminated
distributor does not count as a conspiracy. Even the use of unfair business practices as part
of the termination may not invoke sanction under the antitrust laws.274
Although the Ninth Circuit has limited these more recent statements of the Ha-
waiian Oke doctrine, stating that they do not apply to the termination of a price-
cutting distributor at the request of a competing distributor,275 that court has made
explicit a concept implicit in the Hawaiian Oke line of cases: A terminated distrib-
utor complaining of a dealer switch situation may not show an anticompetitive pur-
pose or effect by demonstrating that the manufacturer's new dealer arrangement had
the effect of cutting off the terminated dealer's source of parts, or that the termi-
nated dealer was damaged by the termination, or that the termination cost the ter-
minated dealer a large part of its business. The Ninth Circuit in Calculators Hawaii
v. Brandt, Inc.276 held that refusal to sell with a resulting loss of business by the
distributor is insufficient to prove anticompetitive purpose of effect. A.H. Cox &
Co. v. Star Machinery Co. 277 contains the best summary of the principles in this
area. Cox emphasized that most dealer terminations or substitutions do not ad-
versely affect market competition. Unless a manufacturer is going out of business,
it will almost always seek to replace a terminated dealer with another dealer. Ac-
cordingly, these factual scenarios will not only preclude a finding of Sherman Act
liability, but make likely the success of a motion to dismiss or for summary judg-
ment.
The Third Circuit followed the Ninth Circuit's decision in Hawaiian Oke in Ark
Dental Supply Co. v. Cavitron Corp.,278 an action in which a subsidiary's output of
a product was restricted to sales to the division of its parent, effectively cutting off
a distributor. Ark Dental Supply is also significant because the Third Circuit joined
the Ninth Circuit in rejecting the intra-corporate conspiracy doctrine, holding that the
corporate defendant's business decision to sell only to the dealers of one of its
271. Id. at 286-87.
272. See, e.g., Dunn & Mavis, Inc. v. Nu-Car Driveaway, 691 F.2d 241, 243 (6th Cir. 1982); Fray Chevrolet Sales
v. General Motors Corp., 536 F.2d 683, 686 (6th Cir. 1976); Aaron E. Levine & Co. v. Calkraft Paper Co., 429 F. Supp.
1039, 1046-47 (E.D. Mich. 1976). But see Bamnosky Oils v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 665 F.2d 74, 86-87 (6th Cir. 1981)
(holding that although Ace Beer permitted termination of a jobber (wholesaler) sales agreement, it did not also permit
severance of the wholesaler's relationship with the retailer dealers).
273. 609 F.2d 843 (6th Cir. 1979).
274. Id. at 854-55 (citations omitted).
275. Zidell Explorations v. Conval Int'l Ltd., 719 F.2d 1465, 1470 n.2 (9th Cir. 1983).
276. 724 F.2d 1332, 1337-38 (9th Cir. 1983).
277. 653 F.2d 1302, 1306-07 (9th Cir. 1981). See also Hood v. Tenneco Texas Life Ins. Co., 739 F.2d 1012,1018
(5th Cir. 1984) (5% market share of the supplier meant that the dealer termination "cannot have an adverse effect on
competition.").
278. 461 F.2d 1093, 1094 (3d Cir. 1972), quoted with approval in Cermuto, Inc. v. United Cabinet Corp., 595 F.2d
164, 167 n.14 (3d Cir. 1979).
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divisions meant that no plurality of persons was necessary for a finding of a violation
of section 1 of the Sherman Act.279
The third leading opinion, the Fifth Circuit's Burdett Sound v. Altec Corp.,2 °
affmned an award of summary judgment for a manufacturer in an action by a
terminated distributor. In discussing "the none too novel question of whether a
manufacturer violates the Sherman Act when it terminates a business relationship with
one of its distributors and contracts with the new firm," 281 the Fifth Circuit
summarized the principles of Hawaiian Oke and Ace Beer, and rejecting the plaintiff's
argument that the manufacturer's commission of various unfair trade practices served
to distinguish that case from other distributor substitution cases. 282 After quoting
Hawaiian Oke, the court summarized the applicable rule:
Lest any other former distributors succumb to the temptation of treble damages, we
reiterate that it is simply not an antitrust violation for a manufacturer to contract with a new
distributor, and as a consequence, to terminate his relationship with a former distributor,
even if the effect of the new contract is to seriously damage the former distributor's
business.83z
This much cited Fifth Circuit decision has been applied to a variety of fact
situations to uphold the elimination of distributors or dealers and refusals to deal in
distribution situations. 284 Both Burdett Sound28 5 and Ace Beer286 noted that to switch
279. Id. at 1094 n. 1. The Ninth Circuit opinion in Hawaiian Oke, considered a similar issue and likewise held that
no conspiracy can exist between divisions of a corporate defendant. Perhaps the leading case in this area is Nelson Radio
&Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200F.2d 911 (5thCir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953). Accord Domed Stadium
Hotel v. Holiday Inns, 732 F.2d 481, 486-87 (5th Cir. 1984). In view of the critical distinction between unilateral and
concerted action, these holdings are significant in terminated dealer cases because frequently there will be an absence of
any substantial indication that the defendant manufacturer agreed with a separate entity to terminate the plaintiff.
Consequently, there is no Section 1 violation because the necessary plurality of persons is lacking. See Copperweld Corp.
v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984) (a wholly-owned subsidiary is incapable of conspiracy with its parent
under the Sherman Act as a matter of law).
280. 515 F.2d 1245, 1246 (5th Cir. 1975).
281. Id. at 1246.
282. Id. at 1248. In fact, the complaint in Ace Beer contained similar allegations. Ace Beer Distribs. v. Kohn, Inc.,
318 F.2d 283, 285-86 (6th Cir. 1963).
283. 515 F.2d at 1249, quoted with approval in Dunn & Mavis, Inc. v. Nu-Car Driveaway, 691 F.2d 241, 244 n.1
(6th Cir. 1982).
284. See Graphic Prods. Distribs. v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 1572 n.20 (5th Cir. 1983) ("We have emphasized
time and time again that mere termination of a dealer-even an arbitrary and unfair termination-does not constitute an
antitrust violation actionable under the treble damages provisions of the Clayton Act."); Carlson Mach. Tools v. American
Tool, 678 F.2d 1253, 1260 (5th Cir. 1982) ("If a manufacturer negotiates, or reaches agreement, with a new distributor
prior to his substitution of distributors, such negotiations do not, without more, amount to a violation of the antitrust
law. ... ); Joe Regueira, Inc. v. American Distilling Co., 642 F.2d 826, 831-32 (5th Cir. 1981) (affirming summary
judgment for defendant in antitrust action by terminated beverage distributor); Muenster Butane, Inc. v. Stewart Co., 651
F.2d 292, 296-97 (5th Cir. 1981); Daniels v. All Steel Equip., 590 F.2d 111, 113 (5th Cir. 1979) (affirming summary
judgment for defendant in antitrust action for manufacturer's termination of sales representative); Aviation Specialities v.
United Technologies Corp., 568 F.2d 1186, 1192 (5th Cir. 1978) ("As a manufacturer, Pratt-Whitney has the right to
select its customers and to refuse to sell its goods to anyone for reasons sufficient to itself."); H & B Equip. Co. v.
International Harvester Co., 577 F.2d 239 (5th Cir. 1978) (even a conspiracy between a supplier and its distributor to put
a second distributor out of business does not violate the Sherman Act); Northwest Power Prods. v. Omark Indus., 576
F.2d 83, 86 (5th Cir. 1978) (affirming summary judgment granted to defendant in antitrust action by terminated
distributor).
285. 515 F.2d 1245, 1248 (5th Cir. 1975). "A mere unilateral change of distributors is not an unusual business
practice, nor is it a violation of the antitrust laws."
286. 318 F.2d 283, 287 (6th Cir. 1963). Such a substitution "is not an unusual business procedure."
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or substitute distributors is not an unusual business practice, recognizing the legality
of this business decision.
7. The Dual Distribution Doctrine
Whether the relationship between the dealer or franchisee, and the manufacturer
or franchisor who also sells the product or service direct to customers is a vertical one
is the subject of the dual distribution problem. Ever since the Third Circuit first dealt
with this problem in 1975 in American Motors Inn v. Holiday Inns,287 the courts and
commentators288 have wrestled with this problem. In Holiday Inns, the Third Circuit
found that operating hotels and franchising others to operate hotels in the same area
combined to support a conclusion that a horizontal conspiracy to divide territories
existed. 289 Plaintiffs will continue to raise the dual distribution argument because (a)
frequently a manufacturer both distributes its own products directly to customers and
employs independent distributors to sell its products; and (b) a finding that the
defendant manufacturer is in competition with its dealers at the same market level
enables the plaintiff dealer to argue that the per se rule applies to the defendant's
conduct. In other words, the plaintiff's goal is to avoid the rule of reason treatment
for non-price vertical restraints, and to obtain the benefit of the per se rule against
horizontal restraints, even in the absence of price fixing.
Cases holding the per se rule to apply to the dual distribution problem have
simply reasoned that (a) the fact that the manufacturer or franchisor sells its product
or service directly to customers means that it sells on the same level of the market as
its distributor or franchisee (i.e., the defendant is both supplier to and a competitor
of its dealer or franchisee); and (b) therefore any agreement between the manufacturer
and one or more of its dealers or franchisees, to plaintiff's detriment, constitutes an
unlawful horizontal allocation of territory or customers. 290
More recently, the Second,291 Fifth,292 Sixth, 293 and Ninth294 Circuits have held
that a dual distribution system must be evaluated according to rule of reason.295 These
287. 521 F.2d 1230, 1253-54 (3d Cir. 1975).
288. Several articles discussing the theory of dual distribution are found in Symposium, Sherman Act Implications
of Dual Distribution, 48 Amm'usr L.J. 1795 (1979). See also Brett & Wallace, Sylvania and the Dual Distribution
Problem, 26 N.Y.L. ScH. L. Ray. 971 (1981) (approaches to distribution have been varying and inconsistent); Rill,
Non-Price Vertical Restraints Since Sylvania: Market Conditions andDualDistribution, 52 ANrrusr L.J. 95, 107 (1983)
("The clear trend of decisions is toward viewing dual distributors' restraints as vertical.").
289. 521 F.2d 1230, 1242, 1253-54. Accord Quality Mercury v. Ford Motor Co., 542 F.2d 466, 471 (8th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 914 (1977).
290. Copy Data Sys., Inc. v. Toshiba Am., Inc., 663 F.2d 405, 409 (2d Cir. 1981) (collecting cases requiring per
se treatment). Of course there is no breach of contract issue inherent in the dual distribution decision. See, e.g., Steams
v. Genrad, Inc., 752 F.2d 942, 947 (4th Cir. 1984).
291. Copy Data Sys., Inc. v. Toshiba Am., Inc., 663 F.2d 405, 409-11 (2d Cir. 1981).
292. Red Diamond Supply v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 637 F.2d 1001, 1004-05 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
827 (1981); Abadir & Co. v. Fi'at Miss. Corp., 651 F.2d 422, 424-28 (5th Cir. 1981). Both Abadir and Red Diamond
were discussed by the Fifth Circuit in Graphic Prods. Distribs. v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 1575-76 (5th Cir. 1983).
293. Davis-Watkins Co. v. Service Merchandise, 686 F.2d 1190, 1201-02 (6th Cir. 1982).
294. Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 664 F.2d 1348, 1354-57 (9th Cir. 1982).
295. Accord Marquis v. Chrysler Corp., 577 F.2d 624, 640 n.27 (9th Cir. 1978) ("The dual distribution system
employed to market Dodge products does not in itself violate the antitrust laws."). The Sixth Circuit has reserved ruling
on the dual distribution issue. Bamosky Oils v. Union Oil Co., 665 F.2d 74, 80 n.10 (6th Cir. 1981).
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courts reasoned that the per se rule is inapplicable to vertical nonprice restraints, and
that the restraints involved in a dual distribution system remain within the definition
of a vertical restraint. 296 In reaching its conclusion that a dual distribution system must
be evaluated under the rule of reason, the Fifth Circuit in Abadir & Co. v. First
Mississippi Corp. ,297 defined a vertical restraint as one which "the party imposing the
agreement has the potential economic advantages typically available to a supplier in
a vertical market-distributing agreement. "298 This analysis is consistent with Sylvan-
ia's emphasis upon the effects on competition of a practice challenged under the
Sherman Act.
Faced with the circuits' conflicting pronouncements, the lower courts have
analyzed the strength of the plaintiff's showing of any restraint 299 and the effects on
interbrand competition in deciding if the dual distribution doctrine should apply. For
example, Midwestern Waffles v. Waffle House300 analyzed a dual distribution problem
by considering both the effects on competition and the right of the franchisor to select
the parties to whom and through whom it would sell. Dual distribution itself is not
unlawful. As is always true in antitrust analysis, the proper inquiry is the effect on
competition. The dual distribution system is most likely to be upheld when:
(a) the manufacturer sells at the same prices to the company-owned and to the indepen-
dent distributors;
(b) the company-owned distributor is not operating at a loss for extended periods of time,
eliminating a charge of predatory pricing;
(c) the manufacturer avoids actions to coerce adherence to its suggested prices;
(d) the company-owned distributor is not favored in allocations of products, parts, or
other services (i.e., dealer service training);
(e) termination, nonrenewal, or replacement of an independent distributor with a com-
pany-owned outlet is performed in an even-handed manner and in accordance with the
dealer agreement.
The national account practice of many manufacturers presents a variation of the
dual distribution problem. Commonly, a manufacturer or regional supplier reserves
to itself certain large accounts, which are frequently called "national accounts." The
rationale for the reservation of these accounts is that they are such large customers that
(a) the manufacturer may wish to give large volume discounts on orders, best
negotiated directly between the customer and the manufacturer; and (b) national
accounts require more attention and more servicing than do smaller accounts, also
best provided directly by the manufacturer.3 01 At least two federal circuits have held
296. See supra note 211.
297. 651 F.2d 422 (5th Cir. 1981).
298. Id. at 427 (footnote omitted). The court also stated: "Thus, vertical market-distributing agreements must truly
be imposed by a supplier, in fact. Market-distributing agreements which are initiated by distributors are horizontal, even
if the supplier is nominally a party to the contract." Id. at 427 n.5.
299. Blake Assocs. v. Omni Spectra, Inc., 1982-3 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,155 at pp. 71,499-71, 504 n. I (D. Mass.
1982).
300. 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,567 (N.D. Ga. 1982), aff'd per curiam, 734 F.2d 705 (1 lth Cir. 1984).
301. For a description of the place of national accounts in a distribution program, see Schwimmer v. Sony Corp.
of Am., 677 F.2d 946, 947 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 362 (1982). Schwinmer's description is not unlike the
typical national accounts program, which seeks to segregate volume accounts for attention by the manufacturer.
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that a distribution complaint about a national accounts program must be evaluated
under the rule of reason, rather than under the per se rule.
H&B Equipment Co. v. International Harvester Co.302 affirmed a directed
verdict for the manufacturer in a distributor's antitrust action. One of the dealer's
theories alleged a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act because "International
Harvester, as part of its dealership arrangement, blocked H&B from selling to certain
'house account' customers, including governments and rental yards." ' 303 Since the
source of the restraints was vertical, not horizontal, the Fifth Circuit held that the rule
of reason applied.3 04
Bostick Oil Co. v. Michelin Tire Corp.,305 a truck tire distributor's antitrust
action against a manufacturer, arose from the termination of a distribution contract.
The Fourth Circuit reversed the grant of the manufacturer's motion for a directed
verdict under theories for recovery under the Sherman Act and under the South
Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act. 306 The Fourth Circuit recognized that the
national accounts program was founded not upon a territorial restriction, but rather
upon a customer restriction. 307 The court held that a manufacturer's central billing
program is not per se illegal under the Sherman Act if the program was voluntary
(i.e., dealers could join or decline to join and yet remain dealers) and if the
manufacturer set no minimum resale price. 308 Nevertheless, the court reversed the
grant of the directed verdict motion because the manufacturer had pressured the
dealers and imposed an "effective barrier to dealer price competition. . . . 309
8. Actions Constituting Only Unfair Competition or Breach of Contract
A number of other antitrust principles support the conclusion that the usual
termination of a distribution agreement is not an antitrust violation. Fundamentally,
the antitrust laws were enacted for the protection of competition, not competitors. 310
Accordingly, unfair competition and other business torts are not antitrust violations;
indeed, the policies underlying the law of unfair competition are inconsistent
with those underlying antitrust law.3 1 ' Nor is breach of contract an antitrust
302. 577 F.2d 239 (5th Cir. 1978).
303. Id. at 243.
304. Id. at 245-46.
305. 702 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir. 1983).
306. Id. at 1209-10.
307. In support of its claim that the manufacturer restricted dealer territories, or customers to whom products could
be transferred, the court stated that the plaintiff dealer offered at most only "a strained view of the potential of the National
Accounts program as a means of overseeing dealer-customer contact. These theories were properly dismissed." Id. at 1218
n.22.
308. Id. at 1216.
309. Id. at 1217.
310. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 475, 488 (1977); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370
U.S. 294,320 (1962); Klamath-Lake Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. Klamath Medical Serv. Bureau, 701 F.2d 1276, 1292 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 88 (1983); Graphic Prods. Distribs. v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 1572 n.20 (11th Cir.
1983).
311. Hunt v. Crumboch, 325 U.S. 821, 826 (1945) ("That Act does not purport to afford remedies for all torts
committed by or against persons in interstate commerce."),followed in Stifel, Nicholaus & Co. v. Dain, Kalman & Quail,
Inc., 578 F.2d 2156, 2161 (8th Cir. 1978); Sutliffe, Inc. v. Donavan Cos., 727 F.2d 648,655 (7th Cir. 1984); L.A. Draper
& Son v. Wheelabrator-Fryo, Inc., 735 F.2d 414 (1lth Cir. 1984); Mid-West Underground Storage v. Porter, 718 F.2d
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offense. 31 2 Therefore, the manufacturer's decision not to renew a distributorship
agreement does not violate antitrust law.313
9. Relief to a Terminated Distributor under Section 2 of the Sherman Act
A dealer's claims against a manufacturer under section 2 of the Sherman Act3t4
usually fail because the three section 2 offenses (monopolization, attempt to monop-
olize, and conspiracy to monopolize) are oriented toward market structure and
conduct, a much broader analytical focus than a particular distributor's situation.
Hence, terminated dealers rarely prove offenses under section 2 of the Sherman Act
because the distributor does not demonstrate the specific intent to monopolize, a
493 (10th Cir. 1983); University Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Unimarc Ltd., 699 F.2d 846, 852 (7th Cir. 1983) ("Unfair
competition in the tort sense does not violate the federal antitrust laws, and to convert a claim of unfair competition into
a federal antitrust claim requires more than the addition of antitrust boilerplate."); A.H. Cox & Co. v. Star Mach. Co.,
653 F.2d 1302, 1308 (9th Cir. 1981) ("Similarly, allegations of unfair competition by the new dealer are insufficient to
raise antitrust concerns in this case."); Byars v. Bluff City News Co., 609 F.2d 843, 855 (6th Cir. 1979) ("Even the use
of unfair business practices as part of the termination may not invoke sanction under the antitrust laws."); Kestenbaum
v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 575 F.2d 564, 571 (5th Cir. 1978) ("Dealings between a manufacturer and its agents may be
arbitrary, unfair, or lacking in good business judgment, but, without more, they will not violate the Act."), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 909 (1979); Hill v. A-T-O, Inc., 535 F.2d 1349, 1355-56 (2d Cir. 1976) (plaintiff's claim alleging that the
defendant through fraudulent misrepresentations intended to and did restrain trade was properly dismissed); Dreibus v.
Wilson, 529 F.2d 170, 172-73 and n.1 (9th Cir. 1975) (no Sherman Act claims found in dealer terminations involving
acts of unfair competition such as "corporate executive unfaithfulness and intracorporate mismanagement," lack of proper
notice of termination, pirating of employees, taking over favored accounts, and similar activities); Ace Beer Distribs. v.
Kohn, Inc., 318 F.2d 283, 286 (6th Cir.) ("[lI]t is well settled that tortious conduct against one engaged in interstate
commerce or which has an effect on interstate commerce does not automatically constitute a violation of the Sherman
Act."), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 922 (1963); Merkle Press v. Merkle, 519 F. Supp. 50, 54 (D. Md. 1981) ("Courts must
be circumspect in converting ordinary business torts into violations of the antitrust laws. To do so would be to 'create a
federal common law of unfair competition' which was not the intent of the antitrust laws."); Uniroyal, Inc. v. Hoff &
Thames, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 1060 (S.D. Miss. 1981) (elimination of dealer's exclusive territory was not a section 1
violation; Sherman Act is not "a panacea for all business affronts which seem to fit nowhere else" and there was "no
antitrust wheat" among plaintiff's "proferred bushell of speculative chaff"); Grotes Mach. Works v. Hess, 496 F. Supp.
945 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (a conspiracy between a company's former manager of engineering and a competitor to obtain the
company's proprietary information was pro-competitive, even if illegal, and not violative of the Sherman Act; the antitrust
laws were enacted for the protection of competition, not competitors); B&B Oil & Chem. Co. v. Franklin Oil Corp., 293
F. Supp. 1313, 1317 (E.D. Mich. 1968) ("But the antitrust acts do not purport to formulate a code of business morality.
They are not tablets of stone for the conduct of business generally."). But see Havoco of Am., Ltd. v. Shell Oil Co., 626
F.2d 549, 556 (7th Cir. 1980); Juneau Square Corp. v. First Wis. Nat'l Bank, 624 F.2d 798, 812-13 (7th Cir. 1980).
312. Unijax, Inc. v. Champion Int'l, 683 F.2d 678, 684 n.12 (2d Cir. 1982) ("In numerous cases filed in federal
court, the parties cloak simple contract or fraud claims in the mantle of antitrust violations."); Reisner v. General Motors
Corp., 671 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1982) (facts behind a commercial venture that went sour would not support plaintiff's effort
to convert a contract claim into an antitrust conspiracy claim; antitrust laws were not designed to police the performance
of private contracts); Gowdish v. Eaton Corp., 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,913 (M.D.N.C. 1981) (motion for
summary judgment granted in favor of a lift truck manufacturer on antitrust claims brought by a terminated dealer, a
contract dispute between a dealership and the supplier may not be cast in antitrust terms); Williams v. Kleaveld, 1982-2
Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,919 (W.D. Mich. 1981) ("[Ihe antitrust laws are not a high powered version of the laws relating
to breach of contract.").
313. For example, J.H. Westerbeke Corp. v. Onan Corp., 580 F. Supp. 1173 (D. Mass. 1984), held that a decision
not to renew an ineffective distributor where the dealer had been devoting increasing attention to other products at the
expense of the defendant's products was not a violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act. Similarly, at least two circuits
have recognized that without more, a short notice cancellation provision in a dealer agreement is not an antitrust violation.
Osbom v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 324 F.2d 566, 575 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 963 (1964); Englander Motors
v. Ford Motor Co., 267 F.2d 11, 15 (6th Cir. 1959). In another case brought by an exclusive distributor of fluorescent
lamp ballasts against the manufacturer and its parent, the court rejected the plaintiffs attempt to create an antitrust case
out of the problems that had arisen concerning the oral agreement granting rights in a five state area. Universal Lite
Distribs. v. Northwest Indus., 452 F. Supp. 1206, 1211 (D. Md. 1978), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 602 F.2d 1173
(4th Cir. 1979).
314. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1984 Supp.).
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requirement of the offense of attempted monopolization. 315 The distributor usually
fails to prove that the defendant's actions were predatory or unreasonable, 31 6 or the
defendant willfully acquired or maintained its market power through the use of
predatory conduct. 31 7
Aside from these bases for rejection of a dealer's antitrust claims, most section
2 claims brought by distributors will fail to surmount the hurdle presented by the
principle that every manufacturer has a natural monopoly over its own product. 318
Accordingly, numerous cases have held that antitrust claims by terminated dealers are
not stated under section 2 of the Sherman Act when the terminated dealer alleges that
the manufacturer has attempted to monopolize or has abused its monopoly in the sale
or distribution of its own products.3 19 A manufacturer's lawful natural monopoly is
especially strong when its product is trademarked. 320 Discussing the law applicable
to antitrust claims by terminated dealers, the Sixth Circuit recently recognized that a
manufacturer's monopolization of its business was lawful, 321 and went on to quote
with approval Justice Stevens' opinion (when he was on the Seventh Circuit) which
explained that proof of a manufacturer's monopoly over its own product is not proof
of dominance in an economic market.322 Further, even if the manufacturer's own
product were the relevant market, a manufacturer's decision regarding termination or
315. General Business Sys. v. North Am. Philips Corp., 699 F.2d 965, 981 (9th Cir. 1983); Crown Beverage Co.
v. Cerveceria Moectezuma, S.A., 663 F.2d 886, 888 (9th Cir. 1981); A.H. Cox & Co. v. Star Mach. Co., 653 F.2d 1302,
1309 (9th Cir. 1981).
316. Walker v. U-Haul Co., 734 F.2d 1068, 1078 (5th Cir. 1984); Calculators Hawaii v. Brandt, Inc., 724 F.2d
1332, 1339 (9th Cir. 1983).
317. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966) (it is necessary to prove two elements to support
a section 2 violation: "(1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or
maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business
acumen, or historic accident."); General Business Sys. v. North Am. Philips Corp., 699 F.2d 965, 981 (9th Cir. 1983);
Cowley v. Braden Indus., 613 F.2d 751, 756 (9th Cir.), (finding no evidence that the manufacturer "acquired or
maintained its market position through the use of predatory conduct as required by the second part" of the Grinnell test),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 965 (1980); J.H. Westerbeke Corp. v. Onan Corp., 580 F. Supp. 1173 (D. Mass. 1984).
318. United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 393 (1956).
319. Domed Stadium Hotel v. Holiday Inns, 732 F.2d 480, 488-89 (5th Cir. 1984) (relevant market was hotel
rooms, not Holiday Inn rooms); Parsons v. Ford Motor Co., 669 F.2d 308, 312 (5th Cir.) (affirming grant of summary
judgment to defendant manufacturer under Sherman Act section 2 claim, which charged defendant with attempting to
monopolize the sale of new Fords) cert. denied, 459 U.S. 832 (1982); Sports Center v. Riddell, Inc., 673 F.2d 786, 791
(5th Cir. 1982) ("[O]bviously, every manufacturer has a natural monopoly over the distribution of its products. That
monopoly, however, does not contravene the antitrust laws."); Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637
F.2d 105, 117-18 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981); Oreek Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 563 F.2d 54, 58
(2d Cir. 1977) (rejecting terminated distributor's argument that its termination provided a manufacturer with a monopoly
position in the market for Whirlpool vacuum cleaners; the distributor failed to demonstrate anything unique about those
vacuum cleaners sufficient to establish them as a separate market apart from other brands of vacuum cleaners); Lynch
Business Mach. v. A.B. Dick Co., 1984-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) T 66,069 (N.D. Ohio 1984); Gowdish v. Eaton Corp.,
1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 163,913 (M.D.N.C. 1981) (terminated lift truck distributor failed to avoid summary judgment
on its attempted monopoly claim because the relevant market was lift trucks, and not Yale lift trucks). Parsons and Sports
Center were followed and explained in Transource Int'l v. Trinity Indus., 725 F.2d 274, 282-83 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding
that the court cannot limit the relevant market to a particular manufacturer's product alone). See generally Martin, Use
of Section 2 to Control Conduct in Vertical Relationships-An Opportunity or an Abuse?, 52 Asm'usr L.J. 111, 126
(1983) ("[Ihe majority of recent cases appear to have rejected plaintiffs' efforts to define the market in terms of a single
product.").
320. V. & L. Cicione, Inc. v. C. Schmidt & Sons, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 643, 651 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
321. Dunn & Mavis, Inc. v. Nu-Car Driveaway, 691 F.2d 241, 244 (6th Cir. 1982).
322. Id. at 244.
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nonrenewal of a dealer could not constitute a section 2 violation because the identity
of a particular dealer cannot affect the market. 323
In sum, terminated dealers' antitrust claims under section 2 of the Sherman Act
rarely surmount the hurdles presented by the elements of a section 2 offense. Isolated
decisions about distribution changes simply do not rise to the level of the abuse of
monopoly power.
10. The Permissibility of Vertical Integration
Termination or nonrenewal of distributorships can take place as part of a plan for
vertical integration, or can operate with the effect of partial vertical integration.
Unless done by a monopolist, vertical integration is not a violation of the Sherman
Act.3 24 The United States Supreme Court set forth that proposition in its 1948
decision, United States v. Columbia Steel Co.:325 "It seems clear to us that vertical
integration, as such without more, cannot be held violative of the Sherman Act.
' 326
The Eighth Circuit has defined vertical integration as "the inclusion within a
single firm of two or more stages in the production or distribution of an end
product.' '327 The courts have sometimes viewed vertical integration as merely a larger
scale example of the manufacturer's right to replace one exclusive distributor with
another without violating section 1 of the Sherman Act. 328 The Ninth Circuit has held
that without "an anticompetitive intent or effect, a manufacturer may replace one
exclusive distributor with another without violating § 1 of the Sherman Act, even if
the change is effected by integrating vertically. ' 3 29 More recently, the Seventh
Circuit engaged in a similar analysis. 330 Likewise, the First Circuit has held that a
decision to integrate vertically downstream 33' did not violate the antitrust laws when
a newspaper decided to begin selling its product directly.
332
Accordingly, a manufacturer should be free to integrate vertically in order to
achieve economic efficiencies. This proposition is qualified primarily by the assumed
inapplicability to any particular factual situation of the antimerger provisions of
323. Mogul v. General Motors Corp., 391 F. Supp. 1305, 1314 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
324. See Auburn News Co. v. Providence Journal Co., 659 F.2d 273, 278 (Ist Cir. 1981) ("Vertical integration by
a monopolist, however, can have adverse consequences on competition because monopoly at one level of the production-
distribution continuum may carry with it the ability to affect competition in earlier or later phases."); Byars v. BluffCity
News Co., 609 F.2d 843,858-59,861 (6th Cir. 1979) (stating three situations in which a refusal to deal as part ofa vertical
integration scheme is anticompetitive).
325. 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
326. Id. at 525.
327. Paschall v. Kansas City Star Co., 727 F.2d 692, 696 n.3 (8th Cir. 1984) (quoting Paschall v. Kansas City Star
Co., 695 F.2d 322, 327 n.6 (8th Cir. 1982)). Cf. Coleman Motor Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 525 F.2d 1338, 1346-47 (3d
Cir. 1975) (examining whether a reduction in intrabrand competition by a vertically integrated distribution system is
unlawful, and holding that a right to structure one's distribution system as it wishes "is at least subject to the qualification
that a lawful end achieved by unlawful means is not protected from the antitrust laws.").
328. See supra text following note 250.
329. Crown Beverage Co. v. Cerveceria Moctezuma, S.A., 663 F.2d 886, 888 (9th Cir. 1981).
330. University Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Unimarc Ltd., 699 F.2d 846, 852 (7th Cir. 1983), quoted in Jack Walters
& Sons Corp. v. Morton Bldgs., Inc., 1984-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,080 (7th Cir. 1984).
331. Auburn News Co. v. Providence Journal Co., 659 F.2d 273, 278 (Ist Cir. 1981) ("In essence, applicant
decided to vertically integrate downstream-that is to undertake the distribution of its products which had been and could
be sold to independent producers or distributors.").
332. Id.
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section 7 of the Clayton Act333 and section 2 of the Sherman Act 334 which proscribes
monopolization and attempts and conspiracies to monopolize.
B. State Laws Applicable to Distributorships
Two typical types of statutory protection-the Uniform Commercial Code and
state dealer protection acts-and several frequently tried common law theories
(fiduciary duty, duty of best efforts, and a duty of good faith and fair dealing)
comprise the majority of dealer claims under state law. 335
1. The Uniform Commercial Code
Several provisions of Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code hold
significance for dealer termination litigation: the provisions regarding termination and
cancellation of contracts, the express obligation of good faith, and the provisions
regarding unconscionability. 336 However, the courts have typically held that certain
provisions of the Code, especially section 2-302 concerning unconscionability, are
not applicable to distribution agreements.3 37 Indeed, cases which support 2-302's
applicability are almost impossible to find.
A number of courts have held Article Two of the U.C.C. to be applicable to
distribution agreements. The Fifth Circuit in its leading opinion, Corenswet, Inc. v.
Amana Refrigeration,338 directly held that the Uniform Commercial Code applies to
333. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1984 Supp.). See University Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Unimarc Ltd., 699 F.2d 846, 852 (7th
Cir. 1983). A section 7 claim can be difficult to support. Sierra Wine & Liquors Co. v. Heublein, Inc., 626 F.2d 130,
133 (9th Cir. 1980) (affirming summary judgment for defendant on a terminated distributor's section 7 claim, where the
defendant corporation acquired control of the parent of the company for which plaintiff was the exclusive distributor, and
the acquired company then terminated the distributor agreement).
334. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1984 Supp.).
335. The state of Massachusetts is a typical example of a state in which a number of statutes as well as the common
law are available for a terminated dealer to attempt to use in litigation with the manufacturer. There are at least three
statutes potentially available in Massachusetts; Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code, MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 106,
§ 2-101 to 2-725 (1985); the Massachusetts State Antitrust statute, MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 93A, §§ 4-6 (1985); and the
Massachusetts Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices statute, Mass. GEN. LAws ch. 93A § 2 (1985). The leading
Massachusetts termination case is Zapatha v. Dairy Mart, 381 Mass. 287, 408 N.E.2d 1370 (1980), which reversed a
judgment in favor of franchisees who sought to enjoin termination of a franchise agreement. Under both the UCC and the
Massachusetts Deceptive Trade Practices statute, the appellate court held that it was not unconscionable, in bad faith, nor
an unfair or deceptive act or practice for the franchisor to enforce a franchise provision that permitted termination without
cause, when the franchisor had given written notice to the franchisee that the contract was being terminated effective in
ninety days. Id. at 293, 295, 408 N.E.2d 1370, 1373, 1376-77.
336. See generally Comment, Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code andFranchise Distribution Agreements,
1969 DuKE L.J. 959, 1009 (There is no adequate reason that the relationships between franchised dealers and their
manufacturers "should not be governed by the modem commerciai principles of the Code whenever they are appropri-
ate.").
337. Stanley A. Klopp, Inc. v. John Deere Co., 510 F. Supp. 807 (E.D. Pa. 1981), aff 'd mem., 676 F.2d 688 (3d
Cir. 1982) (defendant manufacturer's motion for partial summary judgment properly granted in a suit by a former dealer);
Zapatha v. Dairy Mart, 381 Mass. 284, 287, 408 N.E.2d 1370, 1375-76 (1980) (a ninety day termination clause in a
franchise agreement was not unconscionable under section 2-302; the issue was a question of law for the court, to be
determined as ofthe time the contract was made); W.L. May, Co. v. Philco-Ford Corp., 273 Or. 701, 543 P.2d 283 (1975)
(reversing judgment for damages obtained by a wholesale parts distributor that sued the manufacturer for termination of
a distributorship contract). See generally Gellhom, Limitations on Contract Termination Rights-Franchise Cancella-
tions, 1967 DutK L.J. 465, 492 ("In any case, the doctrine of unconscionability has not generally been applied to limit
the harsh effects of franchise terminations.").
338. 594 F.2d 129 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 938 (1979).
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distributorship agreements. 339 The court reversed the grant of a preliminary injunction
which forbade the termination of an exclusive distributor of home applicances,
holding that an arbitrary termination was permissible under the contract and under the
Uniform Commercial Code. 340 The trial court had ruled (a) that the arbitrary
termination was a breach of the distributorship agreement; (b) that the termination
clause, which permitted either party to terminate the contract "for any reason,"
permitted termination for some reason and not for no reason; and (c) in the alternative,
that the U.C.C.'s "good faith" principle forbade the bad faith termination of
exclusive distributorships. 341 Before analyzing the obligation of good faith dealing
and the effect of the Uniform Commercial Code's provision regarding duration of an
agreement, the court held that the Uniform Commercial Code governs a distributor-
ship agreement. 342 Numerous courts have agreed. 343
Two decisions in the Eighth Circuit have expressly followed Corenswet applying
both Iowa and Missouri law. 344 The Sixth Circuit also followed Corenswet in
Cardinal Stone Co. v. Rival Manufacturing Co.,345 which affirmed a grant of
summary judgment in favor of a defendant manufacturer under Ohio law, holding that
an experienced businessman may not represent himself "as an untutored victim of
sharp business practices." 346 It is worth noting that Cardinal Stone affirmed summary
judgment regarding the right to terminate a contract. Application of the Uniform
Commercial Code to distributorship agreements may encourage summary disposition
of questions under distributorship agreements. In a case handled by the author, Mead
Corp. v. McNally-Pittsburg Manufacturing Corp.,347 the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals pointed out that the U.C.C. provides rules of law to resolve questions which
might otherwise remain for jury consideration3 48
Kirby v. Chrysler Corp.349 noted that "a clear majority of courts that have
reached the issue have held that distributorship or franchise agreements are
governed by" the U.C.C.35° The courts that have so held include the Fifth, 351
339. Id. at 134. The Fifth Circuit continues to adhere to Corensvet. Acme Refrigeration v. Whirlpool Corp., 747
F.2d 292, 293 (5th Cir. 1984).
340. Corenswet, Inc. v. Amana Refrigeration, 594 F.2d 129, 131 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 938 (1979).
341. Id. at 133.
342. Id. at 134-35.
343. See, e.g., Aaron E. Levine & Co. v. Calkraft Paper Co., 429 F. Supp. 1039, 1048 (E.D. Mich. 1976) ("Since
the complaint involves a transaction in goods, the sales article of Uniform Commercial Code as adopted in Michigan is
applicable."); Des Moines Blue Ribbon Distribs. v. Drewrys Ltd., 129 N.W.2d 731,736 (Iowa 1964) ("A distributorship
contract is more than a mere contract of agency. It is also a sales contract but it is also more than a mere sales contract.
It partakes of the substantial aspects of both."); Quality Performance Lines v. Yoho Automotive, 609 P.2d 1340, 1342
(Utah 1980) ("Although a distributorship agreement is more involved than a typical sales contract, it is subject to Utah's
Uniform Commercial Code.").
344. Ralph's Distrib. Co. v. AMF, Inc., 662 F.2d 670, 673 n.3 (8th Cir. 1981) (applying Iowa law in suit by
distributor of snowmobiles for breach of contract); Vigano v. Wylain, Inc., 633 F.2d 522, 525 n.3 (8th Cir. 1980)
(applying Missouri law in suit by distributor of modular homes for wrongful termination).
345. 669 F.2d 395 (6th Cir. 1982).
346. Id. at 396.
347. 654 F.2d 1197 (6th Cir. 1981).
348. Id. at 1206. Accord WICO Corp. v. Willis Indus., 567 F. Supp. 352, 355 (N.D. 111. 1983) ("Although the
Agreements are in many ways hybrids, their sale-of-goods purpose clearly predominates.").
349. 554 F. Supp. 743 (D. Md. 1982).
350. Id. at 749.
351. Corenswet, Inc. v. Amana Refrigeration, 594 F.2d 129 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 938 (1979).
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Sixth,352 Seventh, 353 and Eighth354 Circuits.
Another line of cases holds that even though the Uniform Commercial Code may
not be expressly applicable to distribution agreements, its principles are applicable by
analogy. Zapatha v. Dairy Mart355 reversed an injunction against termination of a
franchise agreement, holding that the principles of unconscionability and good faith
embodied in the Uniform Commercial Code applied to the agreement, but that the
franchisor's termination of the agreement without cause on ninety days' notice was
neither unconscionable nor in bad faith under such standards. In so holding, the court
analyzed whether the sales article of the U.C.C. applied to the agreement in question,
and concluded that its principles of good faith and unconscionability applied to
franchise agreements by analogy. 356 A similar analysis was followed in Stanley A.
Klopp, Inc. v. John Deere Co. ,357 which upheld the enforcement of a no-lost-profits
provision in a dealer agreement.
2. State Dealer Protection Statutes: The Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law
Many states have enacted dealer protection acts of various types. 358 An analysis
of each is beyond the scope of this Article. Most cases brought under these statutes
are controlled by the language of the applicable legislation, so that their precedential
effect is limited. Courts have often relied upon the presence 359 or absence 360 of state
dealer protection statutes to determine the public policy of a particular state toward
dealers or franchisees. Nevertheless, the absence of legislation is a thin ground upon
which to base a determination of policy. State contract and tort law should govern,
with perhaps the passing observation that the legislature has not acted in the area.
352. Cardinal Stone Co. v. Rival Mfg. Co., 669 F.2d 395 (6th Cir. 1982). Cf. Randolph v. New Eng. Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 526 F.2d 1383, 1386 (6th Cir. 1975) (insurance agent's suit against the insurer, alleging breach of a general
agency contract by termination in bad faith and without cause).
353. Rockwell Eng'g Co. v. Automatic Timing & Controls Co., 559 F.2d 460, 463 (7th Cir. 1977).
354. Ralph's Distrib. Co. v. AMF, Inc., 667 F.2d 670, 673 n.6 (8th Cir. 1981) (Iowa law); Vigano v. Wylain, Inc.,
633 F.2d 522, 525 n.3 (8th Cir. 1980) (Missouri law).
355. 381 Mass. 284, 287, 408 N.E.2d 1370, 1374-75 (1980) ("Accordingly, courts have applied the Uniform
Commercial Code to distributorship agreements even though such agreements have concerned more than the sale of
goods.").
356. Id. at 288-94, 408 N.E.2d at 1374-77.
357. 510 F. Supp. 807, 809 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
358. These statutes are compiled in CCH Bus. FRANcH. GUmE.
359. Luis Rosario, Inc. v. Amana Refrigeration, 733 F.2d 172, 173 (Ist Cir. 1984) (public policy of Puerto Rico
Dealer's Act was to prevent dealer termination without just cause); Arnott v. American Oil Co., 609 F.2d 873, 883 (8th
Cir. 1979) (South Dakota Franchise Act was indicative of public policy regarding franchise terminations), cert. denied,
446U.S. 918 (1980); 33 Flavors, Inc. v. Bresler's 33 Flavors, 475 F. Supp. 217, 227 n.29 (D. Del. 1979) ("The Delaware
courts have recognized the Franchise Act as being an expression of the public policy of the State of Delaware."); Atlantic
Richfield Co. v. Razumic, 480 Pa. 366, 390 A.2d 736 (1978) (relying in part on public policy shown by dealer termination
law which had not yet taken effect).
360. Bain v. Champlin Petroleum Co., 692 F.2d 43, 48 (8th Cir. 1982) (distinguishing Arnott v. American Oil Co.,
609 F.2d 873 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 918 (1980), which had relied upon South Dakota Franchise Act,
because Missouri had no comparable statute); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Rubenfeld, 48 A.D. 2d 428, 370 N.Y.S.2d 943, 949
(App. Div. 1975) (in reversing a trial court's determination that a fiduciary relationship existed between a dealer and an
oil company, the court noted that the New York legislature had passed a franchise statute which was vetoed by the
governor, the court concluded that there was no fiduciary duty with respect to franchise terminations), discussed in Arnott
v. American Oil Co., 609 F.2d 873, 883 n.8 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 918 (1980).
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No state dealer protection act places more restrictive conditions upon a manu-
facturer's conduct than the Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law. 361 The statute has broad
applicability to agreements between manufacturers and dealers and stringent require-
ments with respect to changes in the competitive circumstances of a dealership and
with respect to termination. An examination of the cases decided under the Wisconsin
Act reveals the length to which state laws can go to protect distributors.
Assuming that the prospective distributor meets the requirement of possession
of a "dealership," 362 the following summary of the Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law
shows the extensive protections the act affords dealers. First, the manufacturer may
not terminate, cancel, fail to renew, or substantially change the competitive circum-
stances of a dealership agreement without good cause. The burden of proving good
cause falls on the manufacturer. 363 In addition, the statute requires at least ninety
days' prior written notice of termination, cancellation, nonrenewal, or substantial
change in competitive circumstances. The notice must state all the reasons for such
action, and must provide the dealer sixty days within which to correct any claimed
deficiency. 364 In the event of termination, the dealer has the right to require repur-
chase at the fair wholesale market value all inventories bearing the manufacturer's
trademark or other identification sold to the dealer for resale.365
The Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law also affects the relief available to a
terminated dealer. The act grants a right of action for both damages (together with
costs and "reasonable actual attorney fees") and injunctive relief against termination,
cancellation, nonrenewal, or substantial change of competitive circumstances in
violation of the statute. 366 The statute also purports to invalidate arbitration agree-
ments in which the criteria for determination of good cause and the relief provided are
less substantial than the act provides. 367 The statute defines "good cause" as either
the dealer's lack of substantial compliance with essential, reasonable, non-
361. Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 135.01-.07 (West 1984).
362. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 135.02(2) (Vest 1984).
363. Ws. STAT. ANN. § 135.03 (West 1984). Van v. Mobil Oil Corp., 515 F. Supp. 487,490-91 (E.D. Wis. 1981)
(a substantial change in the competitive circumstances of a dealership agreement within section 135.03 occurred when the
manufacturer changed a dealer's credit terms to COD, even though the change came after plaintiff issued a check to
defendant and the check was later returned to defendant marked "non-sufficient funds.").
364. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 135.04 (west 1984). Violation of this section is sufficient to warrant the grant of injunctive
relief. In Paul Reilly Co. v. Dynaforce Corp., 499 F. Supp. 1033 (E.D. Wis. 1978), the court granted a preliminary
injunction against a termination that did not meet the notice requirements of the statute.
365. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 135.045 (West 1984).
366. Ws. STAT. ANN. § 135.06 (west 1984).
367. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 135.05 (west 1984). Cutter v. Scott & Fetzer Co., 510 F. Supp. 905, 907-09 (E.D. Wis.
1981) held that the general policy in favor of forum selection clauses must yield to the Wisconsin statutory policy favoring
the right to maintain an action in court under this statute. However, a case involving a forum selection provision like Cutter
should be distinguished from a case involving an arbitration agreement. Under the United States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.
§§ 1-208 (1983), the strong federal policy favoring the enforcement of arbitration agreements should prevail over a
contrary Wisconsin policy. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) held that a provision of the California
Franchise Investment Law (which had been interpreted by the California Supreme Court to require judicial consideration
of claims under that state statute) must give way to the federal arbitration statute. A similar outcome should result when
a party seeks to invalidate an arbitration provision in a dealer agreement under the Wisconsin statute.
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discriminatory requirements, or the dealer's bad faith in carrying out the terms of the
dealership. 368
The Wisconsin act is broad in scope. It applies to agreements "either expressed
or implied, whether oral or written," 369 and the courts interpret it broadly. Indeed,
one element of a "dealership" under the statute is "a community of interest in the
business" of distribution.370 One appellate court has held that the typical performance
standards in a dealer agreement are a sufficient indication of the manufacturer's
"community of interest" with the dealer in the business. 37' Another court has
construed the act broadly, implying a dealer agreement outside the written dealer
agreement. 372 However, either problems of contract formation 373 or a plaintiff's status
as a manufacturer's representative 374 may avoid the act's application.
Courts have readily granted injunctive relief and damages under the Wisconsin
Fair Dealership Law. 375 However, one court has held that despite the fact that the
Wisconsin statute applies even to statewide terminations of all of a manufacturer's
dealers, permanent injunctive relief would not be granted when the manufacturer had
abandoned its dealer system in every other state. Instead, the plaintiff was deemed to
have a remedy in damages.376 The Fifth Circuit opinion in C.A. May Marine Supply
Co. v. Brunswick Corp. ,377 affirming the award of damages of one year's lost profits
under this statute, contains one of the best discussions on damages in a terminated
dealer action. The court set forth the generally accepted methods of calculating
damages. 378 The court also noted that similar conduct frequently underlies alleged
violation of both franchise laws and antitrust laws. 379
The Wisconsin act's standards import into distributorship agreements a far more
stringent set of requirements than is usually contained in a dealer agreement prepared
by a manufacturer. However, the selection of the law of another state, coupled with
368. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 135.02(4) (West 1984). This definition has withstood attack on the ground that it is
unconstitutionally vague. Boatland, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 558 F.2d 818, 824 (6th Cir. 1977).
369. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 135.02(3) (West 1984). However, the act does not apply to motor vehicle dealers, distributors
or wholesalers, or to door-to-door salesmen. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 135.07 (1984).
370. Wts. STAT. ANN. § 135.02(3) (West 1984).
371. Boatland, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 558 F.2d 818, 824 (6th Cir. 1977).
372. Van v. Mobil Oil Corp., 515 F. Supp. 487, 491 (E.D. Wis. 1981). In Van, the "plaintiff and defendant
executed a retail dealer's contract under the terms of which plaintiff became a Mobil dealer." Id. at 489. Yet, under section
135.02, the court found an implied agreement to deliver to plaintiff gasoline on a previous load basis system, to be a
change in the parties' dealer agreement. Id. at 491. In effect, the court implied a dealer agreement outside the written dealer
contract.
373. Century Hardware Corp. v. Acme United Corp., 467 F. Supp. 350, 354 (E.D. Wis. 1979) (finding no dealer
agreement because defendant's form of agreement specified the terms of acceptance, with which plaintiff did not comply).
374. Compare Wilburn v. Jack Cartwright, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 174, 178 (E.D. Wis. 1982) ("manufacturer's
representative" was a dealer within the statute; defendant permanently enjoined from terminating plaintiff without first
complying with statute), with Quirk v. Atlanta Stove Works, 537 F. Supp. 907 (E.D. Wis. 1982) (manufacturer's sales
representative was outside protection of Fair Dealership Law; summary judgment granted defendant on statutory claim).
375. Menominee Rubber Co. v. Gould, Inc., 657 F.2d 164 (7th Cir. 1981) (affirming grant of preliminary injunction
against termination under Wisconsin statute); Reinders Bros. v. Rain Bird E. Sales Corp., 627 F.2d 44 (7th Cir. 1980)
(affirming preliminary injunction for terminated dealer in view of the irreparable harm to the good will accumulated during
twenty years as a dealer for defendant, but reversing trial court's action in failing to consider defendant's demand for a
bond under FED. R. Civ. P. 65(c)).
376. Kealey Pharmacy & Home Care Serv. v. Walgreen Co., 539 F. Supp. 1357, 1364-66 (W.D. Wis. 1982).
377. 649 F.2d 1049, 1053-55 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1125 (1981).
378. Id. at 1053.
379. Id. at 1053 n.4.
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46:925
an arbitration provision, should enable a manufacturer to avoid the application of that
statute.
3. Implying a Fiduciary Relationship in Dealership Agreements
In the 1970s, a body of commentary380 and a few cases381 argued for the
imposition of an implicit fiduciary relationship in franchise agreements. Generally,
this notion is unsupported by the case law. 382 Traditionally, courts imposed no
fiduciary relationship upon the contractual relationship existing between a distributor
and a manufacturer. 383 However, the fiduciary relationship theory reached its high
water mark in Arnott v. American Oil Co. ,384 an action by a service station dealer
alleging that the defendant oil company breached its fiduciary duty by terminating his
lease without good cause. The Eighth Circuit used vague language to describe the
existence of an "inherent" fiduciary duty. 385 Subsequent cases have severely re-
stricted the vitality of Arnott. The Eighth Circuit itself expressly limited Arnott in
Bain v. Champlin Petroleum Co. 386 and lower courts have refused to give Arnott a
broad reading. 387
Two other circuits have also criticized the result in Arnott. The Fifth Circuit, in
Carter Equipment Co. v. John Deere Industrial Equipment Co.,388 reversed a
$1 million jury verdict "based primarily on [a] cause of action that alleged a breach
380. Brown & Cohen, Franchise Equities, 63 MAss. L. REv. 109 (1978); Brown & Cohen, Franchise Misuse, 48
Norm DuAm LAw. 1145 (1972-1973); Brown, Franchising-A Fiduciary Relationship, 49 Tsx. L. Rv. 650 (1971). See
also Brown, The Realities of Franchising, 73 Com. L.J. 371 (1968); Chisum, State Regulation of Franchising: The
Washington Experience, 48 WASH. L. REv. 291 (1973); Hewitt, Good Faith or Unconscionability-Franchisee Remedies
for Termination, 29 Bus. LAw. 227 (1973).
381. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Rubenfeld, 72 Misc. 2d 392, 339 N.Y.S.2d 623 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1972), rev'd, 48 A.D.2d
428, 370 N.Y.S.2d 943 (App. Div. 1975).
382. Brown, Franchising-A Fiduciary Relationship, 49 TEx. L. Ray. 650, 664 (1970-1971) ("I immediately
concede that no reported American case has applied these theories to franchising .... ); In re 7-11 Franchise Antitrust
Litig., 1974-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 75,429 at p. 98,428 (N.D. Cal. 1974) ("Neither party cites any reported federal court
cases recognizing a concept of fiduciary duty in the franchising area, and this Court does not see anything to be gained
by adopting this concept that could not be gained by using other concepts long accepted in the law."); Eaton, Yale and
Towne, Inc. v. Sherman Indus. Equip. Co., 316 F. Supp. 435, 445 (E.D. Mo. 1970) ("The Court has been cited no
authority that indicates the existence of a franchisor-franchisee relationship that places the franchisor in the position of a
fiduciary."); Texaco, Inc. v. A.A. Gold, Inc., 78 Misc. 2d 1050, 357 N.Y.S.2d 951, 956 (Sup. Ct. 1974) ("[Ihe
syllogistic semantics" of such a theory are unjustified and "[t]he court in this case will not indulge itself in such
fantasies."). But see American Nursing Care v. Leisure, 609 F. Supp. 419, 431 (N.D. Ohio 1984).
383. A.B.C. Packard, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 275 F.2d 63, 67 (9th Cir. 1960) (in the absence of fraud or
special contractual provisions, existence of economic inequality in distributorships "does not create a legal fiduciary
relationship between the contracting parties."); Motor Car Supply Co. v. General Household Utils. Co., 80 F.2d 167, 171
(4th Cir. 1935) (distributorship for refrigerators in which the plaintiff had argued that it was a "comparatively helpless
dealer at the mercy of manufacturer," the court replied that when "parties deal upon such a basis, however, they cannot
invoke the aid of the courts when their expectations are disappointed. Our function is to interpret and enforce contracts,
not to make or extend them.").
384. 609 F.2d 873, 881 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 918 (1980).
385. Id. at 881.
386. 692 F.2d 43, 48 (8th Cir. 1982). Accord W.K.T. Distrib. Co. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 746 F.2d 1333, 1336 (8th
Cir. 1984).
387. RJM Sales & Mktg. v. Banfi Prods. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1368, 1378 (D. Minn. 1982) (granting motion for
summary judgment on a fiduciary relationship claim and explaining that Bain had "reconsidered Arnott."); Picture Lake
Campground v. Holiday Inns, 497 F. Supp. 858, 869 (E.D. Va. 1980) (criticizing Arnatt, and noting that "Arnott is in
the distinct minority of federal and state court decisions which have either rejected or failed to frid the existence of a
fiduciary duty in the franchise context.").
388. 681 F.2d 386 (5th Cir. 1982).
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of a fiduciary duty," 389 remanding for a new trial under correct jury instructions. The
court specifically disagreed with the Eighth Circuit's statement that a fiduciary duty
inheres in a franchise relationship, 390 and further held Arnott distinguishable. 391 The
Seventh Circuit in Murphy v. White Hen Pantry Co.3 92 not only limited Arnott to a
franchise termination situation, but also noted that "an inspection of the jury
instruction upheld there indicates that nothing more than well-accepted contract
principles were thereby imposed. ' 393
Murphy v. White Hen Pantry Co.394 summarized the cases opposing the fidu-
ciary relationship theory without reference to its earlier opinion in Bromberg v.
Holiday Inns of America.395 The Seventh Circuit held in White Hen Pantry that no
fiduciary duty to convenience food store franchisees was owed in a case for
"damages, declaratory and injunctive relief, reformation of the franchise contracts,
and an accounting.' '396 The court reviewed the cases involving attempts by plaintiffs
to imply fiduciary duties into franchise agreements, holding that the case law did not
support such a theory.397 Since the case law has not embraced fiduciary theories, a
claim based on fiduciary duty is not likely to survive a preliminary motion. 398
4. Implied Covenants of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Unable to state a claim for breach of an implied fiduciary duty, a terminated
dealer may instead pursue relief under the theory that implied in every agreement is
a covenant of good faith and fair dealing which precludes either party to the agreement
from taking actions to frustrate the benefits to the other party under the agreement. 399
389. Id. at 389 n.4. However, the court held that it was not error to submit this cause of action to the jury; the only
error was in the jury instructions. Id. at 392.
390. Id. at 390 n.6.
391. Id. at 391 n.8.
392. 691 F.2d 350, 355 (7th Cir. 1982), cited with approval in Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Bldgs., 737
F.2d 698 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 432 (1984).
393. Id. at 355.
394. 691 F.2d 350, 354-55 (7th Cir. 1982).
395. 388 F.2d 639, 645-46 (7th Cir. 1967) (no joint venture created by franchisor's commitment letter proposing
to accept plaintiff's application for hotel franchise upon compliance with specific conditions; court rejected argument that
the letter created a fiduciary relationship), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 912 (1968).
396. 691 F.2d 350, 351 (7th Cir. 1982).
397. Id. at 354-55. AccordJack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Bldgs., 737 F.2d 698, 711 (7th Cir. 1984); Domed
Stadium Hotel v. Holiday Inns, 732 F.2d 480, 485 (5th Cir. 1984) (no breach of a fiduciary relationship when franchisor
acquired hotel in franchisee's area); Picture Lake Campground v. Holiday Inns, 497 F. Supp. 858, 869 (E.D. Va. 1980)
("A franchise relationship is inherently a business relationship, not a fiduciary relationship.").
398. In Ohio and California, the courts have expressly rejected the implication of a fiduciary relationship in
distribution agreements. See Walker v. KFC Corp., 728 F.2d 1215, 1221 n.5 (9th Cir. 1984) (in fast food franchisee's
suit for damages against franchisor, court held trial court properly directed a verdict against plaintiff's claim for breach
of fiduciary duty because no such duty existed between the parties either under California common law or under California
Franchise Investment Law); Stanley Steemer Int'l v. Frazier, 2 Ohio Bar Rpt. 443,447 (Pickaway County C.P. 1982) (sale
of franchise created no fiduciary relationship under Ohio law), aff'd, 57 Ohio St. Bar Ass'n Rpt. 883 (App. 1984); Dayton
Motels v. Holiday Inns, No. 74-1150 (Montgomery County C.P., July 29, 1977) (briefed by author, court rejected
fiduciary duty as part of a franchise in an action in which the plaintiff maintained that the defendant franchisor owned a
fiduciary duty which was breached by the addition of another motel into plaintiff's allegedly exclusive territory). But cf.
McAlpine v. AAMCO Automatic Transmissions, 461 F. Supp. 1232, 1249 (E.D. Mich. 1978) ("There is case law for
the proposition that a franchisor who adds franchises to an already saturated market without utilizing geographic spacing
provisions has engaged in tortious conduct.").
399. See generally Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 HAxv. L.
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In the distributorship area, a number of cases have held that a dealer may rely upon
an implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing.4o0 In most instances, this implied
obligation means no more than a duty "not to hinder ... [one's] ability to achieve
operational success. "40
The implication of covenants in dealer agreements is subject to the general rule
that no implied covenant or duty will be found that is inconsistent with the express
terms of the agreement. 40 2 As stated by the Fifth Circuit, the implied obligation of
good faith "should not be used to override or contradict" the express terms of a
contract. 40 3
Further, the courts can usually reach an equitable result without expressly
imposing a duty of good faith and fair dealing. The Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia provided a good example of this point in an opinion which examined the
existence and applicability of a "duty to perform in good faith" in an action brought
by a terminated sales representative.40 4 The court held that "the modem doctrine of
'obligation to perform in good faith' [is]... simply a rechristening of fundamental
principles of contract law well established" in the cases, and that the significance of
R v. 369 (1980); Gellhom, supra note 2, at 499-504. Gellhom comments that only a few isolated cases have adopted a
constructive good faith condition on termination rights.
400. Lippo v. Mobil Oil Corp., 776 F.2d 706, 714 n.14 (7th Cir. 1985) (implied covenants of good faith "restricts
franchisor discretion in terminating a franchise agreement to those cases in which good cause exists."); United Roasters
v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 649 F.2d 985, 990 (4th Cir.) ("Clearly it had an obligation of good faith performance up until
its right of termination was actually effective."), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1054 (1981); 33 Flavors, Inc. v. Bresler's 33
Flavors, 475 F. Supp. 217, 320 (D. Del. 1979) (implying a duty of good faith under a franchise license agreement); W.L.
May Co. v. Philco-Ford Corp., 273 Or. 701, 543 P.2d 283, 288 (1975) ("However, proof that the manner in which the
repurchase election was exercised at the time of termination amounted to a breach of Philco's implied obligation of good
faith and fair dealing would have been an independent basis for a recovery of damages."). Accord, Contemporary Mission
v. Famous Music Corp., 557 F.2d 918, 923 n.8 (2d Cir. 1977) ("Under New York law there is implied in every contract
a covenant of fair dealing and good faith"; the defendant's "determination of [the] effectiveness or profitability of
promotion [of a product to be distributed has] to be made in good faith."). Cf. Reprosystem, B.V. v. SCM Corp., 727
F.2d 257, 264 (2d Cir. 1984) (recognizing that under New York law in some circumstances a party to a contract may be
bound by an implied agreement or duty to negotiate in good faith to reach an agreement), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 110
(1984).
401. McAlpine v. AAMCO Automatic Transmissions, 461 F. Supp. 1232, 1249 (E.D. Mich. 1978). See also R.A.
Weaver & Assocs. v. Haas & Haynie Corp., 663 F.2d 168, 176 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Craig Food Indus. v. Taco Time Int'l,
469 F. Supp. 516, 528 (D. Utah 1979).
402. Ralph's Distrib. Co. v. AMF, Inc., 667 F.2d 670, 672 n.3 (8th Cir. 1981) (under Iowa law, court will imply
a contract term only where necessary to carry out contract and when it can be assumed that it would have been included
if parties had considered it); Neuman v. Pike, 591 F.2d 191, 194-95 (2d Cir. 1979) (New York law holds that where
parties' expressed intent is clear, contrary intent will not be created by implication; court should not redraft agreement by
implied obligations; court will imply a term only if it can be rightfully assumed that parties would have included the point
in the written agreement if their attention had been called to it); Randolph v. New Eng. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 526 F.2d 1383,
1387 (6th Cir. 1975) (under Ohio law, no recovery on theory of unjust enrichment or quasi-contract where an express
contract covers the same subject); Borbely v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 547 F. Supp. 959, 973-75 (D.N.J. 1981)
(granting motion for judgment n.o.v. on issue of breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing under New
Jersey law; an implied covenant may not impose a condition in direct contravention of a provision in the written contract);
Reinharcz v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 514 F. Supp. 1141, 1145 (C.D. Cal. 1981) (no breach of obligation of good faith
and fair dealing by refusal to give written approval of dealership relocation; covenant will not be implied to vary express
unambiguous terms on contract); Snyder v. Howard Johnson's Motor Lodges, 412 F. Supp. 724, 728 (S.D. l. 1976)
(refusing to imply a covenant not to compete in a motel market; negotiations between the parties concerning territorial
rights negated the basis for implication of such a covenant, i.e., that the parties would have expressed the obligation had
they thought of it).
403. Domed Stadium Hotel v. Holiday Inns, 732 F.2d 480, 485 (5th Cir. 1984). See also C. Pappas Co. v. E. &
J. Gallo Winery, 1985-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,641 (E.D. Cal. 1985) (manufacturer has right to insert competing
distributor into nonexclusive area; implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing not to the contrary).
404. Tymshare, Inc. v. Coveli, 727 F.2d 1145, 1151 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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the doctrine is in the implication of terms into the agreement between the parties. 40 5
The court also agreed that the concept of good faith in the performance of contracts
is an "excluder," serving simply to exclude a wide range of conduct said to constitute
bad faith.40 6 The court then summarized the doctrine of good faith performance of
contracts as the courts apply it, contrasting good faith performance with traditional
contract analysis. 40 7 The Fourth Circuit has also dealt with this issue and identified
those situations in which the covenant should and should not be implied. In "an
ordinary breach of contract claim.., in which the economic losses are compensable
under traditional contract principles, the reason for the emerging principle is simply
not present .... ,"408
Even the commentators who support additional obligations running from the
manufacturer to the distributor have recognized that few cases support the implied
covenants40 and numerous cases have rejected them. Most of these cases do so not
in broad terms, but instead reject the implication of various obligations said to flow
from a general duty of good faith and fair dealing. For example, courts have refused
to imply a covenant not to compete in a licensee's motel market. 410 Courts have also
rejected the argument that nonrenewal of a distributor agreement in bad faith and in
violation of both the Sherman Act and the Dealer's Day in Court Act was a breach
of an implied covenant of good faith.411 Further, courts have rejected an implied
obligation on the part of a franchisor not to acquire a hotel in the territory of its
franchisee4 12 and have rejected the implication of a common-law duty to maintain a
valuable franchise and not to terminate a distributorship contract.41 3 Finally, courts
have rejected an implied covenant to repurchase merchandise in an action by a
wholesaler against the manufacturer for termination of a distributorship. 414 No doubt
this reluctance to imply various obligations when the parties' relationship is governed
by a written distributorship agreement flows from the fact that commercial parties can
be expected to state their agreement with clarity and from the policy that too free an
implication of duties will leave the parties' relationship in a state of uncertainty,
neither party knowing exactly what duties it may later be found to have assumed. 415
405. Id. at 1152.
406. Id.
407. Id. at 1152-54.
408. United Roasters v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 649 F.2d 985, 990 (4th Cir. 1981). Accord Triangle Mining Co.
v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 753 F.2d 734 (9th Cir. 1985) (discretionary powerto terminate held not subject to implied covenant
of good faith; motive of terminating party is irrelevant).
409. H. BROWN, FRAcwsrwo-Rminrs AD RBsain 126 (1973) ("[Vlery few cases have found implied covenants
for franchisees with regard to actual practices, apart from the contract."); Brown, Franchising-A Fiduciary Relationship,
49 Trx. L. REv. 650, 666 (1970-1971) (acknowledging "the standard common-law view that no good faith obligation
exists in the performance of a contract.").
410. Snyder v. Howard Johnson's Motor Lodges, 412 F. Supp. 724, 727-28 (S.D. Di. 1976); Dayton Motels v.
Holiday Inns, No. 74-1150 (Montgomery County C.P., July 29, 1977).
411. Sherman v. British Leyland Motors, Ltd., 601 F.2d 429, 455 (9th Cir. 1979).
412. Domed Stadium Hotel v. Holiday Inns, 732 F.2d 408, 484-85 (5th Cir. 1984).
413. Aaron E. Levine & Co. v. Calkraft Paper Co., 429 F. Supp. 1039, 1049-50 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
414. Walnut Creek Pipe Distribs. v. Gates Rubber Co. Sales Div., 228 Cal. App. 2d 810, 39 Cal. Rptr. 767, 771
(1964).
415. Cf. Chicago College of Osteopathic Medicine v. George A. Fuller Co., 719 F.2d 1335, 1348 (7th Cir. 1983)
(under Illinois law, no cause of action for bad faith dealing outside the areas of insurance and employment law).
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At least one case, however, has excused compliance with the termination
provisions of the agreement based upon a finding that the agreement "was subject to
an implied condition that if, without fault of the parties, the... market [that existed
at the time of execution of the agreement] ceased to be available .... [then] the
[a]greement would be dissolved and the parties excused from performing it."416
In summary, in a distributorship situation an implied covenant should be found
only when absolutely necessary, and only when the implied term is not inconsistent
with any provision of the written dealership agreement. Moreover, the same result can
usually be reached applying other principles of contract interpretation.
5. The Best Efforts Obligation
Both the manufacturer and its distributor frequently argue that the other has an
obligation to use its best efforts to promote distribution of the product. Justice
Cardozo, in the leading case, Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon,417 implied a promise
to use "reasonable efforts" 418 in a contract of exclusive agency. In that case the
defendant, a creator of fashions, granted to plaintiff the exclusive right for one year
to place her endorsements on the designs of others, to place her own designs on sale,
or to license others to market them. The court held that the plaintiff was under an
implied obligation to use reasonable efforts to market the defendant's designs.
Twice in recent years the Second Circuit has had occasion to consider the
doctrine of Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon. In Contemporary Mission v. Famous
Music Corp. ,419 the Court of Appeals refused to disturb a jury verdict that a producer
and distributor of musical recordings failed to promote sufficiently a rock opera,
holding that the obligation to use reasonable efforts to promote the production "could
not be satisfied merely by technical compliance with the spending and appointment
requirements of [the agreement]." More recently the Second Circuit has commented
upon the surprising absence of authority on the meaning of a best efforts obligation,
and contrasted the situation before it with that found in Contemporary Mission. In Zilg
v. Prentice-Hall, Inc.,420 the Second Circuit held that a publisher did not have an
obligation to use its best efforts to promote a book, but had an implied obligation to
use good faith to promote the book, and had met that duty. The court's analysis of
the best efforts problem shows that the language of a particular agreement is highly
significant in determining whether such an obligation will be found to exist.421
416. Beltronics, Inc. v. Eberline Instrument Corp., 369 F. Supp. 295, 302 (D. Colo. 1973), affd, 509 F.2d 1316
(10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1000 (1975). In this case, the defendants "did not comply with the termination
provisions of paragraph 16a of the Agreement, which provided for termination prior to the expiration of the ten-year term
of the Agreement upon ninety days notice and payment to Beltronics of $75,000.00." Id. at 299. However, through no
fault of the defendants the market disappeared, so that the defendants were not required to comply with that section of
the agreement "and their failure to do so [did] not constitute an actionable breach of the Agreement." Id. at 302.
417. 222 N.Y. 88, 118 N.E. 214 (1917).
418. Although customarily called a "best efforts" concept, Justice Cardozo twice characterized the implied
obligation as one of the use of "reasonable efforts." Id. at 89, 118 N.E. at 215.
419. 557 F.2d 918, 923-24 (2d Cir. 1977).
420. 717 F.2d 671, 680-81 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 938 (1984).
421. Id. at 679. However, where a contract for promotion of a food product expressly obligated the defendant to use
its best efforts in the promotion of the item, and instead the defendant simply ceased performance, "it broke its contract
when it terminated its performance." United Roasters v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 649 F.2d 985, 990 (4th Cir. 1981).
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Because many distribution agreements contain language that requires the dealer to
promote the product,422 the specific language of the agreement is very important.
Perhaps the most significant best efforts litigation in a distributorship situation
is found in Bloor v. Falstaff Brewing Corp. 423 In that action, the Second Circuit
affirmed a judgment against a defendant brewer in an action for damages arising from
the defendant's discontinuance of certain brands or its failure to use best efforts in
their promotion and for its failure to make certain royalty payments. Following a
bench trial, the district court held that the defendant brewer had failed to use its best
efforts to merchandise the products. 424 That court construed the term "best efforts"
to be the good faith efforts of the average, prudent, comparable party.425 The trial
court found that the discontinuance of the establishment of sales goals ("an essential
step in any marketing effort") did not constitute the "best efforts" of the company. 42 6
The court also held that an "agreement to use best efforts did not require it to engage
in illegal activity to promote the sale of Ballantine products, or to continue prior
improper conduct.'"427 Finally, the court held the measure of damages for breach of
a best efforts obligation to be "the amount necessary to put the injured party in the
exact position he would have been if the contract had not been breached.' 428 This
position was established by reference to sales achieved by comparable companies. 429
The Second Circuit agreed with the trial court's "excellent opinion," 430 recog-
nizing that "New York law is far from clear" as to how onerous an obligation is
imposed by a best efforts agreement. 43t Nevertheless, the result in the case turned
upon the language of the best efforts agreement. The Second Circuit stated that
although "management was entirely free to exercise its business judgment" con-
cerning the maximization of profits for other brands, it had relinquished this freedom
United Telecommunications v. America Tel. and Communications Corp., 536 F.2d 1310, 1316-19 (10th Cir. 1976) held
that "best efforts" in a purchase agreement did not require expert testimony to assist the jury, and that a "'competent
and diligent' standard is not materially different from 'best efforts.'" Id. at 1317.
422. For example, the dealer may be required to use its "best efforts," or it may be required to promote sales
energetically throughout the territory, or any of a number of other formulations of the obligation. Compare Publishers
Resource v. Walker-Davis Publications, 692 F.2d 1143, 1146 (7th Cir. 1982) (the "promise to solicit advertising and to
devote 'such time and efforts as required' is a typical example of a 'best efforts' clause, such as would be implied into
any exclusive sales contract even in its absence.") with General Business Sys. v. North Am. Philips Corp., 699 F.2d 965,
982 (9th Cir. 1983) (no breach of distributor's contractual duty to focus its primary marketing effort on a particular type
of computer when it became available).
423. 454 F. Supp. 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 601 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1979). See also Western Geophysical Co.
of Am. v. Bolt Assocs., 584 F.2d 1164 (2d Cir. 1978); Joyce Beverages, Inc. v. Royal Crown Cola, 555 F. Supp. 271
(S.D.N.Y. 1983); Polyglycoat Corp. v. C.P.C. Distribs., 534 F. Supp. 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Pinnacle Books, Inc. v.
Harlequin Enter., Ltd., 519 F. Supp. 118, 121-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Perma Research & Dev. Co. v. Singer Co., 402 F.
Supp. 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd 542 F.2d Ill (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 987 (1976); Perma Research &
Dev. Co. v. Singer Co., 308 F. Supp. 743 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Arnold Prods. v. Favorite Films Corp., 176 F. Supp. 862,
866 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Great W. Producer's Co-op. v. Great W. United Corp., 613 P.2d 873 (Colo. 1980).
424. Id. at 272.
425. Id. at 266-67.
426. Id. at 270.
427. Id. at 272.
428. Id. at 277.
429. Id.
430. 601 F.2d 609, 611 (2d Cir. 1979).
431. Id. at 613 n.7.
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when it agreed to the "added obligation to use 'best efforts to promote and maintain
a high volume of sales .... "'432
The prudent manufacturer should include in a distribution agreement some form
of defined obligation, depending upon the particular circumstances of the parties and
the industry involved. This obligation serves to satisfy the need for a strong network
of distributors.
6. Tortious Interference Claims
Terminated dealers frequently add a claim for tortious interference with a
contract or with prospective economic advantage to their bag of claims. Most courts
have rejected these claims, frequently by granting defendant's motion for summary
judgment.433 Plaintiffs find it difficult to maintain tort claims in the face of a detailed,
written distribution agreement. These claims are usually a transparent attempt to
avoid the contractual terms to which the parties agreed.
C. Adequate Grounds for Termination
Most distribution agreements specify the bases upon which they may be termi-
nated. This section, however, discusses three reasons sufficient to support dealer
terminations under both the antitrust laws and state law: termination for poor
performance, for material breach, and for dishonest practices. The section then
432. Id. at 614 (quoting Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88, 118 N.E. 214 (1917)) (emphasis omitted).
433. Motive Parts Warehouse v. Facet Enters., 774 F.2d 380 (10th Cir. 1985) (affimning directed verdict on
intentional infliction of economic harm; malicious interference with contract or business relationships); Camfield Tires v.
Michelin Tire Corp., 719 F.2d 1361, 1367 (8th Cir. 1983) (affirning grant of summary judgment to defendant
manufacturer on dealer's claim of tortious interference in its business relationship with customer); General Business Sys.
v. North Am. Philips Corp., 699 F.2d 965,981-83 (9th Cir. 1983) (affirming summary judgment against manufacturer's
claim that distributor was liable for tortious interference and abuse of process); Carlson Mach. Tools v. American Tool,
678 F.2d 1253, 1263-64 (5th Cir. 1982) (summary judgment properly granted on dealer's claim of tortious interference);
Cowley v. Braden Indus., 613 F.2d 751, 754 n.1 (9th Cir.) (under Arizona law, no tortious interference with contract or
with prospective business advantage), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 965 (1980); Sierra Wine & Liquor Co. v. Heublein, Inc.,
626 F.2d 129, 132-33 (9th Cir. 1980) (action by a terminated wine distributor that had oral distribution agreement, and
that claimed tortious inducement of transfer of wine distributorship to a new distributor, court affirmed summary judgment
on tortious interference claims); Industrial Equip. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 554 F.2d 276, 288-89 (6th Cir. 1978)
(affirmed grant of directed verdict in favor of defendant manufacturer on tort claims for interference with contractual and
economic relations and for libel); First Flight Assocs. v. Professional Golf Co., 527 F.2d 931, 936 (6th Cir. 1975)
(defendant's communication with sublicensee of trademark advising it both of trademark ownership deficiencies and of
sales representative's lack of authority to bind defendant did not constitute unlawful interference with or inducement to
breach contract); Frank Coulson, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 488 F.2d 202, 206-07 (5th Cir. 1974) (reversing judgment
n.o.v. that had been granted in favor of the defendant, involving the manufacturer's limited privilege to intervene in
contractual negotiations under Florida law); DePalma v. Jersey Shore Medical Center, 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,005
(D.N.J. 1984) (restating the allegations of an antitrust complaint with the additional claim of intentional and malicious
action did not set forth an independent tort claim for punitive damages); Moffat v. Lane Co., 1984-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
66,110 (D. Mass. 1984) (granting summary judgment to defendant manufacturer on interference with advantageous
relation claim); Bunch v. A-tec Int'l Corp., 559 F. Supp. 961, 967-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (after bench trial, plaintiff failed
to recover damages on claims for antitrust, breach of contract, and tortious inducement of breach of exclusive sales
agreement); Glasofer Motors v. Osterlund, Inc., 180 N.J. Super. 6, 433 A.2d 780 (App. Div. 1981) (in dealer's suit,
affirmed grant of summary judgment for defendants on claim of tortious interference with contractual relations). These
cases make it plain that even though a claim for tortious interference with contract is frequently added to a terminated
dealer action in District Court, often as a pendent claim to an antitrust claim, only rarely does a dealer recover on such
a claim. Indeed, competition can be a privilege which defeats an intentional interference claim. Conoco, Inc. v. Inman
Oil Co.. 774 F.2d 895. 906-07 (8th Cir. 1985).
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examines whether the manufacturer can later defend its termination decision upon a
ground neither known at the time the decision was made nor communicated to the
dealer.
1. Documented Poor Performance
In most if not all terminated dealer cases, the defendant manufacturer argues that
poor performance was the real and sufficient reason for the termination or nonrenewal
decision. The cases recognize that poor performance is sufficient ground to support
termination. 434 This section is but a brief summary of the possible grounds upon
which terminations may be legitimately supported; of course documentation aids in
proving the case.
Sufficient grounds to support termination include the following: the dealer's
failure to pay its account in accordance with the distribution agreement, 435 the dealer's
poor sales performance, 436 the dealer's decision to take on a line of competing
products or to focus its efforts upon the sale of competing products, 437 and the dealer's
refusal to sign a revised form of distributorship agreement. 438 Courts have also upheld
434. See, e.g., Romey v. OK Tire & Rubber Co., 1980-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,360 (D. Idaho 1980) (granting
summary judgment for defendant rubber company in antitrust action by terminated tire distributor, holding that there was
sufficient "evidence supporting defendants' contention that OK legitimately terminated these plaintiffs because they had
ceased to aggressively promote and sell the OK tire line of their own choosing." A good summary is found in Bohling,
Franchise Terminations Under the Sherman Act: Populism and Relational Power, 53 Tax. L. Ray. 1180, 1206-07 (1975).
435. Copy-Data Sys., Inc. v. Toshiba Am., Inc., 755 F.2d 293, 300 (2d Cir. 1985); Trace X. Chem. v. Canadian
Indus., Ltd., 738 F.2d 261,267 (8th Cir. 1984) (upholding supplier's refusal to deal except on a cash basis where dealer
owed $160,000), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 911 (1985); Carefield Tires v. Michelin Tire Corp., 719 F.2d 1361, 1363, 1367
(8th Cir. 1983) (affirming summary judgment in favor of manufacturer in dealer's suit alleging wrongful termination of
dealership contract, where the dealer's account was over 180 days past due); General United Co. v. American Honda
Motor Co., 1985-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,854 (W.D.N.C. 1985).
436. Joe Regucira, Inc. v. American Distilling Co., 642 F.2d 826, 831 (5th Cir. 1981) (poor sales performance and
delinquency in payments demonstrated sound business reasons for termination); Frank Chevrolet Co. v. General Motors
Corp., 419 F.2d 1054 (6th Cir. 1969) (poor sales performance justified refusal to renew dealer agreement). Accord
Brattleboro Auto Sales v. Subar, 633 F.2d 649, 653 n.8 (2d Cir. 1980). See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (requiring "specific
facts" to oppose a motion for summary judgment).
437. Brattleboro Auto Sales v. Subaro, 633 F.2d 649, 650-51 (2d Cir. 1980) (dealer's decision to add new lines
which would compete with distributor's line provided due cause for nonrenewal of dealer agreement); Business Equip.
Center, Ltd. v. DeJur-Amsco Corp., 465 F. Supp. 775 (D.D.C. 1978) (granting defendant's motion for summary
judgment on terminated distributor's claim that it was discontinued because of its insistence on handling a competing line
of dictating equipment, when the plaintiff had dropped to last place among distributors of defendant's products and had
become the top distributor of the competitor's products). Accord J.H. Westerbeke Corp. v. Onan Corp., 580 F. Supp.
1173 (D. Mass. 1984) (upholding failure to renew distributorship because distributor was becoming a serious competitor,
it was not monopolizing conduct to refuse to renew a distributorship agreement with a distributor that was devoting
increasing attention to its own products at the expense of the defendant's distributorship).
438. The courts have upheld termination decisions made after dealers refused to sign new forms of distribution
agreements. Acme Refrigeration v. Whirlpool Corp., 747 F.2d 292, 293 (5th Cir. 1984); Corenswet, Inc. v. Amana
Refrigeration, 594 F.2d 129, 131, 134 (5th Cir.) (upholding termination of distributor who alone among Amana
distributors, refused to execute new standard form distributorship agreement which limited the term to one year, court
recognized manufacturer's interest in keeping all of its distributors under a single form ofcontract), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
938 (1979); Newport Tire & Rubber Co. v. Tire & Battery Corp., 504 F. Supp. 143, 147 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (denying
motion for preliminary injunction prohibiting defendant from termination of plaintiff's distributorship; court found that
defendant pressured the plaintiff to sign a "modernized" distributorship agreement that included a provision permitting
manufacturer to terminate the agreement if the distributor engaged in specified acts "detrimental to the interests" of the
manufacturer); Zapatha v. Dairy Mart, 381 Mass. 287, 408 N.E.2d 1370, 1373 (1980) (two months after franchisor
presented a new and more detailed form of "Independent Operator's Agreement" to the franchisee for execution that
contained some terms less favorable to the store operator than those of the existing agreement and franchisee refused to
sign the new agreement, franchisor gave written notice to franchisee that the contract was being terminated effective in
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these termination grounds: poor profitability,439 elimination of an ineffective
dealer,440 and substitution of one dealer for another. 441
2. Material Breach
The dealer's material breach of its agreement with the manufacturer is a
sufficient reason to justify termination of the dealer agreement. 442 Regardless of the
particular terms of the dealer agreement, 443 a manufacturer is almost always free to
argue that the dealer's poor performance constituted a material breach of the
agreement, justifying the nonrenewal or termination decision. 444 Although not
grounds for termination, dealer's breach that is not material may nevertheless support
a defendant manufacturer's claim for damages. The materiality of the dealer's
nonperformance raises questions of fact which may not be summarily determined.
This section of the Article first defines material breach, then shows that the manu-
facturer can terminate the dealer agreement for material breach, and finally demon-
strates the nature of the inquiry involved in such an argument.
A material breach, as defined in Lipsky v. Commonwealth United Corp., is a
breach "which would justify the other party to suspend his own performance....
a breach which is so substantial as to defeat the purpose of the entire transaction. "445
More recently, holding that sufficient evidence existed to support jury verdict findings
that alleged breaches of contract "were not material and did not justify termination
of the franchise agreement," the Seventh Circuit gave a shorter definition of material
breach: a breach which defeats the object or underlying purpose of the contract. 44 6
Generally, a material breach excuses further performance by the non-breaching
party. 447 A number of recent federal circuit court cases have considered questions
ninety days; trial judge found that franchisor terminated the agreement solely because the franchisee refused to sign the
new agreement; appellate court reversed grant of injunction against termination of franchise).
The antitrust cases, however, recognize a distinction between a refusal to deal with a distributor and a willingness
to sell to a former dealer on terms given to other buyers of the product. See, e.g., J.H. Westerbeke Corp. v. Onan Corp.,
580 F. Supp. 1173 (D. Mass. 1984).
439. Allen v. Tosco, 442 F. Supp. 137, 144 (E.D. Tenn. 1976), aff'd, 570 F.2d 154 (6th Cir. 1978).
440. Chandler Supply Co. v. GAF Corp., 650 F.2d 983, 989 (9th Cir. 1980).
441. See supra text accompanying notes 251-86.
442. Burger King Corp. v. Mason, 710 F.2d 1480, 1490 (1 lth Cir. 1983) (upholding jury instruction under Florida
law that hamburger restaurant franchise could not be revoked absent a material breach of the franchise agreement), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1102 (1984).
443. REsTATEmEr (SEco ) oF Co.,nMAcrs § 241 comment a (1981).
444. This section focuses upon material breach because a finding of material breach is grounds for termination or
nonrenewal of a dealer agreement. In contrast to a material breach, a nonmaterial breach may not be grounds for
termination, but will give rise to an action for damages. The definition of a breach of contract is as follows: "When
performance of a duty under a contract is due any non-performance is a breach." RrTAlE'msr (SEcoNo) or CoYmAcTs
§ 235(2) (1979). Comment b provides in part that even an insubstantial nonperformance is a breach. Accord Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 241 comment a (1981) ("Even if not material, the failure may be a breach and give rise to a claim
for damages for partial breach (§§ 236, 243).").
445. 551 F.2d 887, 895 (2d Cir. 1976) (citation omitted).
446. Canada Dry Corp. v. Nehi Beverage Co., 723 F.2d 512, 517 (7th Cir. 1983). The Seventh Circuit explained
the factors that the jury should consider in determining the materiality of a breach, id. at 517 n.3. See also RanlAml^sr
(SEcoND) or ComzrActs § 241 (1981).
447. Olin Corp. v. Central Indus., 576 F.2d 642, 646 (5th Cir. 1978). Accord MeAlpine v. AAMCO Automatic
Transmissions, 461 F. Supp. 1232, 1249 (E.D. Mich. 1978); Cities Serv. Helex, Inc. v. United States, 543 F.2d 1306,
1313 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
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regarding material breach as justification for the other party's nonperformance. The
Seventh Circuit has stated the general rule "that only a 'material' breach of a contract
provision by one party will justify non-performance by the other party." 44 8 The
Eleventh Circuit recently recognized that a hamburger chain franchise could be
revoked for a material breach on the part of the franchisee. The court's analysis
succinctly summarizes the rules of breach as they apply to dealer or distribution
agreements. 449
Whether a breach is material is a question of fact. 450 In terminated dealer actions,
a manufacturer's claim of material breach on the part of the plaintiff dealer will
necessarily raise issues requiring substantial discovery and a hearing.
The material breach cases involve two rules of law whose application require two
related inquiries: which party breached first and had the breaching party substantially
performed? "Clearly a breach can only occur when one is under an obligation to
perform in the first instance.' '451 A number of states follow the rule that a party to an
agreement who first violates it cannot enforce it or recover on it.452 A manufacturer's
decision to terminate a distributor will ordinarily be made as a result of poor
performance or failure of performance on the part of the dealer. Accordingly, those
states which have this "first breach rule" 453 will permit the defendant manufacturer
to justify its decision to terminate (or not to renew) the dealership on the basis of the
prior breaches by the dealer. In other words, the act of termination cannot be a breach
of the agreement; the first material breach of the dealer excused the manufacturer's
continued performance under the agreement.
Substantial performance and material breach are two sides of the same coin. "A
finding of substantial performance establishes that there was no material breach by"
the substantially performing party.454 The Fifth Circuit in Measday v. Kwik-Kopy
Corp. summarizes the relationship between substantial performance and material
breach; the court noted that "if a party has committed a material breach his
performance cannot be substantial. '455 Since the manufacturer's acceptance of
performance alone does not constitute substantial performance, 456 the manufacturer
should not be precluded from arguing that the plaintiff dealer had not substantially
performed its contract (or that the plaintiff dealer committed a material breach of the
448. Sahadi v. Continental I. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 706 F.2d 193, 196 (7th Cir. 1983).
449. Burger King Corp. v. Mason, 710 F.2d 1480, 1489-90 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1102 (1984).
450. Adams Apple Distrib. Co. v. Papaleras Reunidas, S.A., 773 F.2d 925, 929 (7th Cir. 1985); Canada Dry Corp.
v. Nehi Beverage Co., 723 F.2d 512, 517 (7th Cir. 1983) ("The materiality of a contractual breach is a question of fact
reserved for the jury."); Sahadi v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 706 F.2d 193, 196 (7th Cir. 1983).
451. Stratton Group, Ltd. v. Sprayregen, 458 F. Supp. 1216, 1218 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
452. Apex Pool Equip. Corp. v. Lee, 419 F.2d 556, 562 (2d Cir. 1969); Abel of Ark., Inc. v. Richards, 236 Ark.
281, 289, 365 S.W.2d 705, 710 (1963) (party who first violates an agreement cannot recover in an action upon it); Hurley
v. Bennett, 163 Va. 241, 253, 176 S.E. 171, 175 (1934).
453. The first material breach rule finds its rationale in the REsrmatENT (SEcoaN) or CorRcrs § 237 (1981).
Comment b states in relevant part: "The central problem is in determining which party is chargeable with the first uncured
material failure of performance."
454. Measday v. Kwik-Kopy Corp., 713 F.2d 118, 125 (5th Cir. 1983) (affirming judgment for damages against
a national franchisor of instant printing centers). Accord Casio, Inc. v. S.M. & R. Co., 755 F.2d 528, 531-32 (7th Cir.
1985).
455. Measday v. Kwik-Kopy Corp., 713 F.2d 118, 123-4 (5th Cir. 1983).
456. Id. at 125.
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contract) by the fact that the manufacturer accepted some benefits of the dealer's
performance.
In sum, the proper analysis in a material breach case should be:
(1) Was there a breach by the distributor?
(2) Was the breach material?
(3) Was there substantial performance by the distributor?
(4) Was the breach by the distributor preceded by a breach on the part of the manufacturer?
3. Dishonest Practices by the Dealer
Aside from authorities regarding dishonesty and performance of contracts in
general, 457 the duty of good faith and fair dealing under the Uniform Commercial
Code,458 and the law of fraud, 459 a number of reported cases have denied injunctive
relief or damages to dealers when the dealer has been found to have engaged in
dishonest or unscrupulous practices. A review of the cases will indicate that in fact
the conduct of these dealers can be broken down into two separate aspects. First, the
dealer's conduct invariably violates the dealer agreement; second, following the
unscrupulous practices, the dealer almost always falsely reports to the manufacturer
about the dealer's conduct. Either or both of these grounds may constitute grounds for
termination.
Courts have found a variety of dishonest practices to be violations of exclusive
dealing arrangements or dealer agreements. The Tenth Circuit held that the distrib-
utors' action in analyzing a secret formula for the product, producing a similar
product, and marketing it in small quantities violated an exclusive distributorship
agreement. 460 Those activities were not expressly prohibited by the agreement, but
"amounted to bad faith which constituted a breach of the contract." 46 1 In holding that
the manufacturer was under no duty to continue to perform under the contract, the
Tenth Circuit stated that the plaintiff's dishonest practices violated the relationship of
mutual trust, confidence, and loyalty in an exclusive distributorship contract. 462
Other dealer cases have reached similar results. The Sixth Circuit held that an
exclusive agreement for whiskey distribution was properly terminated after the
457. 3 CoRBIN ON CONTRACTS § 541, at 94-100 (1960).
458. Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness Under the Uniform Commercial Code,
30 U. Cm. L. REv. 666, 672 (1963); Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REv. 195 (1968) (acting honestly is required by the duty of good faith; honesty is
only the very beginning or essential element of good faith.).
459. Although attorneys usually think of fraud in the sense in which it used in the expression "fraud in the
inducement" of a contract, infrequently it has been loosely used to describe bad faith conduct in the nonperformance of
a contract. W. KERR, FRAu & MtsAmx 42 (1872) ("All surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling, and other unfair way that
is used to cheat anyone is considered as fraud."); Shonfeld v. Shonfeld, 260 N.Y. 477, 479, 184 N.E. 61 (1933) ("The
Legislature perhaps adopted the traditional attitude of equity, which has ever refused to define, lest the craft of man evade
the definition."); Brown v. Bonner, 35 Va. 1, 17 (1837) ("No principle is in equity better established than this, that
though there may have been no fraud in the original transaction, yet the attempt to enforce it may become a fraud.")
(emphasis in original); Rodman v. Thalheimer, 75 Pa. 232, 237-38 (1874) (holding that a purchaser's insolvency was not
such fraud as to set aside the sale; to avoid the purchase there must be "artifice, trick or false pretence, as a means of
obtaining possession ..... There must be bad faith, and intent at the time to defraud the seller.").
460. Cowley v. Anderson, 159 F.2d 1, 4 (10th Cir. 1947).
461. Id. at 5.
462. Id. at 3.
[Vol. 46:925
DEFENDING TERMINATED DEALER LITIGATION
distributor padded its advertising expenses of which the distiller was required to pay
half.463 A district court upheld a refusal to renew an automobile dealer's franchise
when the franchisee dishonestly reported forty-four vehicle sales which were not in
fact made and collected $5.85 for each of forty-four vehicle inspections which were
not made.464 Similarly, a New York trial court dismissed an automobile dealer's
petition for injunctive relief because the dealer had submitted claims for warranty
repair work which had not in fact been performed. 465 Moreover, in an action by a
distributor seeking damages under the antitrust laws for wrongful termination, a
district court granted summary judgment to a manufacturer who showed that the
plaintiff had sent to defendant dishonored checks, deposited in its own account
customer checks intended for the manufacturer, and kept erroneous records of
machine rentals. 66 Clearly, a dealer's dishonest practices may thwart its own claim
for relief.
In a case that blurs the distinction between a violation of the dealer agreement
and false reporting to the manufacturer, a trial court upheld the termination of an
automobile dealership when the dealer had given false financial statements to the
manufacturer, despite the lack of any demonstrated financial loss to the manufac-
turer.467 Similarly, Hornsby Oil Co. v. Champion Spark Plug Co.,48 an antitrust
action, recognized that the distributor's falsification of monthly sales reports afforded
a legitimate ground for termination of the distributorship.
Schwimmer v. Sony Corp. of America,469 held that the trial court should have
granted a manufacturer's motion for judgment n.o.v. because the terminated dealer
was involved in a scheme to submit false advertising claims, under a cooperative
advertising program. An audit of all dealers in the region showed that "a number of
Sony dealers had indeed submitted claims for advertising that had never been run."
Nine dealers had submitted "false claims to Sonam totalling nearly $500,000 for
commercials supposedly carried on two New York radio stations. The audit revealed
that the commercials had never been aired and that the radio station invoices ... had
been forged.' '470
Most dealer agreements have provisions which require the submission to the
manufacturer or franchisor of financial statements and other reports. Submission of
falsified reports should justify termination, because (a) the dealer is acting in violation
of its duty of good faith to the manufacturer; and (b) falsified financial statements and
reports are invariably submitted with the intention that the manufacturer will rely upon
them to extend credit, to ship further products to the dealer, or to extend or renew the
dealership. When a dealer submits false reports to the manufacturer for any of these
463. E.H. Taylor, Jr. & Sons v. Julius Levin Co., 274 F. 275, 281-82 (6th Cir. 1921).
464. R.A.C. Motors v. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 314 F. Supp. 681, 683 (D.N.J. 1970).
465. Kerber Motors Corp. v. Dolphin Motors, 36 Misc. 2d 849, 234 N.Y.S.2d 125, 128 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
466. Bougeois v. A.B. Dick Co., 386 F. Supp. 1094, 1098 (W.D. La. 1974). See also Dunkin Donuts of Am., Inc.
v. Middletown Donut Corp., 100 N.J. 166, 495 A.2d 66 (1985) (intentional underreporting of gross sales).
467. Frank Chevrolet Co. v. General Motors Corp., 304 F. Supp. 307, 319 (N.D. Ohio 1968), affd, 419 F.2d 1054
(6th Cir. 1969).
468. 714 F.2d 1384 (5th Cir. 1983).
469. 677 F.2d 946 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1007 (1982).
470. Id. at 949.
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purposes, the specific transaction contemplated (e.g., the extension of credit, the
shipment of inventory, or the extension of the dealer agreement) has been fraudulently
induced; yet the manufacturer may find itself without recourse except as a secured
creditor of the bankrupt dealer.
Analytically, dishonest conduct by a dealer can be considered a violation of the
dealer's duty to perform its contractual obligations in good faith. However, the cases
have properly held that dishonest performance by the dealer goes to the root or
essence of the agreement. Therefore, a dealer's dishonest and unscrupulous practices
should justify termination of the dealer agreement. 47 1
The manufacturer can strengthen its ability to take corrective action when
confronted with dishonest practices, by including in the dealership agreement these
specific grounds for termination: the dealer's submission of materially inaccurate
information, and the dealer's failure to perform honestly any of its duties or
obligations.
4. Termination for Reasons Unknown or Unstated at the Time of Termination
Sometimes a manufacturer approaches counsel about terminating a dealer after
the manufacturer has given notice of termination and specified the reasons for
termination. Then counsel discovers and wishes to assert different or additional
reasons for the termination. Sometimes after termination, or after the commencement
of litigation, the manufacturer or its counsel discovers facts unknown to the manu-
facturer at the time of termination, which give rise to a justifiable termination. This
section of the Article will examine the law concerning these later-found reasons for
termination.
In general, a party to a contract is not constrained to assert only the reasons for
termination given in the notice of termination.472 Similarly, the reasons given for the
termination are not immutable; a manufacturer may change its stated reasons for
termination. 473 The leading case on this subject, College Point Boat Corp. v. United
States, 474 held that a party to a contract may defend a suit for breach of contract on
the ground that an excuse for nonperformance existed, even though at the time of
nonperformance, the defending party was ignorant of that excuse. 475 This opinion,
written by Justice Brandeis, has been widely quoted and applied.
471. In an antitrust action (under both sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act) by a fruit and vegetable wholesaler
against the lessor of a building used as a produce market, the First Circuit stated that a refusal to deal could be justified
in circumstances involving "low business or ethical standards." Garnco, Inc. v. Providence Fruit & Produce Bldg., 194
F.2d 484, 487 (1st Cir. 1952). Cf. First Beverages, Inc. v. Royal Crown Cola Co., 612 F.2d 1164, 1173-75 (9th Cir.
1980) (defendant's evidence regarding the illegality (under Interstate Commerce Commission rules) of the arrangement
under which plaintiffs' product was shipped to Los Angeles by truck, was properly admitted as relevant to damages
issues), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 924 (1980).
472. 3A CoReNm oN Comrcrs § 762 at 524-25 (1960).
473. H.L. Moore Drug Exch. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 662 F.2d 935, 941 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880
(1982); Gellhom, supra note 2, at 494-95. Without more, it is not a violation of the Sherman Act for a manufacturer to
give to its terminated dealer "a false or inaccurate reason" for the termination.
474. 267 U.S. 12 (1925).
475. Id. at 15-17.
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For example, this principle has been applied in a contract action in which the
defendant refused to accept anti-freeze under the contract, defending on the ground
that the anti-freeze was not of sufficient quality. 476 In another case, Frank Chevrolet
Co. v. General Motors Corp.,477 the dealer argued that failure to set forth a ground
for nonrenewal of the dealership agreement constituted a waiver of that ground. The
district court rejected the argument, holding that termination of the agreement could
be justified by facts disclosed to the party during discovery procedures in the
lawsuit. 478 This holding has widespread application in terminated dealer litigation.
Frequently the dealer's own records produced during discovery will reveal facts
previously unknown that expose the dealer's actual performance (or lack of perfor-
mance).
The College Point Boat principle has been applied to termination of agreements
under contractual termination clauses. A party who has terminated a contract for a
stated but unsupportable reason who later discovers a valid reason for cancellation,
may rely upon the valid reason. 479 Courts have also upheld contractual terminations
even though the defendant specified the wrong reasons for termination. 480
These cases demonstrate the need for broad discovery into the plaintiff dealer's
performance. The courts have acknowledged this need. Not only are the standards for
relevance in discovery quite liberal,481 but courts have upheld the right of a party to
discover matters not alleged in the party's complaint. 48 2
D. The Bases for Counterclaims by a Defendant Manufacturer in a Terminated
Dealer Action
This section discusses the grounds upon which a manufacturer sued by a
terminated dealer may counterclaim for damages or injunctive relief. The starting
point is the provisions of the distributor agreement, since many dealer agreements
contain sections governing the rights of the parties upon termination or nonrenewal,
including provisions regarding the manufacturer's obligation to repurchase certain
unsold inventory, the obligation of the dealer to pay its outstanding amounts on
account, and the dealer's obligation to cease use of the manufacturer's trademarks.
476. Western Auto Supply Co. v. Sullivan, 210 F.2d 36, 39-40 (8th Cir. 1954). RwsTATeMrr (SsONt) oF CoeMRncrs
§ 225 (1981) provides that the unexcused non-occurrence of a condition always prevents performance of the duty
from becoming due and, if the condition does not occur within the time for its occurrence, has the additional effect
of discharging the duty. The comment to that section provides the same rule concerning unknown events. Id. at
comment e.
477. 304 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. Ohio 1968), aff'd, 419 F.2d 1054 (6th Cir. 1969).
478. Id. at 319-20.
479. Coastal Cargo Co. v. United States, 351 F.2d 1004, 1007 (Ct. Cl. 1965); John Reiner & Co. v. United States,
325 F.2d 438, 443-44 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
480. Broadstone Realty Corp. v. Evans, 251 F. Supp. 58, 64-66 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (holding that a party to a contract
can defend an action for breach even though "his grounds for being right included a large admixture of wrong reasons."),
affd, 367 F.2d 397 (1966); Newark Fireproofing Sash & Door Co. v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 121,124 (Ct. Cl. 1947).
481. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(1) (one "may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant
to the subject matter involved in the pending action.").
482. See, e.g., Rorer Int'l Cosmetics, Ltd. v. Halpem, 85 F.R.D. 43, 45 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (in a securities fraud
action, the fact that plaintiffs had made no allegations concerning kickbacks in their complaint did not preclude them from
discovery to determine if defendants had paid or received kickbacks; occurrence of kickbacks was relevant to the question
of whether there had been fraud or misrepresentation in connection with the sale of stock).
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The three principal types of counterclaims available to a defendant manufacturer in
litigation with its terminated dealer are actions on an account unpaid by the distrib-
utor, actions for trademark infringement, and actions for defamation or trade libel if
the dealer makes disparaging remarks about the manufacturer or its products to
customers.
A manufacturer's action on an account is the most common counterclaim.
Dealers will often run up a large balance owed on account during the period of time
between receipt of notice of termination and the effective date of that termination. The
dealer feels no obligation to pay that balance promptly since its relationship with the
manufacturer has terminated. An action on an account, frequently a more simple piece
of litigation than the claims raised by the plaintiff dealer, is often resolved by a motion
for summary judgment while the plaintiff's claims remain pending. Although the
distributor may be entitled to credit for goods that it returns to the manufacturer, 483
the distributor may not attempt to disaffirm the distribution agreement as fraudulent;
it has sued on that agreement for breach. 484
Most distribution arrangements include permission during the term of the dealer
agreement for the dealer to use the manufactuer's trademarks triggering a second basis
for a manufacturer's counterclaim, the Lanham Act. 485 A terminated dealer's use of
the manufacturer's trademarks after the effective date of termination gives rise to an
action for damages and injunctive relief. The leading case, Burger King Corp. v.
Mason,486 involved a restaurant franchisor who sued a franchisee for violations of the
Lanham Act, alleging that the franchisee continued to use the franchisor's trademarks
after termination. First, the court recognized that the "unauthorized use of a
trademark which has the effect of misleading the public to believe that the user is
sponsored or approved by the registrant can constitute infringement.' '487 Second, the
court held that the franchisor had shown trademark infringement when it proved that
the franchisee continued to use its trademarks after termination and that "a strong risk
of consumer confusion arises when a terminated franchisee continues to use the
former franchisor's trademarks." 488 With respect to damages, the court noted that the
Lanham Act permits the trial court considerable discretion, including permitting
recovery of the defendant's profits, treble damages, and attorney's fees if the court
believes that such an assessment would be just.489
The third type of counterclaim that manufacturers sometimes assert is a claim for
defamation or trade libel. Damages are difficult to prove on these claims, and the
483. Quality Performance Lines v. Yoho Automotive, 609 P.2d 1340, 1342-43 (Utah 1980) (in suit to recover on
debt owned by distributor, court held that distributor was entitled, on termination of parties' relationship, to offset its
indebtedness to the company by turning in certain components for credit against its account; that had been the parties'
course of performance).
484. Crues v. KFC Corp., 729 F.2d 1145, 1153 (8th Cir. 1984) (plaintiff franchisee, having elected to affirm
contract and sue for benefit-of-bargain damages, could not defend against counterclaim for unpaid royalties by
disaffirming the contract as fraudulent or because the trademark for which royalties were to be paid, had no value).
485. 15 U.S.C. § 1051-72 (1982).
486. 710 F.2d 1480, 1491-93 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1102 (1984).
487. Id. at 1492.
488. Id. at 1492-93.
489. Id. at 1495.
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manufacturer will frequently fail to prove its claim.49° Unless the defendant manu-
facturer can prove more than isolated instances of such conduct, the defamation or
trade libel claim is best avoided in a jury trial. A jury is likely to be put off by the
manufacturer's thin claim regarding the terminated dealer's alleged misstatements.
IV. THE TmmD STEP: AVAILABLE REMEDIES IN DIsTmUTORSHP DIsptrrs
This section discusses two types of remedies available in distributorship litiga-
tion: damages and injunctive relief. The injunction sought is usually a preliminary
injunction. Other relief is meaningless because the terminated dealer will not find
(following denial of its motion for preliminary injunction) any basis for the grant of
permanent injunctive relief a year or two later when the harm caused by any unlawful
conduct can be remedied in damages.
A. Damages
This section assumes that the distributorship agreement does not exclude
particular types of damages,49' and explores the methodology of calculating
damages, regardless of the particular theory of liability. A collection of signifi-
cant cases has considered the issues concerning the types of damages recoverable
by a terminated dealer and the proper methods by which they are calculated;
some of these cases are antitrust cases, and some are state law cases. Together they
establish the principle that although the plaintiff dealer has an obligation to mitigate
damages by taking reasonable steps to market substitute lines of products, 492 the
plaintiff can recover damages for injury to its business, whether measured by its
lost net493 profits, damage to the value of its business, or similar standards.
490. Charlottesville Music Center v. Magnepan, Inc., 655 F.2d 38, 40-41 (4th Cir. 1981) (in terminated dealer's
antitrust suit against manufacturer in which manufacturer counterclaimed for product disparagement, manufacturer failed
to establish a direct causal connection between its decrease in sales and the product disparagement). Cf. First Flight
Assocs. v. Professional Golf Co., 527 F.2d 931, 936 (6th Cir. 1975) (communication with sub-licensee of a trademark
advising it of trademark ownership deficiencies and of a sales representative's lack of authority to bind the defendant
contractually, did not constitute trade libel or defamation).
491. See, e.g., Stanley A. Klopp, Inc. v. John Deere Co., 510 F. Supp. 807 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (provision in dealership
contract barring recovery of future profits if dealership was terminated held enforceable even if manufacturer breached
dealership agreement), aff'd mem., 676 F.2d 688 (3d Cir. 1982).
492. Borger v. Yamaha Int'l Corp., 625 F.2d 390, 399 (2d Cir. 1980) ("Under Borger's duty to mitigate damages,
it would have been remiss if it had not taken reasonable steps to merchandise substitute lines."); Golf City, Inc. v. Wilson
Sporting Goods Co., 555 F.2d 426, 436 (5th Cir. 1977) ("An antitrust plaintiff has a duty to mitigate damages.").
493. 'The measure of lost profits is net profits. Bloomfield Fn. Corp. v. National Home Life Assurance Co., 734
F.2d 1408, 1411-12 (10th Cir. 1984); Graphic Prods. Distribs. v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 1580 (1 th Cir. 1983) ("An
antitrust plaintiffmay recover only lost net profits."); Zell-Aire, Inc. v. Zell-Aire Corp., 684 F.2d 174, 176 (lst Cir. 1982)
("Finally, for damage purposes, one is interested in net profits, not gross profits.") (emphasis in original); Don Burton,
Inc, v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 575 F.2d 702, 708 (9th Cir. 1978) (the rule applicable "in a tort case" as well as "in
a contract situation" is: "Where, as here, a business is terminated, rather than simply interrupted, and operating expenses
consequently cease, net, and not gross, anticipated profits state the correct measure of damages."); Fury Imports v.
Shakespeare Co., 554 F.2d 1376, 1387 (5th Cir. 1977) (evidence insufficient because no evidence of net profits, but only
of gross profits), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 921 (1981); Deaktor v. Fox Grocery Co., 1973-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 74,427
(3d Cir. 1973) (upholding dismissal of grocery franchisee's antitrust claim on ground that there was insufficient proof of
damages; plaintiffs failure to produce evidence of net profit as opposed to gross profit meant that jury would have had
to speculate as to the amount of damages.); Rangen, Inc. v. Sterling Nelson & Sons, Inc., 351 F.2d 851, 856 (9th Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966); Wolfe v. National Lead Co., 225 F.2d 427, 431 (9th Cir.) ("The only way
of ascertaining whether the business was more profitable in one year than another is by comparing the net profits for one
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In general, the two types of damages recoverable are lost net profits and injury
to or destruction of the value of the business. The cases are split as to whether these
two types of damages are duplicative, 494 or distinct.495 Courts have identified three
traditional measures of damages:496 (1) the before and after approach, which com-
pares a plaintiffs profit or loss in two distinct time periods, using his own business
and its performance to calculate damages; 497 (2) the yardstick theory, which compares
the plaintiff's profits during the period of the unlawful conduct to the profits of a
similar company that was not adversely affected by the unlawful conduct;498 and (3)
the market share theory, which calculates the market share lost by plaintiff in dollars,
multiplying that dollar volume by plaintiff's profit margin.
A handful of United States Supreme Court opinions in the antitrust area establish
the principle that damages need not be calculated with absolute exactness; an
approximation based upon a reasonable basis of computation is adequate. A defendant
whose wrongful conduct has rendered difficult the ascertainment of the plaintiff's
precise damages is not entitled to complain that damages cannot be measured with the
same precision as would otherwise be possible. Once the fact of damage has been
shown, a lesser measure of proof is necessary to establish the amount of damages. 499
year with another."), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 915 (1955) ; Holleb & Co. v. Produce Terminal Cold Storage Co., 1975-2
Trade Cas. (CCH) 60,436 (N.D. 11. 1975) (lost net profits and not gross profits is the proper measure of damages;
plaintiff's proof of lost gross sales was insufficient); Umphres v. Shell Oil Co., 1973-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 74,709 (S.D.
Tex. 1973); Peter v. Union Oil Co., 328 F. Supp. 998, 1003 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (collecting the cases that have rejected
"the premise that gross profits are the measure of damages in antitrust cases. No case has yet so held.").
494. Pierce v. Ramsey Winch Co., 753 F.2d 416, 429 n. 15 (5th Cir. 1985); Farmington Dowl Prods. Co. v. Forster
Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d 61, 81 (1st Cir. 1969); Graphic Prods. Distribs. v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 1579 (1 th Cir. 1983);
Malley-Duff & Assocs. v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 734 F.2d 133, 148 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 564 (1984); C.A.
May Marine Supply Co. v. Brunswick Corp., 649 F.2d 1049, 1053 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1125 (1981);
American Anodco, Inc. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 743 F.2d 417, 424 (6th Cir. 1984); Guilfoil, Damage Determinations
in Private Antitrust Suits, 42 NomE DAME LAw. 647, 654-55 (1967).
495. Wilder Enters. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 632 F.2d 1135, 1142 (4th Cir. 1980); Bonjomo v. Kaiser
Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 518 F. Supp. 102, 110-13 (E.D. Pa. 1981), modified, 559 F. Supp. 922 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
496. See generally Faruki, The Practical Use of Motions to Structure a Complex Civil Case, 41 Outo Sr. L.J. 107,
131-34 (1980); Hoyt, Dahl & Gibson, Comprehensive Models for Assessing Lost Profits to Antitrust Plaintiffs, 60 Mem.
L. REv. 1233 (1976); Rulon, Proof of Damages for Terminated or Precluded Plaintiffs, 49 Anoimusr L.J. 153 (1981);
Symposium on Proof of Damages in Private Antitrust Litigation, 49 Amrmusr L.J. 123 (1980) (containing an article
regarding damages for distributors).
497. See, e.g., Builders Windows v. Ceco Steel Prods. Corp., 209 F. Supp. 376, 379 (N.D. Ill. 1962) ("One
recognized method of measuring prospective profits is the profit plaintiff made under the contract which was breached
during a period prior to its breach.").
498. See, e.g., Fargo Glass & Paint Co. v. Globe Am. Corp., 201 F.2d 534, 540-41 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 345
U.S. 942 (1953), in which the plaintiff said that the defendant Globe American Corp. cancelled plaintiff's distributorship
contract and arranged to sell its (Globe's) entire output of gas ranges to the Maytag Co. for resale by the Maytag Co. The
district court had found that Maytag made a net profit from resale of Globe's ovens, and entered judgment for treble that
amount. The court of appeals held that the damages awarded to the plaintiff were "improperly measured":
The profits made by Maytag are not the proper measure of plaintiff's damages. There is no evidence to justify
the assumption that plaintiff would have sold the same number of Globe ranges that Maytag sold, or that it would
have realized the same profit on sales it made. The record is silent as to the comparative cost of doing business
by Maytag and plaintiff. Damages to be recoverable must be actual not speculative, remote or uncertain.
Id. This quotation emphasizes the key requirement of the yardstick theory: the yardstick must be comparable to the
plaintiff's business.
499. "The general rules relating to antitrust damages are easy to state, but difficult to apply." Copper Liquor v.
Adolph Coors Co., 506 F.2d 934, 953 (5th Cir. 1975). The Supreme Court decisions are J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler
Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557, 565-67 (1981); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, 395 U.S. 100, 114 n.9, 123
(1969); Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 U.S. 251,264-65 (1946); Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper
Co., 282 U.S. 555, 562-63 (1931); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 378-79 (1927).
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Flinkote Co. v. Lysfiord,500 summarized the three common types of evidence used to
prove damages:
There are three chief types of evidence which the decisions have approved as the basis for
the award of damages. (1) Business records of the plaintiff or his predecessor before the
conspiracy arose. (2) Business records of comparative but unrestrained enterprises during
the particular period in question. (3) Expert opinion based on items (1) or (2).50
These principles have been applied in terminated dealer litigation. In Joseph E.
Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd.,502 the Ninth Circuit
examined a terminated distributor's proof of damages, finding it insufficient and
speculative because based upon unwarranted assumptions.5 0 3 The Court noted:
"Plaintiff's charts are 'an array of figures conveying a delusive impression of
exactness in an area where a jury's common sense is less available than usual to
protect it'. . . . They should not have been admitted."5 4 The rule that the plaintiff
is not required to prove the amount of damages with mathematical certainty "does not
mean that the door is open to present to a jury the kind of rampant speculation that
went to the jury in this case." 505 Although the above cases are antitrust actions, the
same general damages principles have been applied in breach of contract actions.5 06
Damages for breach of contract begin with the familiar rule that the nonbreaching
party is entitled to be placed in as good a position as it would have been in the absence
of the breach. This principle applies in termination of distributorship agreements.5 07
The leading case on the calculation of damages in a terminated dealer action is the
opinion of the Fifth Circuit in C.A. May Marine Supply Co. v. Brunswick Corp.5 0 8
In this action under the Wisconsin dealer protection statute, the court set forth the
applicable principles of damage calculation, distinguishing between the lost profits
(and the "yardstick" and "before and after" theories to calculate them) and the loss
of going concern value as measures of recovery.509 Interestingly, the court used the
The lower courts still reverse speculative damage awards, despite the language about lesser standards of proof. See, e.g.,
Eximco, Inc. v. Trane Co., 737 F.2d 505, 512-13 (5th Cir. 1984) (evidence insufficient to support $900,000 damage
award to distributor); Kestenbaum v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 575 F.2d 564, 569 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
909 (1979).
500. 246 F.2d 368 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 835 (1957).
501. Id. at 392 (footnotes omitted). Further, one who bears the burden of proof must present the materials to the court
in usable form. Zell-Aire, Inc. v. Zell-Aire Corp., 684 F.2d 174, 175-76 (1st Cir. 1982).
502. 416 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970).
503. Id. at 85-87.
504. Id. at 87 (quoting Herman Schwabe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 297 F.2d 906, 912 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 369 U.S. 865 (1962)),followed in Eiberger v. Sony Corp. of Am., 622 F.2d 1068, 1083 (2d Cir. 1980). Accord
Contemporary Mission v. Famous Music Corp., 557 F.2d 918, 928 (2d Cir. 1977) (breach of contract case, applying New
York law); Gray v. Shell Oil Co., 469 F.2d 742, 749-50 (9th Cir. 1972) (antitrust action), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 943
(1973).
505. 416 F.2d 71, 87 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970). However, a directed verdict against the
plaintiff on the amount of damages is proper only in the most unusual circumstances. Graphic Prods. Distribs. v. Itek
Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 1579 n.36 (11th Cir. 1983).
506. Contemporary Mission v. Famous Music Corp., 557 F.2d 918, 926 (2d Cir. 1977).
507. Taute v. Econo-Car Int'l, 414 F.2d 828, 831 (9th Cir. 1969). In considering damages for breach of franchise
agreements, the Eleventh Circuit stated that "disgorgement of profits earned is not the remedy for breach of contract."
Burger King Corp. v. Mason, 710 F.2d 1480, 1494 (11th Cir. 1983).
508. 649 F.2d 1049, 1053-54 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1125 (1981).
509. Id. at 1053.
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concept of foreseeability to limit the recovery of damages for destruction of the
business; the court stated that the manufacturer "could not have foreseen that collapse
of the entire business would result from nonrenewal of one product line." 510 It also
expressed a preference for calculation of the lost future profits by the before and after
approach, rather than the yardstick approach, since the plaintiff dealer "was an
ongoing business with a profit record.- 51' However, even a money-losing business
can recover an award of lost profits; a plaintiff could have either suffered a loss or
made a profit and still have been injured by unlawful conduct.5 12
The cases reach various results concerning the length of time for which damages
may be awarded.51 3 In cases in which the required notice of termination was not
given, some decisions have held that damages are recoverable only for the period of
notice. 514
In conclusion, the recovery of damages in a terminated dealer action is governed
by the same general rules that apply to the recovery of damages in other types of
cases. Damages must be proved with reasonable certainty; neither their existence nor
their amount may be speculative.
510. Id.
511. Id.
512. Jay Edwards, Inc. v. New Eng. Toyota Distrib., 708 F.2d 814, 819-20 (Ist Cir.) (in action by auto dealership
against regional distributor of automobiles for violation of New Hampshire statutory equivalent of federal Dealers' Day
in Court Act, jury verdict of over $1.4 million plus prejudgment interest was reduced by $950,000 and remanded for
recalculation of prejudgment interest; although the damage award for period of distributorship reflected annual profits
proportionately far greater than dealership ever made or its competitors achieved, amount of award did not exceed any
rational estimate that could be based upon evidence in the record), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 894 (1983); Graphic Prods.
Distribs. v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 1582 (11th Cir. 1983) ("A business need not have been operating at a profit in
order to recover lost future profits."); Allegheny Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. Mid At. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 690 F.2d
411,415 n.4 (4th Cir. 1982); Buono Sales v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 449 F.2d 715,720 (3d Cir. 1971) ("Even a business
which has suffered a net loss before the breach is entitled to damages if the breach deprives it of additional revenue which
it could have used to help defray its overhead expenses."). Compare Universal Lite Distribs. v. Northwest Indus., 602
F.2d 1173, 1175-76 (4th Cir. 1979) (reversing award of lost profits from termination of distributorship because of
insufficiency of evidence of lost profits) with Spray-Rite Serv. Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 684 F.2d 1226, 1240-44 (7th Cir.
1982) (affirming judgment entered on jury verdict of $3.5 million in distributorship action, and reviewing admissibility
of expert damage testimony and method of calculation of damages), aff'd on other grounds, 465 U.S. 752 (1984). The
court also held that "disaggregation" of damages according to each illegal practice was not required. Id. at 1243. Cf.
Litton Sys. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 700 F.2d 785, 825 (2d Cir. 1983) ("AT&T correctly points out that courts have
held that damage studies are inadequate when only some of the conduct complained of is found to be wrongful and the
damage study cannot be disaggregated."), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1073 (1984).
513. Compare Jay Edwards, Inc. v. New Eng. Toyota Distrib., 708 F.2d 814, 822-23 (1st Cir.) (damages for lost
profits could not be awarded for period after plaintiffs supplier had ceased to be automobile distributor), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 894 (1983), with Borger v. Yamaha Int'l Corp., 625 F.2d 390, 398 (2d Cir. 1980) ("Accordingly, recovery is
generally limited to damages suffered to the date of filing the complaint, although in an appropriate case, the trial court
may permit supplementation of the complaint to allow for recovery of damages up to the time of trial." (citations omitted))
and Westman Comm'n Co. v. Hobart Corp., 541 F. Supp. 307 (D. Colo. 1982) (permitting recovery of lost "follow-on
sales" up to the last day of trial).
514. Sierra Wine & Liquor Co. v. Heublein, Inc., 626 F.2d 129, 131-32 (9th Cir. 1980) (where reasonable notice
of termination was required but not given, six months' lost profits awarded); JBL Enters. v. Jhirmack Enters., 519 F.
Supp. 1084 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (agreement said either party could terminate on thirty days written notice; plaintiff's damages
limited to lost profits during period from date of alleged breach (October 1979) to effective date of termination (January
1980), aff'd, 698 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 829 (1983); Des Moines Blue Ribbon Distribs. v. Drewrys
Ltd., 256 Iowa 899, 129 N.W.2d 731 (1964) (damages based on profit on sales plaintiff would have made during period
of time after receipt of notice of termination).
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B. Injunctive Relief
When a distributor decides to seek injunctive relief against termination, the
preliminary injunction is all important. If the dealer loses that motion (and usually he
will, if only because damages are an adequate remedy at law), the status quo prior to
litigation will not be preserved and a future permanent injunction is meaningless and
inappropriate. Therefore this section explores the law of injunctive relief, focusing
upon the motion for preliminary injunction, 515 which in a terminated dealer action is
very much like specific performance. 516 In essence the dealer plaintiff wants specific
performance of certain provisions of the distributor agreement. In an injunction action
the plaintiff dealer usually argues that it is an innocent party threatened with
destruction, relying upon cases which hold that the necessary requirement of irrep-
arable harm is shown if the defendant's actions threaten the loss or destruction of the
plaintiff's business.5 17
Nevertheless, "a moving party possesses an adequate remedy at law if the act
at issue threatens only a disruption in an ongoing business, and not its destruc-
tion. "518 The plaintiff distributor usually argues that its survival is at stake and that
a permanent injunction alone would be too late to save it. Yet the Seventh and Eighth
Circuits have dealt with such a "now or never" argument, rejecting the proposition
that the plaintiff has no realistic hope of relief in damages if a preliminary injunction
is wrongfully denied, reasoning that one who cuts off a dealer during litigation does
so "at its own risk.'5 19 Further, the cases holding that the threatened loss or
destruction of a distributor's business constitutes irreparable injury are predicated
upon the idea that the lost goodwill and business are difficult to prove and to quantify
515. See FED. R. Civ. P. 65.
516. The leading case considering specific performance in the context of a distributor termination is Guinness-Harp
Corp. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 613 F.2d 468, 470-73 (2d Cir. 1980), which affirmed the grant of a preliminary
mandatory injunction against termination of a beer distributorship, pending arbitration between the parties under a
distributorship agreement. The court recognized that "an injunction against termination of the distributorship prior to
arbitration" and "specific performance of the arbitration agreement prior to termination" were "merely different legal
theories for the same relief." Id. at 472 n.5. The court held that specific performance was appropriate in that situation.
Id. at 473. In contrast, Copylease Corp. of Am. v. Memorex Corp., 408 F. Supp. 758 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) held that under
California law the provision in a contract granting an exclusive territory "is not in itself an adequate basis" for the award
of specific performance of the contract, and that both the availability of damages, and the difficulties of enforcing a
contract that requires cooperation between the parties could be sufficient to bar the award of specific performance. Id. at
759-60.
517. The leading case is Semmes Motors v. Ford Motor Co., 429 F.2d 1197, 1205 (2d Cir. 1970). Semmes has been
limited to its facts by subsequent cases. Jack Kahn Music Co. v. Baldwin Piano & Organ Co., 604 F.2d 755 (2d Cir.
1979); Grand Light & Supply Co. v. Honeywell, Inc., 80 F.R.D. 699, 701 n.4 (D. Conn. 1978) (denying preliminary
injunction in terminated dealer action; limited Semmes to termination of sole product). Yet Semmes retains some vitality.
Roso-Lino Beverage Distribs. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 749 F.2d 124, 126 (2d Cir. 1984) (irreparable harm found from
loss of distributorship representing many years of work and livelihood of husband and wife). See also Guinness-Harp
Corp. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 613 F.2d 468, 473 (2d Cir. 1980); Jacobson & Co. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 548 F.2d
438, 441 n.3 (2d Cir. 1977); Interphoto Corp. v. Minolta Corp., 417 F.2d 621, 622 (2d Cir. 1969); Janmort Leasing v.
Econo-Car Int'l, 475 F. Supp. 1282, 1294-95 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); Supermarket Servs. v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 382 F.
Supp. 1248, 1256-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
518. Newport Tire & Rubber Co. v. Tire & Battery Corp., 504 F. Supp. 143, 150 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (case tried by
author) (emphasis in original).
519. Rittmiller v. Blex Oil, Inc., 624 F.2d 857, 861-62 (8th Cir. 1980). Accord Alpha Distrib. Co. v. Jack Daniel's
Distillery, 207 F. Supp. 136, 138 (N.D. Cal. 1961) (a distributorship includes an "implied realization that it cannot last
forever"), aff'd, 304 F.2d 451 (9th Cir. 1962).
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after termination. 520 Although damages for lost goodwill are difficult to quantify, 521
damages suffered by a distributor that was unlawfully terminated are not impossible
to quantify.
A subtle and usually overlooked point is whether an adequate remedy at law
means simply an available remedy in damages. Put another way, are "adequacy" and
"availability" of a remedy in damages equivalent concepts? 22 The better authorities
have held that since damages are calculable for lost profits or injury to the value of
a business, an adequate remedy at law in damages precludes the grant of injunctive
relief. The only exception to this rule should be instances in which the agreement
between the parties itself contains provisions for termination and an injunction is
issued restraining termination until those procedures are followed.5 23
In addition to these problems with the fundamental requirement of irreparable
harm, problems with respect to enforceability of preliminary injunctions exist. The
courts are reluctant to issue preliminary injunctions which in effect give to either party
any distributorship rights for a long period of time because a distributorship, akin to
a personal services contract, requires the cooperation of the parties and the personal
efforts of the dealer. For example, one court denied a mandatory preliminary
injunction to compel a bedding trademark licensor to allow a licensee to manufacture
bedding, reasoning that rather than seeking to freeze the status quo, the licensee was
seeking a permanent position through litigation. 524 In strong terms, the Second Circuit
has expressed concern about the use of preliminary mandatory injunctions to enjoin
the termination of dealerships on antitrust grounds. The court stated that "the granting
of such a preliminary mandatory injunction amounts as a practical matter, as here, to
freezing plaintiffs revocable and hence temporary dealership into a dealership
non-revocable for a substantial period."5 2 5 The court recognized the undesirability
of the situation in which the manufacturer "will be frozen into an intimate and
520. John B. Hull, Inc. v. Waterbury Petroleum Prods., 588 F.2d 24, 29 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 960
(1979).
521. Agricultural Servs. Ass'n v. Ferry-Morse Seed Co., 551 F.2d 1057, 1070-72 (6th Cir. 1977) (in breach of
warranty action, reversing as clearly erroneous a magistrate's findings with respect to damages for loss of goodwill). See
also the authorities collected in Schwartz v. NMS Indus., 575 F.2d 553, 554 n.I (5th Cir. 1978).
522. See, e.g., Luis Rosario, Inc. v. Amana Refrigeration, 733 F.2d 172, 174 (1st Cir. 1984) (in a suit under Puerto
Rico Dealer's Act, court affirmed denial of preliminary injunction; dealer could be compensated by damages); American
Can Co. v. A.B. Dick Co., 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 165,751 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) at p. 69,830 (plaintiff "has not shown
that the effects of the claimed breach on its business are of sufficient magnitude to remove it from the rule that irreparable
injury means injury for which monetary damages cannot adequately compensate a plaintiff, entitling it to preliminary
relief.").
523. Guinness-Harp Corp. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 613 F.2d 468, 472-73 (2d Cir. 1980).
524. Rittmiller v. Blex Oil, Inc., 624 F.2d 857, 861 n.4 (8th Cir. 1980) ("The availability of treble damage relief
is an important consideration, however, weighing against granting an interlocutory injunction."); Ohio-Scaly Mattress
Mfg. Co. v. Duncan, 548 F. Supp. 75 (N.D. lI. 1982) (also stating that the availability of treble damages under the
antitrust laws was an important factor weighing against a finding of irreparable harm and inadequacy of legal remedies),
appeal dismissed, 714 F.2d 740 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1044 (1984).
525. Jack Kahn Music Co. v. Baldwin Piano & Organ Co., 604 F.2d 755, 757 (2d Cir. 1979) (emphasis added).
See also two recent opinions by Circuit Judge Posner, in which the Seventh Circuit has reviewed extensively the law of
preliminary injunctions in antitrust and distributorship cases. Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., 749 F.2d 380 (7th Cir.
1984); General Leaseways v. National Truck Leasing Ass'n., 744 F.2d 588 (7th Cir. 1984). These cases were further
explained by Judge Posner in his opinion articulating the tests for a preliminary injunction as an arithmetic formula.
American Hosp. Supply v. Hospital Prods. Ltd., 780 F.2d 589 (7th Cir. 1985).
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continuous relationship with a dealer it no longer wishes to be associated with." 5 26
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit has recognized that "the injunction has the effect of
forcing these antagonistic parties to maintain their relationship indefinitely and
requiring the continuous supervision of the district court." 5 27 In addition, the courts
are very reluctant to use the tool of a preliminary injunction to make orders with
respect to monetary payments between parties. 528
The best exposition of the problems of the use of injunctions to prevent
termination of distributorships, contained in Autowest, Inc. v. Peugeot, Inc., recog-
nized that the "galling harness of an injunction cannot create teamwork. '"529 The
Second Circuit has had the most occasions to consider the propriety of the issuance
of a preliminary injunction in a terminated distributorship context. Jackson Dairy v.
H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc.5 30 reversed the grant of a preliminary injunction in an action
by a distributor against a manufacturer alleging breach of an exclusive distributorship
agreement.5 3l The Second Circuit held that the plaintiff distributor failed to demon-
strate that money damages would not be adequate compensation for the claimed
breach of the agreement, reaffirming the principle that "where money damages is
adequate compensation a preliminary injunction will not issue." 532 "Clearly, money
would be adequate compensation for the loss of [certain customers], or other business
if Jackson demonstrates that Hood breached its contract with Jackson." 5 33 Finally,
the court also held that the alleged harm concerning disruption of the plaintiff's sales
and delivery relations with its customers and suppliers would "be rather readily
compensable in monetary damages." '534
A few months after Jackson Dairy, the Second Circuit in Jack Kahn Music Co.
v. Baldwin Piano & Organ Co. ,535 reversed the grant of a mandatory preliminary
526. Jack Kahn Music Co. v. Baldwin Piano & Organ Co., 604 F.2d 755, 764 (2d Cir. 1979). Accord Luis Rosario,
Inc. v. Amana Refrigeration, 733 F.2d 172, 174 (1st Cir. 1984) (an injunction requiring defendant to sell to plaintiff on
a non-exclusive basis would "rewrite" the parties' contract and "would automatically make Amana's substitute dealership
arrangments [sic] non-exclusive as well."). Cf. N.A. Sales Co. v. Chapman Indus. Corp., 736 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1984)
(manufacturer could be held in contempt and fined for violation of injunction by selling its product in violation of exclusive
distributorship agreement).
527. Corenswet, Inc. v. Amana Refrigeration, 594 F.2d 129, 134 (5th Cir.) (quoting Refrigeration Eng'g Corp. v.
Frick Co., 370 F. Supp. 702, 715 (W.D. Tex. 1974)), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 938 (1979):
[D]ifficulty of enforcement is, in itself, often a sufficient reason for denying injunctive relief. The Court should
not be called upon to weld together two business entities which have shown a propensity for disagreement,
friction, and even adverse litigation. (citations onitted).
Id. at 134 n.3. See also In re Arthur Treaecher's Franchisee Litig., 689 F.2d 1137, 1144-45 (3d Cir. 1982) (no preliminary
injunction should be used for payment of past royalties because it would grant the franchisor virtually all its damages);
Corbin v. Texaco, Inc., 690 F.2d 104, 105 (6th Cir. 1982) (an order modifying preliminary injunction to reduce amount
of rent that retailer was obligated by contract to pay, was reversed; purpose of preliminary injunction is to maintain status
quo, and not to alter the prior status).
528. See, e.g., Autowest, Inc. v. Peugeot, Inc., 287 F. Supp. 718, 720 (E.D.N.Y. 1966).
529. Id.
530. 596 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1979).
531. The 1967 distributorship agreement in that case gave the distributor an exclusive territory of Vermont and New
Hampshire. Id. at 71.
532. Id. at 72.
533. Id. (footnote omitted).
534. Id. at 73.
535. 604 F.2d 755 (2d Cir. 1979). See Note, The Irreparable Harm Requirement for Preliminary Injunctive Relief
in Antitrust Distributor Termination Cases: Jack Kahn Music Co. v. Baldwin Piano & Organ Co. and the Wholesaler-
Retailer Distinction, 61 B.U.L. Rav. 507 (1981).
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injunction in an antitrust action seeking to enjoin a manufacturer from cancelling a
retail dealership in pianos, organs, and other musical instruments.5 36 The Second
Circuit held (1) that the requirement of irreparable harm was not satisfied on the
theory of an incalculable effect of the termination on the public and on the dealer's
goodwill;537 (2) that the injuries alleged were compensable in damages; 538 and (3) that
despite the language in earlier cases appearing to support the issuance of injunctions
in dealership cases, there is still a "basis requirement in all cases in equity that there
must be proof that there is no adequate remedy at law. 539
Although in one subsequent opinion the Second Circuit distinguished Jack Kahn
Music on the ground that the distributorship in Jack Kahn Music was not the
foundation of the plaintiff's business, 540 both Jack Kahn Music and Jackson Dairy
continue to be the leading cases concerning the availability of injunctive relief in
terminated distributorship situations in the federal courts. 541 Although there are
certainly cases upholding the issuance of injunctions in distributorship situations, 42
the lower court cases have usually denied preliminary injunctions to terminated
distributors. While the cases present a variety of fact situations, these courts usually
express concern about forcing reluctant parties to deal with one another, and about the
necessity for and the inability of the courts to provide supervision. For example, one
court held that a preliminary injunction seeking to prevent the manufacturer from
terminating a franchise would be denied, even though the plaintiff had been a
distributor of the corporate defendant's products for approximately thirty years,
because "it will be apparent that the plaintiff seeks to induce the court to direct pro
tanto, the operations of the defendants' business, which is a large undertaking and
536. In its letter of termination, the manufacturer assured the plaintiff dealer that the manufacturer would continue
to supply instruments necessary to meet sales commitments which the plaintiff obtained on bids submitted before the date
of termination. 604 F.2d 755, 761. Such a move is both fair dealing and wise precaution.
537. Id. at 761-63. Accord Buckingham Corp. v. Karp, 762 F.2d 257, 261-63 (2d Cir. 1985).
538. Jack Kahn Music Co. v. Baldwin Piano & Organ Co., 604 F.2d 755, 759, 763 (2d. Cir. 1979).
539. Id. at 762.
540. Guinness-Harp Corp. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 613 F.2d 468, 473 (2d Cir. 1980) ("In contrast to the
situation in Kahn Music Co. v. Baldwin Piano & Organ Co ... the Schlitz distributorship was a basic element of
Guinness' business and represented a business relationship of long-standing duration."). Accord American Can Co. v.
A.B. Dick Co., 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,751 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
541. Although there are few reported cases, the state cases are in agreement with these principles. One of the leading
cases is Thayer Plymouth Center v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 255 Cal. App. 2d 300, 63 Cal. Rptr. 148 (1967), which
reversed the grant of a preliminary injunction enjoining an automobile manufacturer from terminating a dealership
agreement. The Thayer opinion contains one of the best discussions of the law of preliminary injunctions and specific
performance as it applies to termination of dealership agreements. Among other points, the court held that an agreement
"which requires a continuing series of acts and demands cooperation between the parties for the successful performance
of those acts is not subject to specific performance." Id. at 303, 63 Cal. Rptr. 148, 150. Neither preliminary nor permanent
injunctive relief preventing termination of an exclusive distributorship contract will be granted where such an injunction
would in effect specifically enforce the dealership agreement, and "would require a manufacturer to entrust the marketing
of its products in a wide area to a distributor with whom a relationship of confidence and cooperation has been rendered
impossible by reason of the pendency of the lawsuit." Id. at 304, 63 Cal. Rptr. 148, 151. An adequate remedy at law
in damages existed; the dealer could recover damages for breach of the agreement. Id. at 305-06, 63 Cal. Rptr. 148,
151-52.
542. See, e.g., Gerard v. Almouli, 746 F.2d 936 (2d Cir. 1984) (affirming preliminary injunction requiring
defendant to comply with terms of exclusive dealer agreement despite the Jackson Dairy opinion of that circuit); Trabert
& Hoefer, Inc. v. Piaget Watch Corp., 633 F.2d 477, 483 (7th Cir. 1980) (a powerful name brand trademark which
supported finding of harm from loss of the line and the value of a nationally advertised franchise was a matter of general
recognition); R&G Affiliates v. Knoll Int'l, 587 F. Supp. 1395 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (in almost all of the decisions enjoining
a threatened dealership termination, the distributorship represented a substantial portion of the plaintiff's business).
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would be justified only under the most exigent of circumstances." 543 "The court
should hesitate before granting a preliminary injunction which would require 'defen-
dants to indefinitely entrust the marketing of their product in a wide area to a
distributor with whom a relationship of confidence and cooperation has become
impossible. '544 The trial courts have also repeatedly held that there was an adequate
remedy at law in damages, and that irreparable harm was not shown because the
injury was compensable in money damages.5 45 Yet these principles are difficult to
apply.546
V. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this Article is to review the factors underlying the strategic
decisions in terminated distributorship litigation. Analysis of these issues will help to
avoid mistakes frequently made by terminated distributors such as (1) failures to write
to the manufacturer about problems experienced by the dealer (too often the distrib-
utor relies upon oral communications with the manufacturer and its representatives);
(2) overreliance in the dealer's business on one line of product, rather than reduction
of the distributor's need for one manufacturer by handling alternative lines; (3) futile
attempts to avoid an arbitration agreement which result in the distributor's loss of time
and money in litigating whether its claims must be arbitrated; and (4) the distributor's
greed in pursuit of both injunctive relief and damages, when usually only one type of
relief is appropriate.
Manufacturers make mistakes such as failing to have a written distributor
agreement, or to have one that addresses all of the issues necessary to the proper
structure of a distribution system; and ignorance of the provisions of their own dealer
agreements when they do have such agreements.
543. George W. Warner & Co. v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 167 F. Supp. 860, 863 (E.D.N.Y. 1958), rev'd on
other grounds, 277 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1960). Accord Fuchs Sugars & Syrups v. Amstar Corp., 380 F. Supp. 441,445
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) (denying a motion for a preliminary injunction to reinstate a distributorship agreement because the
product would be less effectively sold by plaintiffs, whose interests were now clearly adverse to those of defendants).
544. Deltown Foods v. Tropicana Prods., 219 F. Supp. 887, 891 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (quoting Alpha Distrib. Co. v.
Jack Daniel's Distillery, 207 F. Supp. 136, 138 (N.D. Cal. 1961), aff'd per curiam, 304 F.2d 451 (9th Cir. 1962)).
Accord Supermarket Servs. v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 382 F. Supp. 1248, 1257 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Lutz v. ChryslerCorp.,
1973-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 74,771 (W.D. Mo. 1973) (denying a preliminary injunction to an automobile dealer because
its effect would be to continue a complex day by day relationship involving not only automobile sales, but adjustment of
warranties, advertising expenses, and other matters); Alpha Distrib. Co. v. Jack Daniel's Distillery, 207 F. Supp. 136,
138 (N.D. Cal. 1961) (court would not grant preliminary injunction which would have the effect of "requiring defendants
to indefinitely entrust the marketing of their product in a wide area to a distributor with whom a relationship of confidence
and cooperation has become impossible"), aff'd, 304 F.2d 451 (9th Cir. 1962).
545. American Can Co. v. A.B. Dick Co., 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 165,751 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (evidence showed
loss of income, compensable in damages); Paint Prods. Co. v. Dutch Boy, Inc., 1980-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) T 63,497 (D.
Conn. 1980) (denying motion for preliminary injunction; plaintiff's chief executive officer admitted that cost of losing
entire Dutch Boy line of paints was calculable in dollars); Bridgeport Convertibles v. Castro Convertible Corp., 1978-1
Trade Cas. (CCH) T 61,954 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (availability of alternate sources of supply negated finding of irreparable
harm).
546. Compare Two Wheel Corp. v. American Honda Corp., 506 F. Supp. 806 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (granting
preliminary injunction), with Newport Tire & Rubber Co. v. Tire & Battery Corp., 504 F. Supp. 143 (E.D.N.Y. 1980)
(denying preliminary injunction). The author represented the defendant in the latter case.
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A Practitioner's Checklist of Facts and Questions
to be Reviewed with Client
It is useful to set forth the list of points that the author uses to review with a client
contemplating a prospective dealership termination or nonrenewal:
(1) location and territory of dealership;
(2) date of dealer agreement and modifications;
(3) applicable state statutes;
(4) reasons for the proposed termination:
(a) why is the dealer a problem?
(b) for how long has it been?
(c) violations of dealer agreement?
(d) sales performance?
(i) is it declining?
(ii) how does client measure poor performance?
(e) financial condition and credit problems;
(f) dealer personnel problems/tumover,
(5) what does client wish to do?
(a) termination/nonrenewal;
(b) credit restrictions;
(c) reduction of territory;
(d) national accounts;
(e) replacement with another dealer;
(6) litigation evaluation:
(a) likelihood of litigation;
(b) will termination force dealer out of business?
(i) other competing lines;
(ii) percent of volume/profit of the dealer composed of this product line or
brand;
(iii) dealer's financial condition;
(c) recent meetings/conversations with dealer;
(i) discussion of litigation;
(ii) what has dealer been told concerning performance or termination;
(iii) analysis of dealer's explanations or excuses;
(iv) documentation of meetings/conversations by letters to the dealer or
memoranda to the file;
(d) complaints about dealer from customers or other dealers;
(e) has the client engaged in the following practices:
(i) disparagement of dealer's operations to potential customers;
(ii) threatened litigation with dealer;
(iii) taking customers or sales away from dealer;
(iv) withholding commissions claimed by dealer;
(v) hiring away dealer's personnel or encouraging them to set up another
dealership;
(vi) talking to other dealers about potential termination of this dealer,
(vii) any conduct which would reduce dealer profits.
(7) Discussion of the following steps to be taken:
(a) review of dealer agreement and modifications to it;
(b) review of manufacturer's files regarding this dealer;
(c) examination of the termination as justified for the following reasons:
(i) increase in sales and market penetration;
(ii) relief of manufacturer from ineffective distributor;
(iii) provision of better service to customers;
(iv) reduction of credit risk by ridding manufacturer of undercapitalized or
financially weak or unsound distributor;
(d) meeting with dealer to describe to it the problems of the dealership, followed
up with a letter to the dealer documenting those points;
(e) if a decision is made in favor of nonrenewal or termination, then give
maximum notice required by dealer agreement or by applicable statute,
whichever is longer.
